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SYNOPSIS
This study begins with an assessment of pre-war food 
production and consumption patterns in the Eastern Region of 
Nigeria. The nutritional vulnerabilities ensuing from the 
fundamental imbalance between reproductive and productive 
capacities in the region are outlined. This is followed by 
an analysis of pre-war politics in Nigeria. The factors which 
led to both the overthrow of the civilian regime and the collapse 
of military government into secession and civil war are discussed. 
The ensuing chapters are devoted to an analysis of the famine 
which resulted from the intersection of the socio-economic and 
political processes described above. First, the origins and 
development of the nutritional crisis are assessed,and linked 
to the pre-war food economy and political crises. Then, the 
efforts made by international humanitarian organizations to 
reduce the severity of the nutritional crisis are discussed, 
and the pernicious effects of political considerations on the 
relief operation are examined. Finally, the goals and per- 
ceptions which underlay the 'politics of hunger 1 are analysed. 
The thesis concludes with some remarks on the relationship of 
the Nigerian famine to episodes of mass starvation elsewhere in 
the Third World.
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INTRODUCTION
For two and one-half years, from mid-1967 until January 
1970, West Africa's most populous state, the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria, was convulsed by a Civil War, which followed upon 
the Eastern Region's attempt to break away from the remainder 
of the Federation and establish itself as an independent state. 
No other aspect of the conflict between Nigeria's Federal 
Military Government and the secessionist regime attracted more 
interest than the nutritional disaster which afflicted the 
civilian population in the war zone. For brief periods during 
the war, the concern and sympathy of virtually the entire 
international community were engaged by the spectacle of millions 
of men, women, and children starving to death in Eastern Nigeria. 
Indeed, efforts to relieve the plight of Eastern civilians 
eventually drew over 100 official and private aid organizations 
from all over the world into contact with the belligerents.
Bitter political antagonisms developed out of this nexus. 
The relief organizations' intense committment to their human- 
itarian mission, combined with the sense of urgency which 
infused their operations, brought them into conflict with the 
belligerent governments; each of which, in turn, attempted to 
use the nutritional crisis to justify and reinforce its own 
political position. The relief agencies were accused by the 
Federal government and its supporters, of wrapping political 
support for the secessionist cause in a cloak of humanitarianism. 
At the same time, the Biafran regime charged the agencies with 
abandonment of their humanitarian principles and obligations in 
the face of Federal opposition to their operations. The Biafran 
government was accused of cynically manipulating the world's
concern for the plight of Eastern Nigerians in order to gain 
advantage in its quest for international recognition and support; 
while the Federal Military Government was widely condemned for 
utilizing mass starvation as a weapon in its conflict with the 
Biafran regime*
This furious barrage of charge and counter-charge shed little 
light on the foundations of either the famine or the controversy 
which surrounded the relief operation. The primary objective of 
this thesis is to present - by relating both the nutritional crisis 
and the relief operation to their socio-political environment - an 
assessment of the causes of the famine and of the disputes regarding 
its alleviation.
The first chapter of the thesis is devoted to an examination 
of the socio-economic structure of the pre-war Eastern Region. Its 
primary emphasis is on the food economy of the region; and on the 
area's vulnerability to the ravages of mass hunger.
The second chapter focusses on Nigeria's pre-war political 
development. In the first section of the chapter the political 
processes which propelled the Nigerian Army into the political arena 
are examined. The second section contains an outline of the 
development of the perceptions and political objectives which under- 
lay the belligerents' participation in both the civil war and the 
politics of hunger.
The third chapter consists of a detailed analysis of the 
development of the nutritional crisis up to mid-1968. It will be 
shown that it was the intersection of pre-war socio-economic and 
political processes which triggered off the region's decline into 
mass starvation.
Chapters Four and Five are devoted to an assessment of the 
famine in the period following mid-1968. Chapter Four is focussed
on the development - from about mid-1968 - of international 
efforts to alleviate the ravages of mass starvation in the war
«
zone. Chapter Five presents an analysis of the politics of 
hunger, which effectively constrained those efforts, and hence 
were largely responsible for the prolongation of the nutritional 
crisis beyond mid-1968.
The sixth and concluding chapter of the thesis is devoted 
to an assessment of the relevance of the Nigerian experience of 
famine and relief for the study of nutritional disasters elsewhere 
in the world*
CHAPTER I
Food and Nutrition in the Pre-War
Eastern Region
There is little doubt that it was the series of political 
crises which preceded, and eventually culminated in, the Civil 
War which triggered off the nutritional crisis in the Eastern 
Region of Nigeria. The mass repatriation of Eastern migrants; 
the Federal blockade of the Eastern Region; and the 
operations of the belligerents 1 armies: all of these distorted 
both supply and demand functions in the regional food economy. 
In order to fully comprehend the nutritional impact of these 
political phenomena, however, it is essential first to understand 
the pressures, and responses thereto, which shaped the Eastern 
food economy and the region's nutritional standards in the pre- 
crisis period.
One characteristic dominates any assessment of the actual or 
potential status of human welfare in the pre-war Eastern Region - 
the pressure of population on available resources. The region's 
29,400 square miles of land area were occupied, at the last pre-war 
census conducted in 1962, by approximately 12,300,000 people: indi- 
cating an average density throughout the region of approximately Jfl8 
persons per square mile - one of the highest in all of Tropical 
Africa - and a 12% increase in total numbers during the period 
1952-62 A\
1. The land area of the Eastern Region is given in Floyd, B. 
Eastern Nigeria; A Geographical Review MacMillan (London, 1969), 
p.19. Population figures for the Eastern Region are rather less 
reliable, due to deliberate and inadvertent errors in the 1963 
census. Floyd cites both the official figures of 12,394,462 and 
Okonjo's estimate of 12,332,046. (p.37) Both of these indicated 
very high population increases in the period 1952-62: increases 
about which Floyd comments, "...the best explanation ror the 
phenomenal but highly improbable growth rates revealed in Table 
2.1 (72%) is to assume an under count at the time of the 1953 
census, when Nigeria was still under British rule and the census 
was associated with taxation, land acquisition, and military con- 
scription; and an overcount at the time of the 1963 census... 11 
(p.38) For further analysis of the accuracy of the 1963 census 
see Okonjo, C. "A Preliminary Medium Estimate of the 1962 Mid-Year 
Population in Nigeria" in Caldwell, J.C. and Okonjo. C. (eds.) The 
Population of Tropical Africa Longmans (London, 196o); Aluko, S.A. 
"How Many Nigerians..." Journal of Modern African Studies 3 (3) 
1965, pp.371-392; and Ekanem, I.I. The 1965 Nigerian Census: A 
Critical Approach Ethiope Publishing Co/(Benin City,' " 
Such rapid population growth is typical of Third World 
states. Indeed, it has often been cited as one of the primary 
reasons for the failure of underdeveloped countries to take off
2into sustained development. Rapid population growth, or high 
population densities, need not in themselves, however, inevitably 
deter the expansion of socio-economic welfare. They lead to 
overpopulation and impoverishment only when they engender a level 
of aggregate demand for goods and services which exceeds the 
productive capacity of society. In the West, for example, 
rapid population growth since the 18th century has not justified 
Malthus 1 belief that "Gigantic, inevitable famine stalks in the 
rear of misery and vice to limit the numbers of mankind. 11 
(In fact, the major problem confronting Western political economies 
in the 20th century has involved devising ways and means to 
fully utilize existing productive capacity.)
The fulfillment of Malthus 1 prophecies did loom over the 
pre-war Eastern Region. The rural populace, which accounted 
for all but 12.8% of the total regional population^, was almost
2. See, for example, Rostow, W.W. "The Take-Off into Sustained 
Growth" in Agarwala, A.N. and Singh, S.P. The Economics of Under- 
development Oxford University Press (London, 1958), pp.l5/f-l#6; 
and Bauer, P.T. and Yamey, B.S. The Economics of Underdeveloped 
Countries Cambridge University Press (Cambridge, 1957), Ch.5.
3. Cited in McCleary, G.F. The Malthusian Population Theory Faber 
and Faber, Ltd. (London, 1953)> P«19.
k. Floyd, op.cit.. pp.38-39 (Table 2.2.)
wholly engaged in predominantly non-commercial farming 'activities 
However, poor soils - in terms of both fragility and limited 
fertility - and largely untransformed traditional modes of pro- 
duction combined to constrain the growth of productivity and
5. Agricultural production accounted for 61.3% of the Eastern 
Region's GDP in 1963- Even in the period following, when the 
exploitation of petroleum resources in the East had commenced, 
agriculture contributed approximately ^0% of the regional output 
of goods and services, tFloyd, op.cit.. p.169; and Oyenuga, V.A, 
Agriculture in Nigeria; An Introduction FAO (Rome, 19§7)» P«21,
(Table 2.2) ;The devotion of the regional labour force to 
agriculture was even more intense - over 75% was engaged in 
agricultural occupations according to the 1963 census. (Federal 
Census Office Population Census of Nigeria 1963 (Eastern Nigeria) 
(Lagos, n.d.), Vol.2, p.lbb1 )
The bulk of agricultural endeavour was directed toward the 
cultivation of food crops grown for the cultivator's own con- 
sumption. Food crops grown for domestic uses accounted for 
over 7^% by value of the total regional agricultural production. 
The significance of such heavy emphasis on subsistence farming 
was noted by Floyd: "With the exceptionally high population levels 
for a territory of this size in Tropical Africa, this emphasis on 
subsistence food crops is understandable though it means that the 
greater share of the sweat and labour of rural residents goes on 
meeting daily dietary requirements, and fails to contribute to 
the earning of essential foreign capital for economic development 
through the export of cash crops." (Floyd, op.cit.. p.21 (Table 
2.2) and p.185)
output in the subsistence sector. The rapid expansion of 
population against such a relatively static supply base would 
undoubtedly have pitched much of the Eastern population into the 
Malthusian maelstrom except for the mediating influence of several 
behavioural patterns which developed in response to over population.
The most important of these involved migration out of the 
rural hinterland into urban centres both within and outside the
Eastern Region. Migration to the cities was a response to both
7 quantitative and qualitative overpopulation. It represented not
only a flight away from the deprivation common to rural life,,but
6. The poverty of the subsistence sector in the pre-war period was 
illustrated in a study of one group of villages in the Ibo Heart- 
land in 1964* Researchers found that average family incomes from 
all sources (including the value of food produced on family crop- 
lands for household consumption) amounted to only £N155«93 per 
annum (or an average per capita income of only £N26.12, which was 
less than the £N30 estimated to be the per capita income for the 
Nigerian Federation). (Oluwansanmi, H.A. et.al. Uboma; A Socio- 
Economic and Nutritional Survey of A Rural Community in Eastern 
Nigeria Geographical Publications (Bude^rCorhwall, 1966)"'.p.62)'
For an analysis of the physical constraints on subsistence 
agriculture in the East see Floyd, op.cit., and Oyenuga, op.cit. 
The socio-economic constraints on productivity, output, and income 
were inextricably bound up in the syncretism of Eastern society. 
'Traditional* aspects of the production system - such as communal 
forms of land tenure - limited the growth of productivity; while 
most developmental effort and funds were ploughed into cash cropping 
in response to the region's nexus with world capitalism. For a 
detailed discussion of the socio-economic constraints on Eastern 
agriculture see Smock, D.R. and Smock, A.C. Cultural and Political 
Aspects of Rural Transformation; A Case Study of Eastern Nigeria 
Praeger (New York, 1972); Eicher, O.K. and Liedholm, C. (eds.) 
Growth and Development of the Nigerian Economy Michigan State 
University Press (E. Lansing, Mich., 1970);and Helleiner, G.K. 
Peasant Agriculture, Government, and Economic Growth in Nigeria 
Richard D. Irwin, Inc. (Homewood, 111., 1966).
7. Overpopulation is not a wholly quantitative phenomenon. As 
Mabogunje says: "The operational definition [of populatfetion 
pressure], based on the simple idea of high density or high ratio 
of population to land, ignores the more vital variable of the 
standard of living or social well being which the people involved 
expect to derive from their resources." (Mabogunje, A.L. "A Typology 
of Population Pressure on Resources in West Africa" in Zelinsky, W., 
Leszek, A.K. and Prothero, R.M. Geography and a Crowding World 
Oxford University Press (London, 1970), p
8also the determination of a semi-educated proto-elite of school 
leavers to seize the economic opportunities and social mobility
o
which accrued to life in the urban centres. Even the growth 
of a large reserve army of unemployed or quasi-employed urban re- 
sidents did not deter prospective migrants. Lured on by the 
demonstration effect of the earliest migrants' success, and by 
the promise of security inherent in the social network of support
provided for the newly arrived immigrant by his kinsmen already
q established in the city , most of the young men in Eastern Nigeria
with primary or secondary education emigrated to urban centres.
Rural-to-urban migration had a two-fold impact on the 
Eastern food economy. First, it reduced the absolute burden of 
demand for food in the region. Even in those cases where migrants
8. Most analysts of the phenomenon of migration in the Third World 
have attributed it to the interaction of 'push 1 and f pull f factors. 
Hanna", in an illustration of the 'push 1 exerted by poverty and in- 
adequacy in the rural hinterland, cited the findings of a survey 
of urban Nigerians in which 69% of respondents indicated that 
achievement qf "improved or decent standards of living for self or 
family", "sufficient money to live better or to live decently11 , .or 
"relief from poverty" was their greatest aspiration. (Hanna, (New 
York, 1971), P-36). Nzimiro, on the other hand, emphasized the 
'pull' of urban life. He attributed Ibo geographical mobility to 
"the desire to seek for a new occupation among the educated elite." 
(Nzimiro, I. "A Study of Mobility Among the Ibos of Southern 
Nigeria" International Journal of Comparative Sociology 6 (1) 
1965, p. 12571
9. As an illustration of the operation of the extended family net- 
work in the urban environment, Gugler showed that, among a group of 
unskilled labourers and traders surveyed in Eastern Region cities, 
1+5% had at one time been employed by a relation or fellow villager; 
and Jf8% had found some sort of employment through one or the other 
of these contacts. (Gugler, J. "Eastern Nigerians in Town: Life 
in a Dual System" Cahiers d* Etudes Afric.ain.es 11 (1) 1971, p. 
(Table
10. See, for example, the evidence presented in Gugler, op.cit. . 
especially p. 411 (Table 4). For a general analysis of the urban- 
ization process in Nigeria see Mabogunje, A.L. Urbanization in 
Nigeria Africana Publishing Corp. (New York, 19661 ), especially
Chs.3-5.
Also see Okonjo, U. The Impact of Urbanization on the Ibo
Family Structure Gerhard Munch Of fsettdruck (GOttingen, 1970) 
pp. 74-75).
went only so far as urban centres within the Eastern Region, the 
total demand for locally produced food supplies was reduced 
because of the apparent propensity of urban residents to increase 
their consumption of imported foods. Perhaps the most important 
effect of urban migration, however, was that it resulted in an 
improved supply of animal proteins in the East.
The Eastern Region produced few animal proteins in the 
pre-war period. There was a small cattle-raising industry in 
the north-east corner of the region; and fishing in the Calabar 
and Rivers Provinces provided a limited source of animal protein. 
However, contrary to what one might have expected given this low 
level of production, students of nutrition in the pre-war period 
observed that per capita consumption of animal proteins in 
the East was greater than in any other region of Nigeria. These 
nutritionists argued that this was accounted for by the flow of 
cash remittances from migrants to their families in the East: a 
transfer of funds which provided the purchasing power that induced 
a massive influx of cattle from Northern Nigeria and fish from
11. See the urban consumer surveys conducted in Enugu in 1961/62 
and in Onitsha in 1963/6^f. (Federal Office of Statistics Urban 
Consumer Surveys in Nigeria (Lagos, n.d*)*
10
n p
Lake Chad, Scandinavia, and Iceland.
Care must be taken, however, not to translate the relative 
superiority of animal protein consumption in the East into an 
assumption that animal proteins made up a large proportion of 
total nutritional intake. * Indeed, just the opposite appears 
to have been true. Nutritional surveys made before the war 
indicated that animal proteins made a negligible quantitative 
contribution to Eastern diets. ^ The bulk of whatever protein 
was present in the diet - and daily protein deficiencies ranged
12. This argument was brought out in a seminar on the Nigerian Civil 
War held at Georgetown University in 1969. (Samuels, M.A.(ed.) The 
Nigeria Biafra Conflict; Report of A One-Day Conference The Centre 
for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University 
(Washington, DC, 1969), p«2). It was also stressed, in a conver- 
sation with the author, by Dr. R.G. Hendrickse, who was on the staff 
of the Institute of Child Health at the University of Ibadan in the 
period preceding and during the war. According to Dr. Hendrickse 
there was, prior to the war, ample clinical evidence that protein 
deficiencies in the Western Region exceeded those experienced in 
the East. He argued that this was largely due to the greater pur- 
chasing power, and hence greater access to marketed high protein 
foods, afforded Eastern residents as a result of remittances from 
Eastern migrants.
For details of animal protein imports in the pre-war period, 
see Aall, C. Relief, Nutrition,, and Health Problems in the Nigerian/ 
Biafran War (Unpublished manuscript, Ibadan, 1969), pp.5-7,and 40; 
and "Report of the Biafra Study Mission" Congressional Record 
(Senate) 91st Congress, 1st Session (Washington, 25 February 1969), 
Vol.115, No.33 (Hereafter referred to as the Goodell Report), pp. 
S1978 and S1980.
One indication of the flow of imported proteins into the tpre- 
war East was seen in the fact that following the Federal blockade 
of the East, Iceland - one of the Region's main suppliers of dried 
fish - was forced to devalue its currency. (Adler, R. "Letter from 
Biafra" New Yorker 4 October 1969).
13. It must be kept in mind that the relative superiority' of East- 
ern animal protein consumption was based on its comparison with ex- 
tremely low levels of animal protein consumption in the Western and 
Northern regions. Also, that not all migrants were economically 
successful - witness the throngs of unemployed school-leavers in 
the cities - therefore not all households would have benefitted 
equally from remittances and protein purchases.
14. Aall, for example, showed that animal proteins supplied only 
2.8% of total caloric intake on a per capita basis (although, this 
2.8% of total caloric intake did account for up to 22.5% of the 
total bulk of crude protein ingested). (Aall, op.cit.. p.49).
11
from JfO to 60% - appears to have been provided frpm the consumption 
of the starchy tubers, yam and cassava; which together accounted 
for up to 80% of total food intake. ^ Animal proteins played a 
much more important qualitative than quantitative role. As 
Aall noted, their contribution to nutritional welfare centred on 
the provision of certain amino acids, largely absent from the 
starchy tubers, which enhanced the degree of utilization of the
15. Referring to diets in the Eastern Region, Dema remarked that 
yam and cassava products made up the bulk of intake. "Consumption 
of leafy vegetables, legumes, cereals, vegetable oils, and animal 
products made up the residue of the diet, with vegetable oils pro- 
viding the next most important source of calories, while animal 
products made only a minor contribution to the diet." (Dema, G.S. 
Nutrition in Relation to Agricultural Production in Nigeria and the 
Countries of West AfricaFAO (Rome, 1965), P-63 (Table 10)). See"" 
also Johnston, B.F. The Staple Food Economies of Tropical Africa 
Stanford University Press (Stanford, Cal., 1958), p.193.
The composition of Eastern diets was typical of both Tropical 
Africa and low income societies in general. As Jones put it: "The 
diets of Tropical Africa are typical of those consumed by people 
with low incomes almost everywhere in the world. The bulk of each 
meal consists of a mass of porridge or paste made from one of the 
starchy staples accompanied by a sauce or gravy that adds flavour 
and contributes fat, protein, minerals, and vitamins." (Jones, W.O, 
Marketing of Staple Food Crops in Tropical Africa: Overall Analysis 
and Report Stanford Research Institute (Menlo Park, Gal., 1969),
p. 65.
12
small amounts of vegetable protein contained in yam and cassava. 
It can be argued, then, that rural to urban migration made 
an important contribution to the viability of the Eastern food 
economy. To the extent that it exported population to other 
regions, it reduced the total level of demand for food within the 
East. At the same time it accounted for an improvement in both 
the quantity and quality of protein food available to Eastern 
residents. This contribution to protein supplies within the 
region was doubly important in the light of another of the major 
responses to overpopulation in the East: the substitution of 
cassava for yam in the food crop structure.
Yam was traditionally the dominant crop - in terms of both
17 
value and preference of cultivation - in the Eastern Region. '
However, Eastern farmers, under pressure to increase output in 
order to feed the rapidly expanding population, began to shift
16. Aall explained the relationship between amino acids, animal 
proteins, and vegetable proteins as follows: "Usually vegetable 
protein is of considerably lower biological value than animal pro- 
tein. This is particularly so if only one, or mainly one, food 
commodity is used as a staple food. The biological value is in part 
determined by the degree to which the protein of the food-stuff 
lacks or has a low content of one or more of the irreplaceable amino 
acids the human' body cannot synthesize, and therefore needs to have 
provided...If one or more of the essential amino acids is missing 
or only present in small quantities - as is often the case with 
vegetable protein - the human body cannot make full use of tt\e 
protein, the missing or deficient amino acids being the limiting 
factor. Therefore the protein requirement is not only a question of 
quantity but also one of quality (Aall's emphasis)...The importance 
of animal protein, therefore, is that (i) not only does it contain 
all essential amino acids and in adequate or close to adequate 
amounts and proportion (sic) to each other and therefore gives a 
high NPU (Net Protein Utilization), but (ii) it also enables the 
human body to make better use of the vegetable proteins, and there- 
fore contributes towards a general NPU increase of the diet." 
(Aall, op.cit. t p.35)»
1?. Floyd, op.cit.. pp.186-187  Consumer preference for yams as 
compared to cassava was marked: "Older people in that region [the 
Eastern Region] still regard manioc [cassava] as an inferior food, 
lacking the prestige of yams." (Johnston, op.cit., p.179. See also 
Okonjo, OE^cit., pp.104-107 on consumer preferences for yam).
13
into a more intensive utilization of their croplands. They 
abandoned, at least in the most densely populated areas of the 
region, the bush fallowing system which was essential for the 
cultivation of yams. As Floyd remarked:
Mounting pressure of population under a land-rotation system 
eventually reaches a point beyond which it is no longer 
feasiV > to hnve 50/o or mor« of a community's land lying 
fallow. Even if yio^uo are lowered, as assuredly they 
must be if alternative measures for maintaining or restoring 
fertility are not adopted, it is necessary for as much 
farmland as possible to be put under cultivation in an 
effort to meet the subsistence requirements of the populat- 
ion. 18
As fallow periods grew shorter, and soils consequently less fertile, 
the substitution of cassava for yam in the crop structure proceeded 
apace. For the cassava not only yielded a greater quantity of
consumable product per unit of cropland, it could be cultivated in
TO 
soils grown too infertile for yam culture. Cultivation of the
cassava expanded until it equalled, surpassed, and in some cases
20 completely replaced the yam in importance as a source of nutrition.
This change in the crop structure simultaneously bolstered 
and diminished nutritional standards in the East. Increased 
production and consumption of cassava engendered higher levels of 
caloric intake in regional diets - 100 grammes of fresh cassava
18. Floyd, op.cit.. pp.178-180.
19. On the comparative economic values of the yam and cassava, see 
Johnston, op.cit,, pp.106-112 and Ch.6.
20. The rise of cassava cropping in relation to yam production was 
illustrated in the study of the Uboma village group. The research- 
ers found that 37% of farm plots and 1+7% of cultivated acreage were 
devoted solely to cassava, as compared with 27% of plots and 21% of 
acreage devoted to yam culture. (This disparity is even larger when 
one takes into account the fact that there were, as well, many plots 
in which cassava was being cultivated in conjunction with another 
crop.) The dominance of cassava was, however, a recent development: 
"...its introduction dates from only a few decades ago." (Oluwansanmi 
op.cit.« p
yielding 109 calories compared to only 90 from the same quantity
of yam - but a decrease in protein consumption - yam contains
PI 2.1% protein while cassava yields only 0.9% protein. In such
circumstances, the consumption of even minute quantities of the 
animal proteins made available as a result of migrants 1 remittances 
provided an important contribution to nutritional welfare. It 
increased the total intake of protein and enhanced the nutritional 
usefulness of the small amounts of vegetable protein contained in 
the staple component of the diet. This enabled the Eastern 
populace to avoid, at least partially, the negative consequences 
of increasing dependence on the cassava:
...attempts to satisfy the pangs of hunger by the develop- 
ment of such crops as cassava...with very high calorie yields 
per acre may merely shift the emphasis from starvation and
undernutrition to protein malnutrition with its serious and
22disabling sequelae.
The substitution of cassava for yam did not, however, have 
wholly negative implications for Eastern nutritional standards.
Protein is only one factor in the overall nutritional equation.
2^5 
Of equal importance are carbohydrates. ^ Carbohydrates are the
basic source of energy for the body, and the shift from yam to 
cassava, with its higher carbohydrate content, improved the level 
of energy consumption among Eastern residents. There was evidence,
21. Johnston, op.cit. t p.160 (Table 6-9).
22. Brook, J.F. "Nutrition" Annual Revue of Biochemistry 2/f (1955), 
p.233. For an attack on this emphasis on protein's centrality to 
nutritional welfare, see McLaren, D.S. "The Great Protein Fiasco" 
Lancet 13 July 1974, pp.93-96.
23. As Platt argued: "...the first step in the 'arithmetic 1 [of 
nutrition] is not in fact 'protein arithmetic' but 'calorie arith- 
metic. A first step is to secure more food for the people so they 
can <do;.more .work.. .thus breaking the vicious chain of an inadequate 
supply of food, low energy intake, limitation of physical effort 
and so on." (Cited in Johnston, op.cit.. p.l6l).
however, that even the shift to cassava failed to raise per 
capita consumption of carbohydrates to nutritionally adequate 
levels. Nutritional surveys made in the pre-war period indicated 
large deficiencies in daily consumption of calories. ^
Another indication that even the substitution of cassava 
for yam in the crop structure did not eliminate the pressure of 
population on food resources was the development of rural-to- 
rural migration in the East. The inadequacy of starchy tuber 
production in the most densely populated areas, which had carried 
the substitution of cassava for yam furthest, fostered the third 
of the major responses to over-population - the temporary migration
of farmers from the most densely populated areas into regional
25 territory where land resources were under less intense pressure. x
There was a flow of farmers from the elongated high density 
population belt stretching through the southern parts of Onitsha, 
Owerri, Anang, and Uyo Provinces into the less densely populated 
areas of the Niger- Anambra flood-plains, the Nike-group village 
territory, the Bende Hill country, and various districts in the 
lower Cross River plains. v
This migration was seasonal - occurring during the February- 
October cropping season - and the migrant returned to his home 
village upon completion of the harvest. The farming activities 
of the migrants centred around harvesting and processing the 
produce of oil palms located on the property rented, and/or 
raising food crops to supplement those produced on plots in the 
home village. Though no specific figures are available to
. Dema, loc. cit.
25. For a detailed description of migrant tenancy in the pre-war 
Eastern Region, see Udo, R.K. "The Migrant Tenant Farmers of 
Eastern Nigeria" Africa 3*f (3) 196/f, pp. 326-339.
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establish the scale of migrant tenancy, it would appear from 
evidence cited by Udo in his study of the phenomenon that large 
numbers of farmers were involved; and that the cash incomes or 
staple crops obtained through migrant tenancy were an important 
factor in preventing a decline in the already inadequate nutritional 
standards found in the most densely populated areas of the region. 
As Udo remarked:
...it is the sparsely settled areas that offer the necessary 
land for producing food in excess of local demand. But 
  since the local inhabitants of such areas usually dislike 
farmwork, the task of raising more food to meet the in- 
creasing demand of both the urban areas and the impoverished
over-burdened districts is increasingly being performed by
26 the migrant tenant farmer.
If, at this point, the observations made in the preceding 
pages are summed up, it is clear that the pre-war imbalance 
between the region's productive and reproductive forces had 
shaped a food economy and nutritional standards which made the 
Eastern population highly vulnerable to famine. The retention of 
traditional modes of production constrained productivity and 
incomes, limiting the accumulation of food surplusses and fostering 
a heavy dependence on self-produced foodstuffs for the bulk of 
nutritional intake. At the same time, rapid population growth 
absorbed any improvements in supply and demand relationships within 
the food economy which resulted from responses to overpopulation. 
7 As a consequence,, the potential for the transformation of any 
disruption of current production - or reversal of such responses 
to overpopulation as rural-to-urban migration (which was closely
26. Udo, op.cit., p.338.
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linked to political stability) ' - into a nutritional crisis
was very high. The widespread and frequent incidence of medical
27. Inter-regional migration, in the Nigerian context, was a 
phenomenon of political stability. It had, to a great extent, 
developed out of the conditions of ethnic security which followed 
upon the imposition of colonial rule. Although on occasion 
inter-ethnic tension was engendered by indigenous groups 1 resent- 
ment of the migrants 1 economic activities, the presence of the 
relatively disinterested colonial authority inhibited the develop- 
ment of insurmountable social or political barriers to the in- 
migration and residence of non-indigenous minority groups.
Nigerian cities were not, however, melting pots. There 
was little inter-ethnic integration. Economic functions and 
socio-political authority within the urban centres were, to a 
large extent, allocated along ethnic lines. Migrants tended to 
maintain strong psychological ties to both their urban kinsmen 
and their rural home communities. As Gugler noted in his study 
of Ibo migrants: "...even among Africans committed to a full 
working life in town, many continue to maintain close links with 
a rural area they consider home: they live in a dual system." 
(Gugler, op.cit. t p.JfOO) .
As an unintegrated minority group within the urban centres 
the Eastern migrants were liable to become scapegoats - the 
targets of majority group frustration - and be forced back to 
their original homes. The indiginization of socio-political 
authority following independence had removed previously existing 
checks on the expression of inter-ethnic tensions and put the v 
migrant minority in a position where it was vulnerable to expul- 
sion by majority groups. First saw the migrants 1 vulnerability 
in terms, of their susceptibility to a pogrom: "The Ibos in the 
North of Nigeria...were ready targets for a pogrom... They had 
lived as a minority in a traditional and static society, resented 
as pushful intruders. A pogrom requires both a particular 
social situation and the exploitation of that situation by a 
politically organized group. In the North, social change had 
begun to produce a group of Northern'entrepreneurs who were ready 
and eager to take over the businesses of the Ibo, the alien and 
successful minority on which could be projected odium and guilt 
for any state of crisis generaged by change. The violence of a 
pogrom in the making can be contained where a government is strong 
or willing enough; in Nigeria the government proved that it was 
neither." (First, R..The.Barrel of a Gun; Political Power in 
Africa and the Coup d'Etat Penguin Press (Alien Lane, 1970). p.328] 
See also O'Connell, J. "The Anatomy of a Pogrom: An Outline Model 
with Special Reference to the Ibo in Northern Nigeria" Bace 9 (1) 
1967, pp.95-100.
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disorders linked to prolonged malnourishment was evidence of 
the narrowness of the margin by which the populace was,even in 
peaceful conditions,avoiding mass starvation. Any further 
decline in per capita food consumption would undoubtedly trigger 
off a famine in the East.
In the chapter which follows, the development of the 
political crisis which was to transform this Eastern vulnerability 
into mass starvation will be described.
28. In his study of Eastern nutrition in the pre-war period, 
Dema noted that low birth weights, poor lactation performance, 
retarded physical development in early childhood, high child 
mortality rates, and loss of strength and productivity in adult- 
hood were frequently encountered throughout the region. This 
indicated - since these were symptoms closely related to mal- 
nourishment - both the prevalence and seriousness of nutritional 
deficiencies in the region. (Dema, op.cit.. p.30).
CHAPTER II
Pre-War Politics
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This chapter is devoted to an analysis of political life 
in Nigeria prior to the Civil War. In the first section of the 
chapter the structure of politics in pre-coup Nigeria will be 
examined and it will be shown how regional competition, ethnic 
sentiment, and class interest undermined the legitimacy of civilian 
government. Although each of these mutually reinforcing phenomena 
was present, in essence, prior to the integration of Nigeria into 
the British empire, colonial status and the nationalist politics 
which brought independence greatly enhanced their dominance of 
political life. In the environment of scarce resources, which 
characterized most of the post-colonial period, these three 
phenomenal exacerbated political and social tensions and eventually 
led to the collapse of civilian government in January 1966.
In the second section of the chapter the political impact 
of military rule will be examined. Three phenomena dominated 
the pre-war period of military government: a re-surgence of 
anti-regionalist nationalism; the collapse of the Nigerian army 
as a cohesive, solidaristic institution; and violent expressions 
of inter-ethnic hostility. These engendered the crises whose 
intersection with the socio-economic structure of the Eastern 
Region triggered off the Eastern famine.
Regionalism in Nigerian politics was largely a legacy of 
colonial policy. Even though they were confronted with widely 
differing indigenous socio-political structures in Northern and 
Southern Nigeria, the British attempted to erect throughout the 
colony a uniform system of administration based on indirect rule. 
The impact of this endeavour differed widely between the two areas.
1. For a more detailed assessment of the development of colonial 
administration in Nigeria see Coleman, J.S. Nigeria: Background to 
Nationalism University of California Press (Los Angeles,
pp
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In the North, indirect rule reinforced the authoritative social 
controls of the traditional elite. In Southern Nigeria, however, 
indirect rule weakened traditional authority, because colonial 
administrators attempted to attach alien meanings to indigenous 
authority structures. The gradual diffusion of the modernizing 
influences of Western education and modern employment opportunities 
- a process from which the colonial authorities tacitly protected 
the North - further sapped adherence to traditional authority in 
the South. Thus, on the eve of the expansion of nationalist 
politics, Nigeria, though formally unified since 1914, consisted 
of two largely unintegrated societies - dominated in the North 
by an elite based on its retention of traditional sources of 
authority; and in the South by a burgeoning commercial/admin- 
istrative elite, whose members 1 status and power stemmed from 
their possession of the manipulative skills required for the 
management of the colonial economy and society.
In the 1940s the colonial authorities were confronted by 
persistent demands from both of these elite groups. Expressing 
itself through fledgling political associations, the Southern 
elite insisted that it be given wider scope for the application 
of its skills and knowledge, calling for the indigenization of 
political and administrative authority. The Northern elite was, 
however, opposed to immediate Nigerianization of the modern 
sector of society. The Northern leaders recognized that their 
region's paucity of modern skills placed it at -a disadvantage, 
and they demanded that the colonial authorities protect the 
North's share of the socio-economic benefits of indigenization
2. See Coleman, op.cit. for an expanded analysis of the process 
of elite formation in the pre-nationalist period.
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from Southern encroachment. After an initial period of resist- 
ance, the colonial authorities acceded to both elites 1 demands. 
The third post-war constitution, which was ratified in 1954» 
provided for the rapid Nigerianization of political and adminis- 
trative structures in the modern sector while, at the same time, 
protecting the North through the regionalization of most political 
authority and administrative control.
The 1954 constitution thwarted the development of trans- 
regional politics in Nigeria. Three major parties had evolved 
during the preceding period - the Northern People's Congress (NPC) 
in the North, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons 
(NCNC) in the East, and the Action Group (AG) in the West. 5 The 
regionalization of power in the 1954 constitution focussed the 
attention of each of these groups onto its region of origin. 
Although the parties continued to joust in the national arena, 
control of a regional power base became the essential criteria 
for effective participation in the political system. Each party 
sought and gained effective hegemony in its own region, fending 
off challenges from local minority parties and from local branches 
of the other major parties.
Regional control, upon which depended a party's chances 
of both electoral victory and the acquisition of political power
3. See Sklar, R.L. Nigerian Political Parties: Power in An Emergent 
African Nation Princeton University Press (Princeton, N.J., 1963), 
Ch.3, for an examination of the disparate pressures brought to 
bear on the colonial administration by Northern and Southern elite 
groups.
4. See Sklar, op_.cit.. pp. 133-134.
5. The premier analysis of the evolution of Nigerian political 
parties is contained in Sklar, op.cit.« Chs. 2 and 3«
6. See Sklar, op.cit. t Chs. 4-6, 8 and 11, for a detailed analysis 
of the regionalist impulse in Nigerian party politics.
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in the national arena, was based on 'big tribe chauvinism 1 ' - the 
hegemony of the majority ethnic group within each region. Each 
of the three regions contained one dominant ethnic group, and the 
political entrepreneurs of the nationalist period articulated the ' 
interests of that majority ethnic group in exchange for its
o
solidaristic support.
The structure of party politics heightened both regionalism 
and ethnic sentiment. The political entrepreneurs who led the 
parties engineered the popular identification of regional and 
ethnic interests with the electoral fortunes of the regional parties. 
Both 'failure and success in the inter-party competitions taking 
place in the national arena came to be seen as the failure or 
success of regional and/or ethnic interests. Trans-regional 
nationalism was largely replaced by inter-regional competition.
In the period leading up to independence, the relative 
abundance of material resources available to the nationalist elites 
dampened the intensity of political conflict. The regional statu^ 
quo was largely respected and the fruits of office were shared out 
on a relatively equitable basis in accordance with what Sklar
7. The term r big tribe chauvinism 1 was coined by Sklar in his 
article "Nigerian Politics in Perspective" Government and Oppo- 
sition 2 (4) 1967, P«535« As Sklar uses the term it implies not 
only majority control of political affairs, but the deliberate 
repression or disregard of the interests and grievances of the 
of the population which belonged to none of the three major ethnic 
groups.
8. Zolberg has argued that, in their concentration on electoral 
control and success; and in their emphasis on patronage and the 
exploitation of communal sentiments as the mechanisms of control; 
the nationalist political parties of Africa more closely resembled 
the classical American political machine than any mobilization 
movement. (Zolberg, A. Creating Political Order: The Party States 
of West Africa Rand, McNally and Co. (Chicago, 1966), p.123).
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called the 'principle of regional security 1 . And the fruits of 
office were sweet. Those resources not externally controlled by 
the metropolis were largely concentrated into the state apparatuses, 
and the acquisition of political power became the key to wealth 
and prestige. Nkrumah's admonition to 'seek ye first the 
political kingdom and all things will be added to you 1 became 
the unspoken credo of Nigerian political entrepreneurs, who took 
advantage of the years of dyarchy to entrench themselves in the 
economic structure of the state. The outcome of this process 
was the emergence of a 'political class' - a ruling elite, whose 
control of the political process opened the way to embourgeoise- 
ment through the exploitation of state resources.
Things began to fall apart, however, even before independ- 
ence. The 1958 Constitutional conference both revealed and
reinforced what Sklar called an 'acute contradiction 1 in the
12 Nigerian political economy. This contradiction revolved
around the fact that the foci of economic and political power in 
Nigeria were incongruent. The real source of wealth and eco-nomic 
development was located in Southern Nigeria, while, under the 
provisions of the constitution, the North was assured political 
dominance in the State.
The 1958 constitutional conference, in effect, ratified
9. Sklar, loc^cit., p.527.
10. Cited in Fitch, B. and Oppenheimer, M. Ghana; End of An Illusion 
Monthly Review Press (New York, 1966), p.25.
11. See Cohen, R. "Class in Africa: Analytical Problems and Per- 
spectives" in Milliband, R. and Saville, J. (eds.) The Socialist 
Register 1972 The Merlin Press (London, 1972), pp.247-2^9, for a 
full description of the 'political class' as the term is used here. 
This article also contains an excellent review and assessment of 
the various points of view on the validity and applicability of 
class analysis in an African context.
12. Sklar, R.L. "Contradictions in the Nigerian Political System" 
Journal of Modern African Studies 3 (2) 1965, pp.201-213*
the legal separation of political authority and economic power, 
which had been implied in all the metropolis 1 previous efforts 
to protect the North from Southern encroachment. The balance 
of power in the Federal arena was upset by the introduction of 
a system of representation which virtually guaranteed a Northern 
majority in the Federal Parliament. This breached the 'principle 
of regional security 1 under which the regional segments of the 
political class had thrived. Northern dominance of the Federal 
government at a time when the regional pools of exploitable 
resources available to Eastern and Western politicians had largely 
been expended on patronage - and at a time when unfavourable 
shifts in the terms of trade portended the increasing concen- 
tration of resources under Federal authority - threatened to 
impede the embourgeoisement of the Southern elements of the 
political class. Southern politicians were faced with the 
possibility that, even though the majority of Nigeria's economic 
resources were generated in the South, Northern dominationjDf the 
Federal arena would block their access to them. ^
In the 1959 Federal elections both the NCNC and the AG 
allied themselves to disaffected Northern minority groups in an 
attempt to defeat the NPC and thereby pave the way to a restor- 
ation of the pre-1958 balance. ^ Though successful in denying 
the NPC an absolute majority in the Federal House, the two 
Southern parties were unable to resolve their own antagonisms and
13. First, R. The Barrel of A Gun; Political Power in Africa and 
the Coup d'Etat Penguin Press (Alien Lane," 1970), pp7148-IW.
14. For a detailed description of the 1959 Federal elections see 
Post, K.W.J. The Nigerian Federal Election of 1959 Oxford Univer- 
sity Press (London, 1963) 
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agree on a coalition government. ^ In the end the NCNC, in what 
First called lf a display of opportunism that set a precedent for 
all Nigerian politics 1 ' 16 , allied itself to the NPC and, in 
return for dropping its trans-regional appeal, ensured its access 
to Federal resources. The AG, forced into opposition, was
denied access to the Federal resource pool and two years later
17 disintegrated. '
Following the 1959 Federal elections, political life in 
Nigeria revolved around the increasingly desperate manoeuvres
of the regionali<:parties and political class segments, as they
18 
attempted to gain or sustain their control of Federal resources.
At the same time politicians as a whole were stripped of much 
of their public affection and perceived legitimacy. The right 
of the political class to rule was initially widely accepted. 
There was ''a prevalent sense that they had earned the right to 
rule through their leadership of protest movements and that they
15- A coalition was forestalled by the bitter inter-personal relat- 
ions of the leaders of the AG and NCNC, each of whom greatly resented 
past attempts by the other to win support in their own region o£ 
dominance. For a more detailed analysis of the reasons behind 
the failure of the two Southern parties to form a coalition see 
Post, K.W.J. "The National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons: 
The Decision of December 1959" in Mackintosh, J.P. (ed.) Nigerian 
Government and Politics Northwestern University Press (Evanston, 
111.7 1966), pp.405-*f26.
16. First, R. op.cit., p.150.
17. For a detailed account of the disintegration of the AG see 
Mackintosh, op.cit. t pp.^27-^60 and First, op.cit.. pp.150-152.
18. Aside from the major instances of wholesale violation of ideo- 
logical principles - such as the NCNC alliance with the NPC and the 
fission of the AG in 1962 - the desire to share in the benefits of 
power drove many individual politicians across the parliamentary 
floor. In the Western Region, in the 18 months following the I960 
elections, six NCNC members crossed to the ruling AG. After Akin- 
tola's formation of the UPP in 1962, these same former NCNC members 
accompanied by the majority of AG members who had supported Awolowo 
prior to Akintola's seizure of parliamentary control, recrossed the 
floor to support the UPP. (See Mackintosh, J.P. (ed.), op.cit.. 
and
26
10
were the legitimate successors of the colonial officials." ^ 
However, as the possibility of emulating the material success of 
the f big men 1 declined, admiration for their extravagant con- 
sumption was soured by envy, and turned to disgust with their 
corruption.
Confronted with declining support, the regional segments 
of the political class turned to the politics of coercion, "using
ballot box, parliamentary speech, bribery, nepotism, and where
pi 
required, thuggery in the struggle for power," These tactics,
however, cut two ways. In resorting to force and skullduggery 
in order to gain its objectives, the political class squandered 
its remaining reserves of legitimacy. It revealed the extent to 
which it lacked public support and, most significantly, exposed 
the extent to which its retention of power depended on the con-
*
tinued allegiance and obedience of the coercive institution to
2.2. 
which it turned for assistance - the Army.
The Nigerian Army was one among the package of institutions
19. Zolberg, A. "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New 
States of Tropical Africa11 American Political Science Review 62 
(1) 1968, p.72. '
20. The most explicit demonstration of this attitudinal shift was 
the generally joyous popular reaction to the f Young Majors 1 coup 
(although, the joy may have been largely confined to the South). 
See First, op.pit., p.301 and St. Jorre, John, D. The Nigerian 
Civil War Hodder and Stoughton (London, 1972), p.Jf3.
21. First, op.cit.. p.158.
22. As Zolberg has remarked: "The centre's weakness, hitherto 
hidden from sight, was unmercifully exposed, as when the value of 
the currency issued by a national banking system is drastically 
reduced when the credit pyramid, itself based on the productivity 
of the economy, collapses...Political power, normally based on the 
overall social structure, gives way to force...Beyond its immediate 
unfortunate consequences for the individuals affected, the shift 
from power to force as a technique of government has serious long 
term consequences for political life more generally in that it 
serves as the prelude to anti-government coups and revolutions..." 
Zolberg, loc.cit., pp.76-77.
transferred to Nigeria by the metropolitan power. As a profess- 
ional military organization, patterned on its British counterpart, 
it was considered to share many of the characteristics of the 
1 total institution 1 : relatively impermeable boundaries, a uniquely
solidary process of socialization, and hierarchical authority
2^
relations. ^ However, the institution was flawed from its
inception; and, over time, it absorbed the regional and ethnic
23. For a theoretical definition of the 'total institution 1 and a 
discussion of its characteristics, see Goffman, E. Asylums: Essays 
on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates Aldine 
Publishing Co. (Chicago, 1962), Ch.l. Goffman made no detailed 
examination of the professional military organization as an example 
of the total institution; however, several other authors have done 
so: for example, Zurcher, L.A. "The Sailor Aboard Ship: A Study of 
Role Behaviour in a Total Institution" So c ial Fo r c e s /*3(3) 1965 > 
Pp.389-JfOO; and Feit, E. "The Rule of the Iron Surgeons: Military 
Government in Spain and Ghana" Comparative Politics 1 (4) 1969,
For an assessment of the extent to which the Nigerian Army 
resembled a total institution see Luckham, R. The Nigerian Military; 
A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt 1960-1967 Cambridge 
University Press (Cambridge, 1971), p. 102. Luckham argued that 
"Each army unit was in many respects a 'total 1 institution. . .Though 
physically dispersed, the army's unity of structure ensured that the 
boundaries between army units and their local social and political 
environment were relatively sharply defined. . .The barracks was a 
residential unit, with all officers and men - whether married or 
unmarried - living in segregated areas of the"*same compound. Both 
the officers and the NCO's had their messes, each with its distinct- 
ive traditions and each providing an effective integrative focus 
for the social life of the unit."
A discussion of the permeability of the military's institut- 
ional boundaries in the African and Nigerian contexts can be 
found in Price, R.M. "A Theoretical Approach to Military Rule 
in New States: Reference Group Theory and the Ghanaian Case" 
\Vorld Politics 23 (3) 1971, pp. 399-^30; and in Luckham, op.cit.. 
pp. 101-108. For a full discussion of the impact of the military 
socialization process on the value and behaviour patterns of 
military personnel see Kjellberg, F. "Some Cultural Aspects of 
the Military Profession" Archives Europeens de Sociologie 6 (2) 
1965, p. 286; Bourne, P.G. "Some Observations on the Psychological 
Phenomena Seen in Basic Training" Psychiatry 30 (2) 1967, pp. 187- 
1%; and Price, op.cit. The pattern of authority relations 
within professional military institutions is discussed by Janowitz, 
M. The Professional Soldier; A Social and Political Portrait Free 
Press of Glencoe (Glencoe, 111., I960), Chs. 1 and 2; and Van 
Doom, J. "The Officer Corps: A Fusion of Profession and Organizat- 
ion" Archives Europeens de Socioloffie 6 (2) 1965, pp. 262-282.
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tensions which convulsed its civilian surroundings.
Regionalism suffused the army as a result of the civilians 1 
imposition of differential criteria of recruitment throughout its 
history. These eventually created clusters of regional strength 
throughout the hierarchy of commissioned and enlisted ranks. ^
2if. The soldiers of Nigeria's colonial army were drawn primarily from 
the North. This fact reflected both the British preference for re- 
cruits from the 'jnartial tribes' of the North, and Southern disdain ^ 
for the limited prospects of upward mobility accruing to a career in 
the colonial army. As Nigerianization of the officer corps got under 
way, the majority of regular commissions were conferred on Northern- 
ers (e.g., the first five cadets to graduate from Sandhurst were all 
from the North). The number of Eastern officers increased rapidly 
however, in the period 1956-60, reflecting the access of relatively 
small numbers of better educated Southern NCOs and Warrant Officers 
to short service commissions. At independence only 8 of 57 Nigerians 
commissioned had Northern origins.
From the onset of rapid Nigerianization in the post-independ- 
ence period, pressure was exerted by the politicians to reduce the 
imbalance in the numbers of Northern and Southern officers. After 
1961 a regional quota system specified that 50% of all officer cadets 
accepted and passed out must come from the North, regardless of the 
order of merit. This regulation, reinforced by steps taken in the 
North to increase the output of potential cadets, resulted in a gra- 
dual alteration of the regional composition of the officer corps. 
Easterners dropped from 65% in I960 to /fO.5% of the total number of 
officers in 1965; while Northerners increased from -11+% to 32.5% in 
the same period. Though no formal regulation favouring Northern 
officers for promotion was ever issued, it was commonly believed that 
they were being pushed up over the heads of their Southern comrades. 
The important point about this assertion - whatever its actual val- 
idity - is its impact on the psychological expectations of officers.
By January 1966 the different criteria for recruitment had 
created clusters of regional strength throughout the hierarchy of 
officers grades, as shown below: 
Total REGIONAL STRENGTH IN OFFICER GRADES
Officers(%irnLTG(%)(2)MAJ(%TT2T Subalterns(%) (3) 
East 40.5 57.2 71.9 30.0 
North 32.5 21. k 6.2 48.8 
West 26.3 21.4 21.9 21.2
99.5 (4)
(1) Total male officer strength January 1966. (2) Combat officers 
strength January 1966. (3) Combat sub-alterns commissioned in the 
post-quota period. Includes 3 sub-alterns promoted to captain prior 
to the January coup. (4) -g-% of male officers came from the Southern 
Cameroons.
Source: Miners, N.J. The Nigerian Army 1936-1966 Methuen (London, 
197D, pp.118-119 and 123; and Luckham, op.cit.. pp.72-73.
See Miners pp.33-58 and 115-12^; and Luckham pp.191-192 for 
more details on the impact of regionalism on the structure of the 
officer corps.
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Though there was a strong institutional impulse toward cohesion
25
and solidarity -/ , fears of regional domination penetrated instit- 
utional boundaries and strained adhesion to the values of pro- 
fessionalism which were supposed to govern the behaviour of 
Nigerian soldiers. At the same time, a deepening disgust with 
the excesses of the political class , reinforced by the values 
and attitudes internalized during professional training, propelled
some elements of the officer corps towards sympathy with an
27
'intendant class 1 ' comprised of state functionaries, middle- 
level bureaucrats, and supervisory personnel who were committed 
to a more rational exploitation of the state apparatus. As these
25. See Feld, M.D. "Professionalism, Nationalism, and the Alien- 
ation of the Military" (Paper presented to the Sixth World Congress 
of Sociology, Evian, France, 1966) for a more detailed analysis of 
the imperatives of cohesion and solidarity within military organ- 
izations in general.
26. See Luckham, op.cit., pp.107-108,203,248 and 284 for recorded 
expressions of soldiers 1 hostility to the political class. Two 
things must, however, be kept in mind when considering the army's 
resentment of the political class. First, not all members of the 
military were opposed to the politicians. The^army had many close 
links to the political class throughout the independence period, 
and some of the military leaders owed their positions to their 
friendship with members of the political elite. (For examples of 
the army's cooperation with the politicians see Dent, M.J. "A 
Minority Party - The United Middle Belt Congress" in Mackintosh, 
op. cit., pp.461-507 (military suppression of the Tiv rebellions in 
I960 and 1964); Luckham, op.cit., p.249 (military cooperation in 
the dissolution of AG control of the Western Region in 1962); 
Braundi, E. and Letteiri, A. "The General Strike in Nigeria" Inter- 
national Socialist Journal 1 (5/6) 1964, pp.598-609 (military 
suppression of the 1964 General Strike); and Miners, op.cit., 
pp.150-155 (military support of the NNDP following the controversial 
elections in the West in October 1965) )
Secondly, it must be remembered that expressions of an anti- 
political nature are part of the ethos of military professionalism. 
As Janowitz put it: "Interest in politics goes hand in hand with a 
negative outlook and even hostility to politicians and political 
groups. It is the politics of wanting to be above politics...Among 
officers there is no glorification of or even respect for and under- 
standing for the creative role of the politicians and the political 
process." (Janowitz, M. The Military in the Political Development'of 
New Nations: An Essayin Comparative Analysis University of Chicago 
Press (Chicago, 1964)1 pp.65).
27. For a full definition of the 'intendant class 1 see Conen, 
op.cit., p.249«
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sentiments hardened into the belief that, for the good of both
28 
society and soldiers, the political class must be removed, the
Nigerian Army could be viewed as a time bomb embedded in the 
fabric of the state.
The decision to shatter the constraints of internal authority 
relations and to end the hegemony of civilian politicians was
catalyzed by rumors of an impending move on the part of the NPC
oq 
to seal its domination of Nigerian politics. 7 In retrospect, it
appears that the prime motivation of the 'Young Majors 1 , who 
initiated the military coup on January 15th, 1966, was their 
determination to break the grip in which the political class 
held both military and civilian institutions. Their action was, 
however, destined to be perceived through the regional and ethnic 
filters created by the structure of civilian politics in Nigeria. 
In the next section of this chapter it will be shown that, far 
from dissolving the regional and ethnic tensions which had wracked
28. It is difficult to trace attitudinal: changes vis-a-vis the 
politicians within the military. As an inherent distaste for 
politicians seems to be a common element in military thought at 
all times, perhaps the best measure of heightened resentment is 
the frequency with which expressions of distaste for the political 
class were articulated. Luckham notes: "As one major political 
crisis in Nigeria followed another, the talk in officers' messes 
became increasingly political. By 196^-, at the latest, there were 
several groups of officers who thought that military intervention 
'to stop the political mess' was on the cards." (Luckham, op.cit., 
P.2/+8).
29. Following the largely fraudulent 1965 elections in the West, 
the people of that region were in a virtual state of rebellion 
against the victorious NNDP and its leader Akintola. This situation 
was obviously untenable and rumours began to circulate that Akintola 
and the Sardauna of Sokoto planned to engineer the re-introduction 
of troops into the West in order to entrench the NNDP. At the same 
time, it was said, they would stage an insurrection in the East as 
the pretext for declaring a state of emergency and introducing 
Northern troops into the region. Major Nzeogwu, the leader of the 
'Young Majors' coup, later said that it was their belief in the 
veracity of these rumours which triggered off their coup on January 
15th, 1966. (First, op.cit.. pp.156-157 and 166-169; and Luckham, 
op.cit., p
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the civilian regime, military government exacerbated them and led 
to the disintegration of the state.
The disintegration of the Nigerian polity in the period 
between the coup in January 1966 and the secession of the Eastern 
Region in May 196? centred on three phenomena: the resurgence of 
anti-regionalist nationalism; the collapse of the Nigerian Army 
as a cohesive, solidaristic institution; and the violent expression 
of inter-ethnic hostility. These developments triggered off the 
crises whose intersection with the socio-economic structure of 
the Eastern Region resulted in a nutritional catastrophe. They 
also moulded the perceptions and political objectives which moti- 
vated and sustained the belligerent parties' participation in both 
the Civil War and the politics of hunger.
The military take-over in January 1966 re-vitalized anti- 
regionalist nationalism in Nigeria. Prior to the coup, the 
fortunes of groups appealing to trans-regional sentiments were at 
a low ebb. The Northern elite had re-inforced its hegemony in 
' the Federal arena by repulsing Southern*"challenges to the 1963 
Federal census results, which gave a majority of seats in the 
Federal House to the North. Then, in the 196^ Federal elections, 
the regionalist coalition of the NPC and its Western partner, the 
NNDP (the previous alliance of Northern and Eastern interests 
having effectively disintegrated) defeated the anti-regionalist 
coalition made up of the NCNC, the remnants of the AG, and other 
anti-regionalist, anti-Northern groups.-' Finally, in the 1965
30. For a more detailed analysis of the controversy over the 1963 
census results see Post, K.W.J. and Vickers, M. Structure and 
Conflict in Nigeria 1960-1966 Heinemann (London, 1973), pp.80-82.
31. For a full description of the 196^ Federal elections, see 
Mackintosh, op.cit.; and Post and Vickers, op.cit., Chs.7-10.
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Western Region elections, the NNDP secured an unexpected, and 
largely unwarranted, victory over the combined forces of the AG 
and the NCNC. 32
Nigeria's first military government was, however, firmly 
committed to ending the regional political competition of the 
civilian era.*-5 And on May 24th Ironsi announced the abolition
32. See Post and Vickers, op.cit., Ch.10.
33. The military government's commitment to the abolition of 
regional political competition was evident in General Ironsi's 
first public communications. For example, in a policy broadcast 
made on January 28th, 1966, General Ironsi said: "All Nigerians 
want an end to Regionalism. Tribal loyalties and activities which 
promote tribal consciousness and sectional interests must give way 
to the urgent task of national reconstruction." He followed this 
up with the following remark at a press conference in February: 
"It has become apparent to all Nigerians that rigid adherence to 
 Regionalism 1 was the bane of the last regime and one of the main 
factors which contributed to its downfall. No doubt, the country 
would welcome a clean break with the deficiencies of the system of 
Government to which the country had been- subjected in the recent 
past." ("Policy Broadcast by General Ironsi, 28 January 1966" 
(Document No.16) and "Ironsi's Press Conference of 21 February 1966 
(Document No.l?) in Kirk-Greene, A.H.M. Crisis and Conflict in 
Nigeria: A Documentary Sourcebook 1966-196g Oxford University Press 
(London, 1971), Vol.1, pp.l5A--155 and 155-158)).
It is possible that Ironsi's anti-regionalism exceeded that 
of his fellows. First asserts that most members of the Supreme 
Military Council opposed immediate unification of the state, but 
that Ironsi replied to their objections with the statement f l f m 
committed 1 . (First, op.cit., p.310). In any event, it is likely 
that Ironsi f s drive for unification, and the support he received 
from his colleagues, stemmed to a large extent from the imperatives 
of professionalism rather than from a realistic assessment of the 
nature of and possible solutions to the political crisis. As 
Luckham notes: "It [the military government] came to power with a 
political carte blanche, which permitted it to engage on a programme 
of reform...the general drift of which was the creation of a 
cohesive and disciplined society in the military's own image. It 
was seeminglyi'unaware, or unconcerned, that these reforms might 
also constitute a very important shift in the allocation of values 
between political groups or between the regions." (Luckham, op.cit.. 
p.261).
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of the regions in favour of a unitary state. ^ Unfortunately 
though, the promulgation of Decree No.34, the legal vehicle on 
which Ironsi planned to base the reconstruction of political 
life in Nigeria, was received in the North as a confirmation of 
suspicions that the January coup and the policies of the military
zc
government both reflected Ibo ambitions to dominate the state. ^ 
The roots of this perception were multifold, and stretched 
back into the era of civilian politics. The post-independence 
period had seen a close articulation of the interests of the 
Eastern elite, as reflected in the policies of the NCNC, with 
those of other groups opposed to the continuation of political 
life on the basis of big tribe chauvinism and regional competition 
Northern dominance of the Federal arena had exerted increasingly 
fissiparous strains on the major parties of the Eastern and 
Western Hegions, leading to the fission of the AG in 1962, and 
sapping the allegience of the non-Eastern/Ibo elements of the
See "The Unification Decree: No. 34 -of 1966" (Document No. 24) and 
"The Regions Are Abolished: Ironsi f s Broadcast to the Nation Banning 
Political Parties and Introducing Decree No. 34, 24 May 1966" 
(Document No. 26) in Kirk-Greene, op.cit, , Vol.1, pp. 169-173 and 
174-177, for the details of Decree No. 34.
divergence between the actual content of Decree No. 34 and 
what it was believed to have signified shows the extent to which 
appearances, or perceptions, had come to outweigh intentions in 
this period. Luckham argues that the legal/constitutional impact 
of Decree No. 34 was minimal: "It was a gesture of the Ironsi 
government's commitment to national unity, but did not strengthen 
central control in any important respect..." (Luckham, op.cit. . 
pp. 265-266). Similarly, the Northern response to Ironsi 's re- 
construction of the civil service assumed changes which were in 
reality non-existent. Although Decree No. 34 provided for the 
unification of the Federal and Regional civil services, the 
proposed provincial civil service commissions, which would have 
made all except the highest appointments, would, in fact, have 
controlled the distribution of more posts throughout the former 
regions than under the previous system in which all Federal appoint- 
ments were made from the centre. However, as First notes, any 
benefits derivable from the new administrative system were out- 
weighed by "the sight of power at the centre in the hands of Ironsi 
and a close group of civil servants from the East." (First, op.cit. .
p. 309).
NCNC. 3° As a result the NCNC began to shift away from its 
alliance with the NPC - a process which was mirrored by the 
development of an increasingly close relationship between the
NPC and the UPP (forefunner of the NNDP) following the latter
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party's seizure of control of the Western Region government. '
By pulling away from their Northern connection Eastern leaders 
evidently hoped to resurrect the NCNC's traditional trans-regional 
appeal, thereby providing the base for an electoral coalition which 
might bring NPC/Northern dominance of the Federal arena to an end, 
and restore to the Eastern elite its access to the Federal resource 
pool. 38
This strategy failed. In both the 1964 Federal elections 
and the 1965 Western Region election the Northern elite and its 
Western allies were triumphant. The Eastern strategy did, however, 
result in the identification of anti-regionalism with both anti- 
Northern sentiment and the interests of the Eastern Ibos - at 
least in the eyes of the North. Consequently, when a military 
government was installed and began to pursue anti-regionalist 
policies, these actions were perceived in the North as the raachin- 
ations of the Eastern Ibos.
36. See Post and Vickers, op.cit.. Ch.5 for a description of the 
strains within the NCNC during the post-independence period.
37. Ibid.
38. See Post and Vickers, op.cit., pp.99-103 and Ch.6 for a 
description of the groups making up the NCNC led anti-regionalist 
electoral coalition, and an examination of the objectives of this 
coalition.
39. See, for example, the suspicions voiced in a letter addressed 
to the New Nigerian of 19 April 1966, which is reproduced as 
"Federalism is Good for Nigeria" (Document No.22; in Kirk-Greene, 
op.cit., Vol.1, pp.162-164.
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Northern suspicions of the military government's links to 
Eastern interests were not, however, rooted solely in the relation- 
ship between anti-regionalism and the NCNC. They had been roused 
as well by the fact that the group which instigated the coup was 
comprised almost wholly of Ibo officers, while its victims were 
virtually all Northerners. Northern chariness was also re- 
inforced by Ironsi's dilatory behaviour regarding the punishment 
of the 'Young Majors 1 for their flagrant violation of military 
discipline; reinforced again by the enhanced status of Ibos in 
the post-coup army and civil service^" ; and brought to a climax 
of virtual certainty by the announcement, simultaneous with the 
promulgation of Decree No.34- of a civil service reorganization 
on a basis which it was believed would favour Southerners with
40. Of the 31 officers who participated in the coup, all were 
Southerners, and all but 5, Ibos. 15 members of the government and 
armed forces were killed by the conspirators. Of the civilians 
killed, 3 out of 4 were from the North; and 4 of the 7 senior army 
officers killed were Northerners. (Miners, op.cit., pp.167-170; and 
First, op.cit, t p.284)- The strength of these facts as evidence of 
an Ibo plot is, however, questionable on the grounds that the ethnic 
composition of both the conspirator and target groups was largely 
determined by the articulation of the tactical objectives of coup- 
making and the clustering of regional/ethnic groups in the hierar- 
chies of both government and army. For more of this argument see 
Luckham, op.cit. t pp.44-50.
41. As a result of the depradations of the 'Young Majors 1 , the 
percentage of Ibos among the 20 most senior officers in the Army 
rose from 30 to 60%; while the Northern percentage declined from 
25 to 10%. (Luckham, op.cit.. p.55 (Table 7)). This shift was re- 
inforced by the pattern of promotion in the post-coup period. 
When promotions to Lt.Col. were announced in May 1966, 18 of the 
25 officers named were Ibos. Even if, as Miners argues, these 
promotions reflected nothing more than the operation of the merit 
system, and the effect of past recruitment criteria, they were a 
"public relations blunder". (Miners, 03^cit.. pp.210-211). 
First characterizes the suspicion surrounding Ironsi's civilian 
appointments as follows: "Ironsi, an Ibo, it was said, was going 
out of his way to further Ibo power: did he not depend on an inner 
clique of Ibo advisers, whose instrument he was? and when key 
appointments were made, as of the new attorney-general and several 
heads of crucial commissions, were they not Ibo?" (First, op.cit.. 
p.308).
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regard to appointments and promotion.
Northern reaction to Ironsi's initiative of May 2^th, 1966, 
introduced the second of the three phenomena which dominated this 
period: communal violence. On May 29th anti-unification demon- 
strations staged by students and junior civil servants in Kano 
degenerated into riots directed against the resident Ibo community. 
Before the authorities were able to contain them three days later, 
these attacks had spread from Kano to Zaria, Kaduna, Jos, and 
oth^r urban centres in the North.
Direct responsibility for the May riots has never been fully 
ascertained; but it would seem, if one discounts the propagandistic 
claims made by the Eastern and Federal Governments, that they 
resulted from the concantenation of a number of factors: ranging 
from the machinations of dispossessed Northern politicians to the 
display of offensive political cartoons by some Ibos who lived in 
the North. ^ What is certain is that this outburst of inter-ethnic
f
hostility fostered the identification of ethnic security with 
regional autonomy which underlay Biafran^ policies throughout the 
civil war.
If the May riots laid the foundations for the reversal of 
the Eastern leadership's previously anti-regionalist stance, this 
process of about-facing was completed, and extended from the East 
to the North following the destruction of the Ironsi government in 
July 1966. The counter-coup staged by Northern enlisted men and
k2. See footnote 35-
. Descriptions of the May riots, and analyses of their origins, 
can be found in St. Jorre, op.cit. . pp. 58-61; First, op.cit. . pp. 
311-312; the Daily Telegraph of May 2/tth through May 31st, 1966; 
and Luckham, op. cit. t pp. 271-274-
. For a full description of the events of the July counter-coup 
see First, op.cit. . pp. 313-325; and Luckhara, op. cit. . pp. 51-79.
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junior officers in July 1966 had unexpected consequences. 
It appears that, to the extent that the counter-coup represented 
more than an outburst of anomic violence directed against Ibos 
within the Army, the instigators of the 'Northern revenge coup 1
intended it to be the stroke which severed Northern ties to the
/,«5 
Federation. ^ However, once vengeance had been wreaked, North-
k6ern unity dissolved^ ; for the counter-coup ushered into pro- 
minence a new power grouping - the Northern minority ethnic 
groups which had been among the chief victims of the 'big tribe 
chauvinism 1 which had characterized civilian politics.
The ethnic structure of the army was such that, following, 
the virtual exclusion of Ibos from the Federal military organ- 
ization, men from the Mid- and Lower-North dominated the hier-
As Schwarz noted: "The rebels' idea was, first, revenge for 
the murdered Northern officers, and second, for the North to 
secede. For the North, secession was an irrational proposition. 
It would have cut the Region off from the sea and from Nigeria's 
promising new oil wealth and, not surp-r isingly , Northern leaders 
soon had second thoughts. But in July and August secession, first 
proclaimed in banners the previous May and embodied in the emir's 
memorandum in June, was still the popular Northern demand." 
(Schwarz, W. Nigeria Pall Mall Press (London, 1968), p. 210).
As Luckham puts it: "...it is clear that [in the period leading 
up to the counter-coup] common interests and goals were widely 
shared and mobilized a substantial proportion of those officers 
and men from all areas of the North, including those previously in 
political opposition to one another. The common political cause of 
these groups was fashioned from the special political conditions 
prevailing in July 1966 which. . .defined the situation in terms of 
regional sentiment, resistance to administrative and political uni- 
ficagion, and opposition to the real or supposed dominance of the 
Ibos both in the structure of the central government and the mili- 
tary... After the seizure of power, the consensus began to weaken 
almost immediately and the North no longer evoked the same loyalty. 
The new political balance created by the coup encouraged officers 
who had earlier wanted the North to secede to swing round behind a 
strong Federation. . .Many of the diaspora and Middle Belt officers 
came from September 1966 onwards to demand that the old North be 
broken up into a number of separate regions or states..*" (Luckham, 
op.cit.. pp. 78-79).
archy of enlisted and commissioned ranks. This gave the 
long-repressed minorities of the Mid- and Lower-North access 
to Federal power. Both military and civilian members of these 
groups exerted strong pressure against secession. They feared 
that the disintegration of the state into its regional components 
would return them to the grip of the ! dry' North ethnic majority. 
At the same time they opposed any resolution of the political 
crisis based on resumption of the preceding inter-regional 
political conflict and ! big tribe chauvinism 1 .
In the end, and it seems with the assistance of external
i O
pressure from American and British representatives^ , the minority 
groups carried the day and Northern secession was averted. 
This success was to be reproduced a month later at the constit- 
utional conference convened by Supreme Military Council. 
Delegates from the Mid- and Lower-North, assisted by their 
compatriots in the army and the civil services, were able to 
engineer a shift in the Northern delegation's previously pro- 
regionalist policy. The Northern delegation came out in favour 
of the creation of a'number of states linked together in a strong
. The majority of enlisted recruits had always come from the 
Mid- and Lower-North. And the attempt to restore the balance 
between Northern and Southern elements in the post-independence 
officer corps had propelled a large number of men from the Mid- 
and Lower-North into officer training courses. See Luckham, 
op.cit. , p.313«
. First argues that both British and American diplomatic pressure 
against Northern secession was brought to bear in the period 
immediately following the counter-coup. According to First, 
British diplomats performed the surgery which, at the last moment, 
excised an announcement of Northern secession from Gowon's first 
public address, made on August 1st. (First, op.cit. t pp. 320-321).
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federation.
Eastern leaders, meanwhile, were moving further away from 
their previous affection for a strong central authority. The 
slaughter of Ibo officers and enlisted men during the July counter- 
coup reinforced the identification of ethnic security with regional 
sovereignty which had been engendered during the May riots. This 
shift was not propelled solely by fear of a hostile North, however. 
It apparently also reflected the Eastern leaders' commitment to 
the 'big tribe chauvinism 1 of the civilian epoch. The socio- 
economic structure of the Eastern Region was such that, if the
i»9. See Panter-Brick, S.K. Nigerian golitics and Military Rule: 
Prelude to the Civil War The Athlone Press "(["London, 1970) /Appendix 
A, for a re-capitulation of the proposals and counter-proposals 
made by the various regional delegations to the Constitutional 
Conference in September/October 1966.
The final Northern position at the ^Constitutional Conference 
reflected the fundamental reconstruction of power which had 
occurred in the North following the imposition of military rule. 
The Northern soldiers' swing toward the establishment of a strong 
Federal authority was matched by a similar shift of civilian 
opinion in the North. The January coup had dispossessed the 
Northern political class, and, although its machinations con- 
tributed to communal riots in the North, and to the July counter- 
coup, it was unable to re-assert its former grip on the region. 
Military rule had sapped its influence; reforms instigated by 
the soldiers had destroyed many of its powers; and violence and 
unrest in the North's urban centres had robbed it of much of its 
former prestige. The decline of the Northern political class 
diminished the imperatives of Northern solidarity: "...out with 
the old politicians went their determination to run the North as 
a single political unit and thereby to control the political 
life of the whole Federation. This was partly because the 
ethnic and cultural minorities were in a strong position to 
assert their demands for new regions or states because of their 
well-entrenched position in the army; and partly because many 
of the new political leaders of the old North, like Aminu Kano, 
were willing to acquiesce in the sub-division of the North for 
complex reasons of their own. [However,] The creation of new 
regions or states was not a practicable proposition unless some 
kind of effective political centre could be ensured... [Thus] 
The merits of an effective central government could be argued 
both by those like the minorities who wanted more regions or 
states and by proponents of a reinvigorated, reformed One North." 
(Luckham, op.cit., pp.326-238).
long standing demands of Eastern minority ethnic groups for 
political autonomy were met through the division of the Eastern 
Region into three states - as was proposed at the September 
constitutional conference - the region's Ibo majority would be 
confined to the already overpopulated, impoverished, and land- 
locked Ibo heartland. The oil-rich and moderately populous 
areas of the region would fall under the control of potentially 
hostile non-Ibo ethnic groups.  
The conflict inherent to their divergent views on future
constitutional arrangements and power relationships does not,
\ 
however, sufficiently account for the bitterness and hostility
which suffused relations between the Eastern and Federal leaders 
during this period. To account for this the other two dominant
5>0. The history of anti-Ibo sentiment within the Eastern Region 
stretches back to the colonial period. The first demand for 
minority autonomy appears to have been made at a conference of 
chiefs and other representatives in December 1953- In 195*f the 
COR state movement was inaugurated at Uyo and later transformed 
into an anti-NCNC party. Throughout the era of civilian politics, 
resentment of Ibo domination propelled Eastern splinter parties 
into electoral alliances with either the NPC or AG.
Following the January and July coups the minorities problem 
in the East became more complex. On the one hand members of 
minority ethnic groups suffered along with Ibos in the Northern 
riots. This tended to propel them toward, cohesion with the Ibo 
majority. At the same time, Ojukwu attempted to temper their 
hostility to the Ibos by devolving some central powers to pro- 
vincial governments; and by adding minority representatives to 
his entourage. (Ojukwu even offered to accept the results of 
a referendum on the question of the division of the East into 
ethnic states; however, he proposed the referendum only after 
the minority areas had been occupied by Federal forces.) On 
the other hand, the prospect of autonomy implied in the re-vamped 
Northern proposals made at the September/October Constitutional 
Conference was attractive to minority groups. An attraction 
which must have been considerable if some minority spokesmen's 
claims of Ibo arrogance and even assaults on minority groups 
were true.
For further details on the minority question in the Eastern 
Region see Whiteman, K. "Enugu: The Psychology of Secession" in 
Panter-Brick, op.cit.» pp.111-115; Luckham, op.cit.. pp.330-322; 
and Graham-Douglas, N.G. Ojukwu's Rebellion and World Opinion 
Gallitzine, Chant, and Russell (London, 1966).
phenomena of the post-coup period must be considered: the dis- 
integration of the Nigerian Army and inter-ethnic violence.
The July counter-coup resulted in the fission of the Nigerian 
army. The counter-coup stemmed from the eruption of regional 
and ethnic tensions within the armed forces. Suspicions that 
an Ibo plot lay behind the policies of the Ironsi government 
were not confined to Northern civilians. They also suffused 
Northern elements within the army. Northern soldiers began to 
view their Ibo comrades with suspicion. As one Northern soldier 
put it: "...'the Ibo knows how to talk and pretend to be brothers. 
We discovered this treachery late. "Most countries have one
X
Judas Iscariot for every hundred of their people. The Ibos are 
ninety-nine per cent Judas f ..."^ In the period following the 
January coup there began to occur incidents of gross indiscipline 
involving Northern enlisted men and Ibo officers; with the
result that during most of July, Northern soldiers were already
52 in a semi-mutinous state.
It is not clear whether the Northern 'revenge coup 1 , when 
it came, resulted from a spontaneous collapse of institutional 
values and behaviour patterns, or whether it represented the
activation of latent inter-ethnic hostility within the army by
5-5 
dispossessed Northern politicians. ^ Whichever the case, the
counter-coup, although it exhibited an extra dimension of communal 
violence, was in many ways typical of the second phase of military
51. Miners, op.cit., p.212.
52. Luckham, op.cit., pp.51 and 6^. Also see Miners, op.ci t. t 
pp.182-183 for a description of indiscipline in the Army following 
the January coup.
53. See Luckham, op.cit. t pp.68-76, for a detailed examination of 
both anomic and organized behaviour patterns manifested by par- 
ticipants in the counter-coup.
intervention in politics.
The Ironsi government, like most military regimes in
»
Africa, attempted to reproduce the pattern of political authority 
and administration which existed in the colonial period. During 
the colonial period political authority stemmed from a central 
source and flowed outward into society through the administrative 
regulations and fiats issued by authoritarian institutions. 
This pattern serves as a paradigm for the reforms and changes
!
introduced by most African military governments. They perceive 
authority as an outward flow of command rather than an inward 
flow of consensual affirmation. They reject the aggregation 
and mediation of political interests and extol honest, efficient 
administration as the object of government. This conception, 
stemming for the most part from the values and behaviour patterns 
of military professionalism, results in a regime characterized 
by its emphasis on the promulgation of decrees and regulations; 
and by its failure to institutionalize effective feedback mechanisms.
This attempt to impose a neo-colonial 'iron grid 1 on society 
is, however, flawed from its inception. The source of authority 
- the army and its agents in the civil services - is not, as in 
the colonial period, external to domestic society. It is soon 
perceived by the subjects of the regime to be involved in the 
power struggles of domestic interest groups. Nor is the seat of 
authority outside the grasp of dis-affected domestic groups. In 
the absence of institutions through which support for the regime's 
policies can be mobilized, or dissent expressed, the only outlet 
for social tension is violence, which usually manifests itself 
in the form of a counter-coup in which one segment of the armed 
forces, its adhesion to institutional values and norms weakened 
by the initial coup, takes on the function of interest articulation
and overturns the original military regime.
«
In the case of Nigeria, it was soon obvious that the counter- 
coup had succeeded. By August 1st, 1966 General Ironsi and many 
other Ibo officers and men were dead, while those still alive 
were, where allowed, fleeing toward the Eastern Region. The 
Nigerian army had virtually ceased to exist as a coherent organ- 
ization. A fact recognized in the agreement made within the 
Supreme Military Council on August 9th that all troops should be 
repatriated to their region of origin. ^
The disintegration of the army into its ethnic components 
was of major significance for the development of the perceptual 
screens through which the military leaders were henceforth to 
view each other. Cohesion and brotherhood were important aspects
Most troops of Eastern origin had already fled back to the 
East. The main impulse behind Eastern agreement to regionalization 
of the Army was the Eastern leaders' desire to remove the threat 
poised by the presence of Northern soldiers in the Enugu garrison. 
A mutiny in the Enugu garrison had been only narrowly averted 
during the counter-coup, and so long as the Northern soldiers 
remained in place - they were repatriated on August 13th - there 
was a threat to the internal security of the East.
The'West backed the repatriation agreement because it would 
mean the removal of Northern troops from the Western Region. 
Though the July coup had been directed against Easterners, Western 
leaders, especially Chief Awolowo, viewed the continued presence 
of Northern troops in the West with alarm (although re-garrisoning 
the region with Western troops would have required a large recruit- 
ing and training programme since only about 10% of the army's 
personnel were of Yoruba origin).
Even though the repatriation agreement, for all intents and 
purposes, dissolved the Nigerian Army into two antagonistic armed 
forces, the institutional impulse to cohesion still flickered in 
th.e gathering gloom. There still existed a feeling that the 
military men were really all comrades. St. Jorre described the 
scene of Northern troops' departure from Enugu as follows: " ! Baba' 
Ogunewe, the Ibo commanding officer, had resisted attempts by the 
Eastern government to wreak revenge on his Northern soldiers with 
the same courage and determination with which he had stopped the 
latter from mutiriying during the coup. The send-off was preceded 
by drinks with his Northern officers in the mess, an official 
photograph, and accompanied by tearful scenes at Enugu railway 
station." (St. Jorre, op^cit., p.80). See also, Luckham, op.cit.. 
pp.289,304,332-334; First, op.cit,. p.323; and Dudley, B.J. 
"Western Nigeria and the Nigerian Crisis" in Panter-Brick, op.cit., 
pp.103-4-
of life in the pre-coup armed forces. "Because of the relative 
impermeability of its boundaries, and its emphasis on solidarity 
in the socialization process and the daily rituals of military
V
life, the army provided a unique degree of security and predict- 
ability in inter-personal relationships in a rapidly changing 
society. However, in the event of institutional collapse, the 
dissolution of solidary relationships often results in exaggerated 
hostility among institutional participants. As Luckham noted, 
"...the corporate unity which had earlier insulated the military 
from politics and conflict on primordial lines only made these clea- 
vages worse when they finally penetrated the army's boundaries."-^ 
The impulse to regain the security of institutional cohesion 
and solidarity was strong. This was most clearly illustrated at 
the meeting of the Supreme Military Council held under the auspices 
of the Ghanian military government at Aburi in January 1967  
The tone of this meeting was set by General Ankrah in his opening 
address to the Nigerian soldiers:
It is a saying that if Generals were to meet and discuss 
frontiers, wars or even go into the details to forestall 
war, there will never be any differences or discrepancies 
but unity and understanding. There will be no war because 
the two old boys will meet at the frontier and tell each 
other - 'Old boy, we are not going to commit our boys to 
die, come on, let us keep the politicians out - and that 
is the end.' 57 . < 
General Ankrah was mistaken in this case. Although a
 
superficial bonhomie was re-established among the participants, a
55. Luckham, R. "The Nigerian Military" in Panter-Brick, op.cit.. 
PP.75-76.
%. See Kirk-Greene, op.cit., Vol.1, pp.312-340 (Documents 77-81), 
for details of the Aburi meetings and agreements.
57. Cited in Luckham, op^cit.. pp.289-290.
fundamental contradiction in attitudes undermined the value of 
the meeting. It appears that Ojukwu came to Aburi intent on 
negotiating a final settlement of the crisis; while Gowon and 
the other representatives of the Federal government viewed the 
meeting as no more than a discussion prior to formal negotiations. 
This differing conception of the importance of Aburi may partly 
explain Ojukwu's apparent success in gaining approval for the re- 
structuring of the army and state on a loose confederal basis, 
with each region retaining control of its own security forces, 
administrative structures, and political organization. And it 
certainly explains in some part the Federal leaders 1 retreat from
the Aburi agreements once it became clear that the East regarded
59 Aburi as a final victory for its cause. 7
A more fundamental flaw in the value of the Aburi meetings, 
however, lay in the soldiers 1 failure to perceive the limits on 
their control of the political process. Their attempt to settle 
their differences without reference to the aspirations of civilian
power groups doomed their efforts to failure. The 'New Niger- 
60 ians' who had risen to positions of prominence and administrative
authority in the Federal arena were unwilling to forfeit their 
gains and see central authority once again diminished. To the
58. See St. Jorre, op.cit., pp.92-93«
59. As St. Jorre says: "The ! Aburi spirit 1 , three short weeks after 
the meeting, was already flickering out and both principals were to 
blame: Ojukwu for not resisting the temptation to spell out his 
'confederal' victory the moment he got home and thus opening the 
old wound, and Gowon for not ignoring the challenge and then 
publicly reneging on certain crucial -parts of the agreement." (St. 
Jorre, op.cit.. pp.97-98).
60. The term 'New Nigerians' was used by St. Jorre to describe civil 
servants and otherv mostly public, officials whose loyalty lay to 
the Federation rather than a particular region. (St. Jorre, op.cit.. 
pp.73 and 107).
leading civilians of post-July Nigeria the political cost of 
regaining harmonious relations within the army was too high. 
As Dent says;
Aburi demonstrated both the inadequacy of the military's 
political and constitutional skills and the vulnerable 
position in which they put themselves if they sought, in 
their sole capacity, to make generous settlements to each
other at the expense of constitutional principles which/:-)
some considered vital.
In the end the Aburi agreements collapsed. Rather than 
providing a solution to the crisis they merely added fuel to the 
fires of bitterness and hostility which consumed the brotherhood 
of Nigerian soldiers; so that, by the time of secession in May 
1967, the Eastern and Federal governments were led by men whose 
political ambitions were heavily reinforced by personal distaste 
for and distrust of their opponents. Bitterness and distrust 
were not, however, confined to the military leaders of the state. 
The outbursts of mass inter-ethnic hostility which punctuated the 
various phases of the national power struggle following the Jan- 
uary coup reproduced a similar set of perceptions on a wider scale.
Recognizing the Ibos f industry and dynamic pursuit of
upward mobility, some observers had called them the 'Jews' of
£~> 
Africa. Following the riots which convulsed major Northern
cities in May 1966, it became possible to perceive another simil- 
arity between the two groups: irrational persecution by the
61. Dent, M.J. "The Military and the Politicians 11 in Panter-Brick, 
op.cit., pp.88-89-
62. For example, in a discussion of the tradition of Ibo business 
success, Schwarz remarked: "If the Ibo are 'clever 1 it is mainly 
because, like the Jews, they have had to be." (Schwarz, op.cit.. 
p.252.
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community within which they formed a minority group. ^ This 
perception was re-inforced and converted into an outright fear 
of genocide by the eruption of anti-Ibo/Eastern rioting in Sept- 
ember/October 1966.
Isolated incidents of inter*-ethnic violence had occurred 
in the North throughout August and September 1966. However, 
Radio Kaduna ! s re-broadcast, on September 28th, of a Dahomean 
report of attacks on Northerners resident in the East triggered 
off "a terrible new cataclysm which made all the year's preceding 
violence look like a barrack-room brawl." ^ Largely unhindered 
by governmental authorities - indeed, Northern soldiers in some 
cases led the slaughter - Northern mobs murdered thousands of 
Ibos and other Easterners. By the time the pogrom had burned 
itself out, virtually every Ibo in the North was dead, hiding
with sympathetic Northerners and expatriates, or making the
66 perilous trek back to the East.
Accurate reports of the numbers of Easterners murdered or 
repatriated to the East were lost in the flood of Federal and 
Eastern propaganda which followed the autumn violence; but the 
riots 1 impact is not diminished if one accepts the lowest esti- 
mates of approximately 7,000 killed and 1,000,000 repatriated. 
So far as the survivors of the massacre and their comrades in
63. O'Connell, J. "The Anatomy of a Pogrom: An Outline Model with 
Special Reference to the Ibos in Northern Nigeria" Race 9 (1) 1967, 
pp.95-100.
64. See Luckham, op.cit., pp.307-310, for a description of the 
atmosphere of inter-ethnic tension in the North following the 
July coup.
65. St. Jorre, op.cit. t p.84*
66. See the description of the events of the September/October 
massacres in St. Jorre, op.cit.. pp.84-86; and First, op.cit., 
pp.329-333-
tbe East were concerned, there was little question that the 
autumn riots clearly revealed the genocidal ambitions of the 
North.
The question of the genocidal intentions of the North was 
to linger throughout the war. Under the Genocide Convention 
adopted by the United Nations in 19^8, genocide is defined as:
...any of the following acts committed with intent to 
destroy, in whole or part, a national, ethnic, racial, 
or religious group as such: (a), killing members...; (b). 
causing serious bodily or mental harm to members...; (c). 
deliberately inflipting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its destruction in whole or in 
part; (d). imposing measures intended to prevent births
within the group; (e). forcibly transferring children of
67 the group to another group.
Whether or not the Northern massacres in fact met the criteria 
set up under this convention, for most Ibos there was no doubt 
that the evidence pointed to a deliberate attempt to exterminate 
the Ibo presence in Nigeria. The obvious failure of the Northern
t
authorities to take adequate steps to prevent, or at least quell
6?. Cited in O'Brien, W.V. "International Crimes 11 in Sills, D.L. 
(ed.) International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences MacMillan 
and the Free Press CLondon, ""~~~
/- Q
the riots ; the 'callous indifference' of representatives of 
other ethnic groups, who responded to the news of what the Ibos 
saw as an unparallelled tragedy with comments such as "the Ibos 
had it coming to them" and "God's will"69 ; and the insistent 
repetition and inflation of the story of the massacres by the 
Eastern government's propaganda machine ; all combined to 
transform the Ibo's nascent fears of Northern intentions into 
a firm belief that they were the intended victims of a Northern 
policy of genocide.
The net result was the creation of one of the major pro- 
pellants of the Eastern famine. The Ibos.1 fear of genocide 
pushed them toward secession. It sustained their support of 
the political objectives of the Biafran government, and sustained
68. First described the official attitude to the massacres as 
follows: "Curfew was imposed for the first time on the sixth day 
of the killings. Only with enormous difficulty were the author- 
ities persuaded to organize the evacuation of Ibo civil servants. 
The press in the North, inhibited by official attitudes made only 
too clear, was censored or tongue-tied; during the first wave of 
killings, it carried not reports of the killings, but denials that 
they were taking place at all. In the very week that they were 
reaching their peak, Gowon issued an instruction to all government 
staff who had 'deserted' their posts to return by a given deadline. 
The day after the killings in Minna, the Northern military governor 
said publicly that the staff absences were a deliberate plan to 
paralyse the efficiency of the public service..." (First, op.cit.,
p.331).
The extent to which any desire to quell the violence could 
have been translated into action by the Federal commanders may 
have been very limited. In the first place, as Luckham argued, 
military commanders exercised only tenuous authority over their 
troops in this period. In some cases the troops simply ignored the 
hierarchy of authority in pursuit of their own ends. At the same 
time the Federal leaders may have been inhibited by their fear that 
the use of troops to quell the disturbances would simply result in 
the embroilment of those troops in the upsurge of communal hostility, 
(Luckham, op^cit., pp.305-307) 
69. Whiteman, op.cit. t p.116. As First remarked: "Hardly any Ibo 
lineage escaped unscathed; but if the scale of the disaster v;as 
hard to bear, the conviction that the rest of Nigeria neither 
knew nor cared was unendurable." (First, op.cit. t p.334)«
70. See the discussion of Eastern propaganda efforts in Luckham, 
op.cit., pp.300-303.
that government's rejection of Federal proposals which - by
ending the conflict - would have alleviated the wartime nutritional
crisis. As the Africa Research Group put it:
At the beginning of the war, the Ibo people were mesmerized 
by the fear of genocide. An atmosphere of collective 
paranoia existed with what appeared to be a plausible and 
frightening basis in reality. Through the specter of 
genocide, the Ibo people were organized to support Ojukwu's 
secession - more by mass psychological mobilization than by 
any appeal to a progressive program. This image of geno- 
cide catalyzed a people into a fighting machine, converting 
Ibos and other ethnic groups into Biafrans. It consolidated 
the population behind Ojukwu's leadership, creating and 
preserving solidarity and determination, while retarding 
any significant -..political, dissent or ethnic division within
Biafra. Psychologically and politically the fear of
71 genocide became Biafra's glue.
Or, more simply, as Nwankwo remarked:
That the Biafran propaganda sustained the support of the
>
Biafran populace for the leadership is true. But what was 
the magic of the Biafran propaganda? Just this; that the 
Northern massacres lent credibility to the fear for the
security of the Ibos which was the crux of Biafran propa-
72ganda. '
If, at this point, the material in the preceding pages is 
summed up, it is clear that after only one year of military rule 
the perceptual and goal structures which were to underlay the 
Civil War and the famine had been erected. The political ob- 
jectives of the belligerents were defined. Their conflict would 
revolve around the determination of the Federal leadership to
?1.Africa Research Group The Other Side of Nigeria's Civil War 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1970).
72. Nwankwo, A.A. and Ifejika, S.U. The Making of a Nation; Biafra 
C. Hurst and Co. (London, 1969), pp.15-17.
institutionalize a diffusion of authority away from the majority 
ethnic groups and regional apparatuses; and the Eastern leaders 1 
determination to retain regional autonomy based on the hegemony 
of the majority ethnic group within the region. The psychological 
screens through which the belligerents would perceive events during 
the war were also in place. The Ibos 1 fear of the Federal 
regime's genocidal intentions, and the hostility and bitterness 
of the inter-personal relations of the opposing leaders, would 
condition each side's lack of readiness to temper the pursuit of 
its political objectives in view of the cost of that quest in 
terms of human suffering.
In the next chapter the impact of the belligerents' perceptual 
and goal structures on the nutritional status of Eastern residents
7
will be assessed. The development of famine conditions will be 
traced and it will be shown that it was the articulation of these 
values and goal structures with the pre-war socio-economic structure 
of the Eastern Region which underlay the development of the 
nutritional catastrophe.
Before proceeding to a detailed analysis of the nutritional 
crisis, it seems appropriate to assess the extent to which the 
Civil War - the overt cause of the famine in the East - was 
inevitable. Military government up to the spring of 1967 had 
been a relatively unmitigated disaster. But did this reflect 
the insertion of soldiers into an already irretrievable situation; 
or had military intervention itself pushed the nation into the 
abyss of chaos and disintegration?
It appears that military rule in Nigeria both created and 
destroyed the possibility of transcending the 'praetorianism 1 of 
the era of civilian rule. There is no doubt that the January 
coup did, at least temporarily, break the grip of the political
class. However, the soldiers, largely because of the inhibitions 
of military professionalism, were unable to translate their initial 
success into a sustained attack on the other two poles of Nigerian 
politics - regional competition and ethnic sentiment. Their 
disavowal of political mechanisms for the aggregation and mediation 
of interests allowed these two forces untrammeled play and, in 
the end, they consumed the only remaining authoritative sources 
of national unity, the Army itself.
Following the July counter-coup it might have been possible 
for a civilian government to at least retard the plunge toward 
disintegration. But the addition to the political equation of 
the bitterness and distrust which accompanied the dissolution of 
the armed forces probably, given the essential political incom- 
petence of the soldiers, made secession, civil war, and famine 
inevitable. Nigeria was like a truck careering out of control 
down a mountain road; and the intervention of the military in 
political life like the introduction of a drunkard into the 
driver f s seat. In the chapters which follow, the ensuing crash 
will be examined.
CHAPTER III
Origins and Development of the 
Nutritional Crisis
The nutritional catastrophe which ravaged the civilian 
population of Eastern Nigeria during the Civil War resulted 
primarily from a drastic decline in per capita levels of protein 
consumption throughout the region. Although carbohydrate con- 
sumption dropped to low levels, the major cause of mortality 
during the disaster appears to have been severe protein deficiency. 
It was only in the latter stages of the war, and then only inside 
the Biafran enclave, that relief workers began to fear a sig- 
nificant rise in the number of deaths attributable to carbohydrate 
deprivation. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the 
initial development of the nutritional disaster in the Eastern 
Region.
The nutritional disaster began to take shape even before 
secession. It was given its initial impetus by the massive 
influx of dispossessed migrants into the Eastern Region following 
the communal upheavals which occurred during the summer and
1. See, for example, JOINTCHURGHAID_Press Rej^ge (Hereafter 
cited as JCA) JCA 87, Geneva, 19 August 1969; and the Guardian 
8 December 1969.
autumn months of 1966. Most of the repatriated migrants 
arrived in the East with few, if any, resources. As the Chair- 
man of the Eastern Region Rehabilitation Commission put it:
Suddenly and without warning they have been thrust out of 
these areas into this region. Many of them in a state of 
helpless indigence and penury...quite a number naked and 
without clothing...A refugee clutching his child and without 
any belongings became a regular feature for those four 
depressing weeks.
Two main avenues of support were open to the refugees. 
A lucky few found either public or private employment. The
2. See Luckham, R. The Nigerian Military; A Sociological Analysis 
of Authority and Revolt 1960~lg62 Cambridge University Press 
I Cambridge, 1971), PP»307-308, for a description of Eastern re- 
patriation in the months following the July counter-coup. The 
number of refugees which fled to the East from the Northern Region, 
and the number from the West and Lagos which joined them there is 
not certain; although, even the lowest estimates of the influx of 
displaced persons are of sufficient magnitude to have triggered off 
the nutritional crisis in the East. By the end of 1966 the Eastern 
Region Rehabilitation Commission reported a population of 1,175,000 
refugees. (West Africa, 26 December 1966, p.li|97). S.A. Aluko ! s 
analysis of the refugee problem assumed that a total of 1.6 million 
people eventually fled into the East. ("The Problem of the Displaced 
Persons" in Christian Concern in the Nigerian Civil War Daystar 
Press (Ibadan, 1969)). The Goodell study mission to Biafra assumed 
a refugee population from the West and North of 2,000,000 in its 
report. ("Report of the Biafra Study Mission" Congressional Record 
(Senate) 91st Congress, 1st Session (Washington, 25 February 1969, 
Vol.115, No.33 (hereafter referred to as the Goodell Report), p. 
S1977). St. Jorre f s estimate of the situation seems a reasonably 
acceptable middle position on which to stand: "It is difficult to 
quantify but the million Easterners who fled from the North were 
eventually to be joined by half a million from other parts of the 
Federation, producing a total of something around 1.5 million 
refugees in the East by the time the war broke out." (St. Jorre, 
John de The Nigerian Civil War Hodder and aoughton (London, 1972), 
p.87).
3- "Speech by the Chairman of the Eastern Region's Rehabilitation 
Committee" (Document No.95) in Kirk-Greene, A.H.M. Crisis and Con- 
flict in Nigeria; A Documentary Source Book 1966-lggg Oxford Univ- 
ersity Press (London, 197D, Vol.I7~pp.380-383." Perhaps the best 
evidence of the general penury of the refugees was the fact that 
the authorities in the areas from which they had fled, felt com- 
pelled to set up organizations to safe-guard the property the 
refugees left behind. Estimates of the value of the property aban- 
doned by Easterners ranged as high as £N60 m. (See Aluko, op.cit.,
p.32).
Eastern Region government committed itself to providing jobs for 
all displaced former public employees; and, by March 1967, the
\
Chairman of the Rehabilitation Commission reported that over 
28,000 refugees were employed in the public sector, with nearly 
5,000 more having been absorbed into the private sector.
This performance proved grossly inadequate, however, in the 
face of population displacement on such a massive scale. The 
Chairman of the Rehabilitation Commission noted:
Already pressures are building up in the civil service, the 
public sectors, and the private sectors which admittedly 
have a limit they can absorb...nearly six thousand Railway 
men and about that number of daily paid workers have been
unleashed on us. A couple of thousand more are overflowing15 
from the Posts and Telegraphs Department... ^
The pressure of demand for jobs from former public employees, not 
to mention the large number of repatriates who had previously been 
engaged in private sector employment as traders, clerks, etc.,
overwhelmed the absorbtive capacity of the regional employment
£ structure. Even though the authorities appeared willing to
countenance the creation of vastly inflated public sector employ-
**• JkicL
5. Ibid.
6. Aluko estimated that the repatriation of Eastern migrants added 
about 1.1 million men to the Eastern labour force. (Aluko, op.cit-, 
p.21).
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ment , and even though the regional government created a number 
of job vacancies by expelling non-Easterners in October 1966, 
there could never be enough jobs to go around.
For the majority of repatriates the extended family network 
offered the major,'if not the sole, source of support. As the 
chairman of the Rehabilitation Commission said:.
...this miracle [absorbtion of the repatriates] has been 
performed as a result of our time honoured and respected 
extended family system... These refugees returned and 
were absorbed in existing facilities of their homes...
However, the absorbtive capacity of the extended family network 
was itself limited:
God in his infinite mercy worked on the side of the people 
of this region. They arrived at a time when our harvest 
was at its peak and our barns were full with crops. Food 
was therefore' not a pressing necessity... [However,] my 
commission knew that very soon the honey-moon would be over; 
very soon the elasticity of the extended family network
?. First estimated that the Eastern Region government's plans for 
absorbing all repatriated public employees would have expanded 
public sector employment by approximately 50%. The problems con- 
nected with financing such a massive expansion of public employment 
soured relations between the Eastern and Federal governments. 
According to the Aburi agreements the FMG was to pay repatriated 
public employees 1 salaries up to March 31, 196?. However, the FMG's 
payments amounted to no more than £N300,000 while the Eastern budget 
announced in April 196? allocated £N4 million to job creation for 
refugees. (First, R. The Barrel of a Gun: Political Power in Africa 
and the Coup d'Etat Penguin~Press~ TAlIen"Lane","1970), p7342; White- 
man, K. "Enugu: The Psychology of Secession" in Panter-Brick, S.K. 
Nigerian Politics and Military Rule: Prelude to the Civil War The 
Athlone Press (London, 1970), pVH9; and St. Jorre, p-p.cit., p.87).
8. Although the expulsion of non-Easterners was rationalized as 
a security measure, it seems likely that the pressures of employ- 
ment creation provided one of the impulses behind the act. See 
St. Jorre, op^cit., p.87-
9. Kirk-Greene, loc.cit.
would become so distended that it would burst under its 
own inscrutable burden. Our first task therefore was 
to anticipate that food in the next few months may become 
short. 10
The Chairman's line of reasoning appears to have been well 
founded. The sudden addition of over one million refugees to the 
Eastern population could hardly have resulted in anything other 
than a dramatic reduction in the quantities of food consumed not 
only by the repatriates, but by the other members of the extended 
family whose food supplies the refugees were sharing. In the 
most densely populated areas of the region - such as the Ibo 
Heartland - which had been the most deeply involved in exporting 
population to the cities , there was little prospect of expanding 
food production in order to accommodate higher levels of demand. 
These were the very areas in which cultivation had already been 
intensified, the substitution of cassava for yam pushed furthest, 
and rural-to-rural migration developed to the greatest extent.
Nor, it appears, would there have been widespread oppor- 
tunities for the repatriated migrants to re-enter the subsistence
10. Ibid.
11. Population densities in the pre-war Ibo Heartland ranged from 
a low of i|l? per square mile in Udi Division, up to 1632/square 
mile in Orlu Division. (Federal Census Office, Population Census 
of Nigeria 1963 (Eastern Nigeria) (Lagos, n.d.) vol.3> P-54). 
r-iigration out of this overpopulated area had been extremely heavy. 
In Uborna, for example, researchers found that of 30 individuals 
who had completed primary or secondary school in 1962, 28' had 
migrated to urban centres. (Oluwansanmi, H.A. et al. Uboma: A 
Socio-Economic and Nutritional Survey of a Rural Community in 
Eastern Nigeria Geographical Pub1i cat ions~CBude, Cornwall, 1966), 
p76T^Similarly, Gugler discovered, in a survey of 12 Ibo and 
Ibibio villages made in 1961-62, that half of the men and a quarter 
of the women were away in urban centres at the time of the inquiry. 
(Gugler, J. "Eastern Nigerians in Town: Life in a Dual System" 
Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines 11 (1) 1971, p. 4-11 (Table
58
economy and commence producing food for themselves. The system 
of land tenure in the East was generally based on familial owner-
"1 7*
ship with usufruct vested in patrilineal descent groups. The 
individual's right to utilize communal land was virtually inalien- 
able. However, the pressures of overpopulation in the areas of 
the region from which most migrants originated were such that, 
in practice, land not utilized by migrants reverted to the owning 
body if or re-assignment to resident members of the eligible descent 
group. Thus, "The emigrant, while his claim to a share in the 
communal farmland is upheld, is under constant threat that he may 
lose his right to a specific piece of land." ** .In a context of 
land scarcity, this would have largely precluded the repatriate's 
assumption of a productive role in the subsistence economy. ^ 
In sum, it can be argued that the mass repatriation of
12. See Smock, D.R. and Smock, A.C. Cultural and Political Aspects 
of Rural Transformation: A Case Study, _of ^Eastern. Nigeria Praeger 
(New York, 1972) , Introduction and Ch.3 for a detailed assessment
of land tenure in the Eastern Region. \  
13. Gugler, op.cit. , p
The tendency for the refugee to be cut off from the use of 
communal land was heightened by the temporal dimension of migration 
Gugler '.s research showed that most Eastern migrants were fully 
committed to earning their living in town. Fully 79% of generally 
unskilled labourers and traders, and 95% of senior civil servants 
and professionals, indicated that they had never resided at home 
since the age of 15 (or leaving school). "Nearly all expect to 
spend their entire working life away from their home place... Even 
on retirement many will make an attempt to find other sources of 
urban income." (Gugler, op . ci t . * p. ^ 05). On the other hand, the 
tendency was to some extent mediated by the migrant's response to 
his achieved level of urban income. Gugler showed that the 
economic attraction of urban life, for low income groups, was 
complemented by an economic attraction to the home village: "Low 
income earners find it difficult to support a wife and children in 
town... Unless wife and or children succeed in supplementing the 
family income from employment, trade, or crafts, they have to rely 
on a rural income... It accrues only so long as the family con- 
tinues to occupy the land; once they leave it, their rights to 
its proceeds lapses; the family hand becomes a family mouth." 
(Gugler, op.cit. , p
Eastern migrants must have precipitated the nutritional crisis 
in the East. It created a large population of essentially 
non-productive persons who were dependent for their sustenance 
on the already stretched resources of the extended family net- 
work. It engendered an upward shift in aggregate demand for 
food without evoking a concomitant increase in the supply capacity 
of the region's resources. In fact, the repatriation of Eastern 
migrants, by halting the flow of cash remittances to Eastern 
households, reduced the regional capacity to command external 
supplements to local production of foodstuffs. ^ On a per 
capita basis, Easterners' consumption of both starchy staples 
and imported animal proteins probably declined; a reduction in 
protein and carbohydrate intake which, given the already low 
standards of nutrition in the region, must have triggered off - 
at least for those who were worst off - a descent into star- 
vation.
The nutritional impact of the mass repatriation of Eastern 
migrants was reinforced in the spring of 196? when the Federal 
government imposed an economic blockade on the Eastern Region. 
The erection of Federal barriers to the inflow of external re- 
sources eliminated any possibility of mediating the impact of
15. In a discussion with the author, Arnold Hughes pointed out 
that the influx of non-local protein supplies would also have 
been impeded by the forcible removal of Ibo traders from the 
network of food exporters and importers who met Eastern food 
requirements.
16. The Observer, 23 June 1968, contained an interview with a 
Dr. Aaron Ifekwunigwe who stated that the first cases of Kwash- 
iokor to arrive at his hospital near Owerri came in March 1967 
and were the children of refugees from Northern Nigeria.
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the refugees on the Eastern food economy. '
The institution of economic sanctions against the East 
resulted from the collapse of the Aburi agreements. In February 
1967 Ojukwu announced that, unless the commitments made by Gowon 
and the other members of the Supreme Military Council in the
meetings held at Aburi in January 196? were fully implemented by
i ft March 31st, he would unilaterally put them into operation. The
Supreme Military Council responded to this threat with the promul- 
gation of Decree No.8 on March 17th. ° Decree No. 8 reflected a 
compromise between the more or less pro-confederal agreements made 
at Aburi and the objections made to those agreements by Federal
civil servants, who wanted to retain some semblance of a Federal
20 system with a powerful centre.
Ojukwu rejected Decree No.8. - He believed that its provisions
for the declaration of a state of emergency within any of the
21 regions represented a potential threat to Eastern security.
Following March 31st he proceeded to appropriate all Federal
revenues generated in the East, taking over control of the Eastern
22assets of Federal corporations, schools, and courts as well.
1?. Although the forcible restriction of exports of food - such as 
yams - out of the Eastern Region would have mitigated in a small 
way the impact of the blockade.
18. See "On Aburi we Stand: Ojukwu's Dawn Broadcast, 25 February 
1967" (Document No. 90) in Kirk-Greene, op^cit. , Vol.1, pp. 362-367.
19. See "Decree No. 8 of 1967" (Document No. 99) in Kirk-Greene, 
op.cit. . Vol.1, pp. k 01-^f 02.
20. For a detailed assessment of the manoeuvering behind the pro- 
mulgation of Decree No. 8 see St. Jorre, og_. c i t . , pp.97 and 103- 
10^; First, op.cit. , pp. 338-339; and Kirk-Greene, op^ ci t . , Vol. 
1, pp. 77-86.
21. Ibid.
22. For details of the rationalization behind this- action see Kirk- 
Greene, og^cit., Vol.1, p. 90.
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In retaliation, the FMG .immediately suspended Nigeria Airways 
flights to the East; and, at the next meeting of the Supreme 
Military Council, imposed a number of economic sanctions against
o~z
the region. ^ With the addition of a naval "blockade of the East
in May 1967, the Federal siege of Biafra can be said to have
2k begun.
Siege warfare has a long, if not particularly illustrious, 
history. Reduction of an enemy through interdiction of his food 
and/or other supplies played a major role in medieval warfare, 
the Napoleonic era, and in both World Wars. Few economic block-
ades in history have, however, had the dramatic impact of the one
25 imposed on Eastern Nigeria. ^ Although considerations of the
effect of the Federal siege tend to focus on the barrier it 
presented to the international relief agencies which were attempt- 
ing to alleviate the nutritional crisis in the war zone, it was 
also an important factor in creating a nutritional emergency 
prior to the war.
The blockade intensified pre-existing protein deficiencies 
in the Eastern Region. It disrupted the importation of animal
23. See Kirk-Greene.. op. cit. , Vol.1, p. 90.
. The exact date on which it commenced is unclear, 
but it appears that the marine blockade or the East must have 
been imposed immediately following the announcement of Eastern 
secession. See Kirk-Greene, op . cit . , Vol.1, p. 93.
25. For a compelling account of one blockade which did cause 
suffering on the scale seen in Biafra, see Salisbury, H.E. The 
900 Days : Th e Siege .of Leningrad Pan Books Ltd. (London, i9?l7<
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and fish products into the Eastern Region , reducing the total 
supply of protein available to the population and, because con- 
sumption of the amino acids associated with animal proteins 
declined, reducing the nutritional utilization of the vegetable 
proteins contained in the starchy staples, which, more than ever, 
provided the bulk of nutritional intake. In fact the heightened 
demand for locally produced foodstuffs induced by the Federal 
blockade must have, given the- essentially static level of regional 
food production, reinforced the reduction of per capita consumption 
of starchy tubers already triggered off by the repatriation of 
migrants; a reduction w.lii.ch implied, in turn, not only a decrease 
in the total consumption of vegetable proteins, but, because of 
diminished ingestion of carbohydrates, the diversion of consumed
on
proteins from their normal bodily functions to energy provision. (
It appears, then, that a nutritional crisis developed even 
before secession. The combined effects of mass repatriation and 
blockade must have reduced already inadequate levels of protein 
and carbohydrate consumption to a point at which an increasing
26. A number of observers have pointed out, however, that at least 
some trade between the East and the rest of the Federation continued 
following the imposition of the blockade; indeed, right through the 
v;ar. Akpan, for example, refers to this trade as the 'attack trade 1 
(an indication that cross-barrier trade reached a size sufficient 
to warrant a general denomination).(Akpan, N.U. The Struggle for 
Secession: A Personal Account of the Nigerian Civil War Frank Cass 
(London, 1971), p. 1220. In Samuels, op_.,c it., p. 10, it is asserted 
that there was "much interchange of goods and currency within Ibo 
areas, regardless of whether Biafran or not. Supplies came across 
and down the Niger from both the North and Midwest. Even cattle 
came down on rafts." Another indication of the existence of a 
flow of goods across the blockade lay in the Biafran accusations 
that the FMG was attempting to pursue its genocidal policies by 
poisoning food supplies procured in this manner. (See, for 
example, the article in the Daily Telegraph, 8 July 1968). Also 
in the fact that the FMG felt obliged to issue a new currency.
2?. This latter point was brought out by Aall, op.cit.  p.5.
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proportion of the Eastern population was approaching or moving 
across the threshold of starvation. It was, however, the 
commencement of military operations by the belligerents which 
largely accounted for the transformation of the nutritional 
crisis into one of the most grievous episodes of mass starvation 
in the 20th century. As Aall said:
When people even in normal times had to live on such a 
poor diet as 75-80% of the desirable calorie level and 
50-65% of the desirable protein level, it is obvious that 
they would be vulnerable and prone to 'suffer severely even 
by exposure to moderate stress and strain. It is there- 
fore not difficult to imagine the results of war destruction
pO
and consequent food shortages.
Armed conflict between Biafra and the Federal Military 
Government commenced with the Federal capture of Ogoja, Nsukka, 
and Bonny in July 196?. By the end of October 1967, Federal 
forces had captured Enugu and its northern environs, re-taken 
Benin, occupied Calabar, and completed the encirclement of Biafra 
by linking up elements of the 1st and 3rd (Marine Commando) 
Divisions at Ikom on the eastern border of the region. Following 
a winter lull in the fighting, the Federal advance resumed and by 
the end of 1968 Onitsha, Port Harcourt, Aba, Owerri, and Okigwi 
had been secured by Federal troops. Thus, by the end of the 
first 18 months of combat, the territory under the control of the 
Biafran government had been reduced essentially to the area 
comprising the Ibo Heartland. And from this point onward, the 
land area of the Biafran enclave was steadily, though gradually 
and with a few reversals, eroded under the pressure of Federal
28. Aall, op cit., p.6.
6/f
attacks. y
The Federal occupation of large areas of the original 
territory of Biafra was a primary factor in the intensification 
of the nutritional crisis. It led - as both Ibo and non-Ibo 
residents of the enclave's periphery fled from their homes in 
the face of the Federal advance - to the creation of an ever 
larger population of refugees in the East. Their flight from 
Federal troops took many of these refugees deeper inside Biafran 
territory-' , with the result that, as the Federal army compressed 
the land area under Biafran control, the proportion of displaced 
persons within the total population of the enclave steadily 
increased. As the number of refugees built up, toose indi- 
viduals who had not been displaced from their normal places of 
residence or employment came under increasing pressure. Members 
of their extended family who had become refugees descended on
29. See Niven, R. The War of Nigerian Unity 1967-1970 Evans
Brothers (Nigeria Publishers) Ltd. (Ibadan, 1979), Ch.15-17,
for detailed description of the military operations of both sides.
30. Describing a visit he made with Ojukwu to the front north of 
Enugu just prior to that city's capture in September 1967, Akpan 
said: "Then we saw the refugees. We had started seeing the throngs 
twelve miles from Enugu. Women and children, old men and women, 
with fowls, cats, goats, and whatever personal belongings they 
could carry, moving aimlessly to uncertain destinations. We saw a 
few lying dead, or nearly so, from hunger and fatigue. They were 
among those who had been trekking for days from the most remote 
parts of the Nsukka Division [in which there had been intense 
fighting] - those who did not take to the bush." (Akpan, op.cit., 
pp.93-9/4-). The Goodell study 'group reported that virtually all 
Ibos and about i+Q% of the non-Ibos normally resident in territory 
held by Federal troops fled into the enclave as the front approa- 
ched. (Goodell Report, op.cit., p.S1977). See also St. Jorre, 
op.cit., pp.378-380, for a description of refugee movements.
31. According to the report made by the Goodell study mission, which 
travelled inside the enclave in early 1969, refugees accounted for 
approximately one-third of the enclave's population. (Goodell Report, 
op.cit., p.S1977).
them seeking food and shelter*2 ; while, in the case of farmers, 
they were simultaneously expected to produce food for the use 
of the army and displaced persons living in refugee camps.
The struggle to increase food production within the enclave 
occupied the efforts of both official and private agencies. The 
major initiative was embodied in the Emergency Food Programme, 
which was launched in 1969-^ This programme aimed at the total
mobilization of all available resources in order to increase
L
food production. The primary focus was on staple carbohydrate 
crops, shortages of which were beginning to threaten the conver- 
sion of the protein crisis into carbohydrate starvation. More 
land was to be brought under cultivation and virtually the entire 
population of the enclave was to be drawn into food production. 
The creation of a 'Land Army 1 attracted the most outside attention 
to the Biafran agricultural schemes. As described by one ob- 
server, "...the Land Army is organizing to clear 100 acres for 
each village. Men between the ages.of 12 and 35 who are not in
32. A number of observers remarked on the pressure refugees ex- 
erted on their relatives who had not been displaced: "Under normal 
conditions in Nigeria, if a relative comes to visit you, however 
remote that relationship may be, you are bound to give hospitality. 
In war this meant that as soon as a family became refugees they 
would descend on some relatives in an undisturbed area, and these 
relatives would have to look after them. At least it shared the 
burden of suffering." (Roberts, B. Life and Death among the Ibos 
Scripture Union (London, 1970), p.55")'"  -See also Lindsay, K. 
"A Clan System that Means Agony for Biafra's Starving Refugees" 
Globe and Mail (Toronto), 2 October 1968; and Akpan, pp.cit. 5 p.l60.
33. For details of the Emergency Food Programme see the Goodell 
Report, op^cit., pp.S1978-S1979; "Emergency Relief in Nigeria 
and the Biafran Enclave July 196? Through June 30, 1969" AID^Fbr- 
eign Disaster Relief Report Reprint (Reprinted from: Ninth Report, 
Fiscal Year 19697 Foreign Disaster Emergency Relief, issued by 
Disaster Relief Coordinator, Agency for International Development) 
(Hereafter referred to as USAID), pp.37-38; and Adler, R. "Letter 
from Biafra" New Yorker if October 1969-
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military service are being given special Land Array training. 
In addition, persons up to [age] 50 will assist with the land 
clearing. The Land Array will plant as much seed yam as it 
can get; then plant early maize on the remaining land... : '^
Although the Biafran Government proudly announced its 
success, the extent to which the Emergency Food Production Pro- 
gramme was fruitful is unclear. It appears that it was pursued
•ZC
with enthusiasm by the people of the enclave^ ,  however, most 
of its objectives relating to increased unit productivity in 
subsistence farming were impossible to accomplish so long as 
the Federal blockade checked Eastern farmers 1 access to fertil- 
izers, pesticides and other capital goods. More importantly, 
Federal military operations severed the Ibo Heartland's farmers 
access to the fertile croplands of the non-Ibo periphery of the 
region. The land which remained under the control of Biafran 
farmers was the most degraded in the Region: even before 
secession it had been incapable of supporting population den- 
sities lower than those experienced during the war.
The military operations of the Federal armed forces result 
ed, then, in the establishment within the territory left under 
Biafran control of a minimum level of demand for food far in 
excess of the productive capacity of the resources left in the
- Adler, op. cit.
35. See the report by Paul Connet in the Spectator (Reprinted in 
Press Actions, 1 January ~3Q_ June 1969 Biafran Overseas Press 
Division (Markpress) , Geneva.
36. For assessments of the nutritional impact of the loss of the 
non-Ibo periphery of Biafra see Akpan, ojo^cit., p. 193; Goodell 
Report, op. cit. , p.S19?8; and the speech by Dr. Herman Midaelkoop 
reprinted in Perspectives Biafra: _An International Conference 
s£QggQggJ_j?Y Occupation Outrage, Inc.. "f Washington, B.C., 11 
January 1969)  
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enclave. Growing shortages of both protein and carbohydrate
foodstuffs - reflected in rising market prices for those v;hich
^7 
were available-" - marked a fundamental deterioration in supply
and demand relationships in the enclave. For most of the pop- 
ulation of the enclave life became, as described by Nwankwo, a 
Malthusian nightmare:
Living in Biafra today is like a nightmare... Food prices 
have risen a hundred-fold. Garri, which is the staple 
food, used to be less than a penny a cup. Now it's more 
than a shilling (twelve pennies) a cup.' Yet it is the 
basic and commonest foodstuff which even the poorest must 
afford or starve. Such things as meat and fish are now 
exorbitant luxuries. Salt costs £105 to £120 a bag.1 And 
so on. To appreciate the situation, it must be realised 
that the purchasing power of money (particularly of local 
foodstuffs) is particularly high in underdeveloped countries..
One can then imagine a situation where an average 
Biafran can't have a satisfactory meal on five shillings.1 
And to crown the misery the earning power is less by ;riore 
than a half now. The peasant farmers have been driven out 
of their lands, their crops destroyed and set ablaze by the 
Nigerian Army. The heavily burdened government is the only 
employer and its employees are (inevitably) paid allowances 
and not salaries. With an increased number of dependants, 
heavily reduced wages, and prices multiplied tenfold, the 
average Biafran is forced to concentrate on the progressively 
more difficult job of keeping from starvation. This is the 
story for the average Biafran who earns an income (no natter 
how small) or who has a relative who does so. There are 
millions of others who are below this fortunate average. 
These are the desperate refugees, no less than six million 
in number, unemployed, destitute, driven from their homes 
and deprived of their lands - their only means of livelihood 
- which have been blazed into desolation by the invading
37. See the Goodell Report, op^^cit. , p.S1978, for a general 
assessment of food price movements inside the enclave.
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Nigerian Army. It is from this -miserable group that two 
to three thousand die every day of hunger and disease.... 
They are about the streets in families, the woman, grim- 
faced, carrying a crying, hungry child; the rest stumbling 
blindly after her; all of them miserable, living skeletons, 
picking their weary way through the more fortunate but no 
more happy crowd, in search of just sufficient food to 
postpone the inevitable parting of ways between body and 
soul. At first the alms came, freely and generously. 
But soon they became only a trickling, as the shortage of 
circulating money became more acute... In any case, most 
of the fortunate ones walk about with little or no money 
in their pockets (and of course nothing in the house). 
And none is sure of the next meal. Under this condition, 
the refugees receive little and they die of hunger and of 
exposure to the elements of nature. The extended family, 
that resilient traditional umbrella in whose comfortable 
and protecting shade the Biafran always finds a welcome 
place in times of need, is useless today. The umbrella 
itself has been torn to pieces by the invading Nigerian
 2 Q
forces.
It must be remembered, however, that the nutritional crisis 
was not confined to the Biafran enclave. As Colin Legum reported, 
many Easterners elected to hide in the bush surrounding their 
homes rather than flee deeper into the Biafran enclave as the 
frontline approached them: "Hundreds of thousands of Ibos who 
fled before the advance of the Nigerian Federal troops into break- 
away Biafra six months ago are still living precariously in make- 
dwellings in the bush... Red Cross workers estimate that at least 
120,000 Ibos are sheltering in the bush between the northern 
university town of Nsukka and the fallen Biafran capital of 
Enugu... By day the entire Ibo countryside 'liberated 1 by Federal
38. Nwankwo, A.A. and Ifejika, S.U. The Making of aJEation; 
Biafra C. Hurst and Co. (London, 19b977 pp.2?l-2?2.
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troops is denuded of Ibo life. By night people emerge from the 
bush to visit their homes in the villages and gather food in the
fields - and the militants to harry the troops and set booby
39 traps."-" Although these people were able to produce some food
while hiding in the busVr , the bulk of available evidence pointed 
to a drastic decline in their state of health if they remained 
hidden for a long period of time. (Once relief operations in 
the occupied areas were well under way, it was found that the 
incidence of new cases of severe malnourishrnent was closely 
linked to the emergence of new groups of refugees from the bush). 
Coming out of hiding .though, did not lead automatically to 
a resumption of normal economic activity and the end of the 
nutritional crisis for inhabitants of the occupied areas. Per- 
haps the best illustration of this can be seen in Colin Legum's 
reports on conditions around the former capital, Enugu. In 
January 1968 Legum described the virtual absence of normal life 
both there and around Nsukka, even though these areas had been 
liberated 3i months before. In a second report filed 4 months 
later, Legum found only a limited improvement in the situation: 
"With the return of confidence, more people are coming out of the 
bush; but their numbers are hundreds rather than thousands."^ 
Civilians living in the Port Harcourt-Owerri sector, in the 
area around Ikot Ekpene, in the strips of territory bounding the
/
39. Observer, 21 January 1968.
40. This point was made in many discussions the author held with 
relief workers who had extensive contacts with groups which had 
remained hidden in the bush for considerable periods of time 
following the passage of the frontlines.
41. Ibid.
- Observer, loc.cit. See also St. Jorre, op.cit., pp.264-265-
70
Niger river on either side of Onitsha, and on either side of the 
road linking Enugu and Onitsha, were caught between Federal 
security regulations, which forbade the resumption of peacetime 
routines, and a real fear of Biafran retaliation against collab- 
orators who accepted the Federal presence and attempted to lead 
normal lives. In these, and, as Legum illustrated, in some other 
areas where Federal control was less tenuous, many fields remained 
uncultivated, markets empty, and refugee camps full long after 
the re-imposition of Federal authority.
In the spring of 1968 nutritional standards in the war zone 
deteriorated precipitously. Reports of mass starvation and 
rapidly escalating death rates - both inside the enclave and in 
the territory occupied by Federal forces - were publicized by 
the relief agencies and the press. •* These reports focussed on 
immediate events, such as the fall of Port Harcourt in May, for 
an explanation of the nutritional crisis. ^ It can be argued, 
however, that the dramatic impact of such events was largely a
43. In the late spring of 1968 the Nigerian Civil War shed its 
status as the 'forgotten \var ! - as it was called by Dame Margery 
Perham in earlier days. (Observer, 17 December 196?, 
Letters section) . The deterioration of the nutritional situation 
propelled the conflict onto the front pages of much of the world's 
press. Whereas, in the first four months of 1968, the British 
press, which provided one of the most complete coverages of the 
war, contained only 4 references to the war or its consequences 
for the civilian population, during June, July, and August 1968 
it gave extensive, virtually daily, coverage of developments. 
For more details of British press treatment of the war see Appleby, 
D» Public Relations, the Mass Media, and Political Pressure Groups: 
British Opinion and the Nigerian Civil War Dissertation submitted 
for the degree of M.Soc.Sci. at the University of Birmingham in 1973
. See, for example, the ICRC 8 s appeal for support following 
the fall of Port Harcourt. Topical Red Cross News, No.l07b, 
Geneva, 31 May 1968:''
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function of the extent to which the earlier shocks of repatriation, 
blockade, and military disruption had shattered the foundations 
of nutrition in the war zone. It appears that during the pre- 
ceding eighteen months the pressures resulting from the inter- 
section of the civil crisis with the socio-economic structure of 
the East had propelled large segments of the population onto and 
over the threshold of starvation. Consumption of proteins within 
a large proportion of the population had been reduced to a levej. 
at which any further contraction would trigger off the rapid 
development of a debilitating - and if untreated, fatal - form of 
protein starvation called kwashiokor.
The prolongation of the war into, and beyond, the spring 
of 1968 resulted in just such a contraction in protein consumption 
in the war zone. Unable, because of the Federal blockade, to 
counter the increasing scarcity of animal proteins; confronted 
with a reduction in their consumption of vegetable proteins and 
carbohydrates because of the onset of the annual pre-harvest 
f hungry season 1 ^ , faced with a rapid increase in the number of 
refugees and a further disruption of food production in the 
enclave as a result of Federal offensives; and with production 
and markets in the territory under Federal control still largely 
in a state of collapse, the residents of the war zone had little 
option but to tighten their belts one more notch and endure. 
For many, though, there was neither notch nor endurance left.
< The annual hungry season was the period between March and 
July when the supplies of food derived from the previous year's 
crops had been exhausted but the current season's crop was as 
yet unready for harvest. Although closely linked to the period- 
icity of agricultural production in the region, it was also a 
phenomenon of poverty. As Oluwansanmi said: "The failure of the 
family to make good their food deficits in the hungry season with 
local purchases is a sad reflection of the prevailing high market 
 orices and low buying power of the householder." (Oluvjansanmi, H.A. 
et al. Uboma: A Socio-Economic and Nutritional Survey of a Rural 
Community in Eastern ^ Nigeria Geographical Publications (Bude", 
Cornwall, 1966)"," p. "
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Whether they were refugees moving along the roads leading away from 
the frontlines; workers faced with the growing disparity between 
their wages and the cost of foodstuffs; families attempting to cope 
with the burden of their dispossessed relations; or displaced 
persons lodged in refugee camps or hiding in the bush, this further 
contraction of protein consumption saw millions of Easterners 
sliding into the state of lassitude and weakness which heralded 
protein starvation and the approach of death.
46. It must be remembered that the nutritional crisis had an uneven 
impact on the population of the war zone. Not all Easterners were 
equally affected by any one, or by the combination, of the phenomena 
which undermined nutritional standards. There was, as L'wankwo asser- 
ted, a "...disparity in living standards between the composite 
peoples of Biafra. On the one hand are the big government officials. 
On the other are the common men. The former have cushioned themselves 
from the shocks of the war and insulated themselves and theirs from 
its stark realities. The latter have borne the brunt of the war. The 
former still indulge in peace-time niceties even as thousands of the 
latter starve to death. While some children .pine away in the houses 
of death, others still have monthly gifts of expensive toys to play 
with while their well-fed parents indulgently watch them in air- 
conditioned rooms, sipping beer and smoking cigarettes." (Nwankwo 
and Ifejika, op.cit., p.290). Aside from the disparities in the 
impact of the famine on different socio-economic classes, there 
were wide differences in the impact of the crisis on 'common men 1 of 
the same class. It is difficult to say which groups suffered most; 
but, at least initially, it would appear to have been the refugees. 
See for example the reports in the Observer, 23 June 1968; and 
Lindsay, OTycit., p.2. As the war wore on, however, there was some 
evidence Tfrom both sides of the lines) that refugees - at least 
those in the camps - were beginning to fare better than some people 
who had not been displaced (and the displaced persons who were shel- 
tering with them). In a report, the Biafran Rehabilitation Commission 
noted that: "It should be borne in mind that the vast majority of 
refugees in Biafra...live in private homes where they fend for them- 
selves or live at the expense of their relatives and friends. The 
extended family relationship has been over-stretched and there is 
total breakdown as well, resulting in refugees malnutrition all 
round... Up to date statistics show that there are more deaths 
outside the camps than in the camps." (Rehabilitation Commission 
I|otes on the Management of Refugee Camps in the Republic of Biafra 
(Circular"NoVl/19bB7CEnugu, 10 July 19637)^This point was "also""" 
stressed by Dr. Wolfgang Bulle, a doctor working in Federal territory 
under the auspices of the Lutheran church, who, in a taped interview 
with Dr. R.G. Hendrickse on k February 1969, argued that the relief 
agencies made a mistake in feeding high protein foods only to f so- 
called' displaced persons, rather than looking for people who were 
not well nourished. Arguing from his experience of the nutritional 
crisis in the South East state, Dr. Bulle asserted that so long as no 
selection on need rather than residential stajus was used "We are not 
usin^ our food very intelligently." See also Cervenka,Z. The_.Nige_rian 
War "Q£7-1Q70: History of the War, Selected Bibliography &;pocu'gerit^ 
BerharoTGraefe Verlag fur Wehrwesen (Frankfurt am Main; 1^71)' p.162-3.
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Mid-1968 marked a watershed in the development of the 
nutritional catastrophe. This period saw the peak of starvation- 
related mortality in the war zone. ' Although the death rate
47, The question of how many Biafrans died as a result of star- 
vation, or even what was the daily mortality rate at different 
periods during the war, vexed observers of the conflict and relief 
operations. It is now (just as is the case with the number of 
casualties incurred during the 1966 riots, or the number of East- 
erners repatriated) a question which is impossible to answer wioh
As evaluations of the causes or even thefinal certainty.
existence of,' the nutritional crisis became more entangled in the
political conflict surrounding the war, estimates of mortality
became Just another in the 
to support one side or the 
variation among estimates,
0.
array of political arguments advanced 
other. To obtain some idea of the 
see the following references: The
Goodell Report, op.cit. , p.S1977 (1.5 million dead in 1968; 
estimated deaths in the range 1-2.5 million for 1969); ^alogun, 
The Tragic Years: Nigeria _ in J3risis l^-lg^Q Ethiope Publishing 
Corp". (Benin City, 1975) , pp. 96-97 (cites press reports of death 
rates and total starvation related mortality and roundly condemns 
them as "fantastic figures. . .based for the most part on wild 
guessing of an unsubstantiated nature, and usually accompanied 
by hallucinatory and sensational articles.,."); Speech by G.T. 
Orick First International Conference on Biafra Columbia University 
(Mew York, 7-o* December 196B7V (mimeo graph edJT^The death rate is 
talked about a good deal. In July and August when it was in- 
creasing from 3 3 000 to 6,000 people a day, the American State 
Department was talking about 200 to 400 a day and their estimates 
have maintained just about that degree of lag since..."); Guardian, 
29 June 1963, (Leslie Kirkley, director of OXFAM, said 1,000 
people would die each day in Biafra, an increase from the present 
rate of 200 a day, unless large quantities of relief supplies 
arrived in the next six weeks.); Guardian, 6 July 1968, t "Things 
are very bad and are going to get worse in weeks to come. It is 
certain that in the months ahead deaths will be counted in tens of 
thousands a month." Statement made by Karl Jaggi,^ICRC chief 
delegate in Biafra. Jaggi guessed that a total of" 2, 000, 000 deaths 
had occurred.) Perhaps the most perceptive statements made 
concerning the mortality rate were the following ones: the first 
from Roger Galopin, Director-General of the ICRC, at a press 
conference in Geneva on 29 July 1968: "He [Galopin] noted that 
nobody had time for collecting statistics; and that nobody was 
consequently in a position to make an accurate estimate of the 
number of dying and sick." (Guardian, 30 July 1968). Secondly, 
this statement made by A.G. Somerville, Organizing Secretary of 
the World Council of Churches Refugee Relief in Biafra: "Questions 
concerning death rates in Biafra... are frequently raised. The 
simple fact is that no completely accurate statistics are available. 
Obviously many people in the bush, particularly in fightin 
inaccessible to relief organizations, die without any records
too, death rates vary tremendously in different 
Long-settled refugees regularly supported by
areas
made... Then, 
of the nation 
organizations 
placed." (JCA
eing 
-oarts 
relief
are much better than populations more recently dis- 
117, Geneva, 2 December 1969).
J_
rose during the latter part of 1969 until it approached its 1968 
heights, it is commonly agreed that the crisis, following the 
commencement of large-scale relief operations in rnid-1968, never 
regained its former intensity. There was a continuing nutritiona 
emergency inside the Biafran enclave. However, the various 
international relief organizations operating there were, for the 
most part, able to fly sufficient quantities of high protein food 
into the enclave to keep consumption just above the level at which 
massive protein starvation would be triggered off. In the 
territory under Federal control, the relief agencies not only 
succeeded in restoring most of the population to its former 
nutritional state, but in many cases enabled residents to raise 
their nutritional standards above pre-crisis levels.
The intervention of international relief organizations also 
shifted the foundations of the nutritional catastrophe. Up to 
the point where large-scale relief operations were organized the 
foundations of the Nigerian famine could be traced back largely 
to the phenomenon of underdevelopment. The deterioration of 
the region's pre-crisis nutritional standards was triggered off 
by the uneven progress of the modernization process in Nigerian
i O
society. The uneven diffusion of modernity in Eastern socio- 
economic structures accounted for the imbalance between the 
region's productive and reproductive capacities: an imbalance 
which had fostered behavioural patterns whose reversal now placed 
the nutritional welfare of the region's population in jeopardy.
The Eastern Region's nexus with Western modernity had been 
so shaped that production methods, objectives, and incentives had
48. In the sense in which it is used here, the modernization .orocess 
involves the diffusion throughout Third World societies of the 
social, economic, and political processes which characterize Western 
industrial societies. See the argument in the concluding chapter.
been transformed only to the extent necessary to ensure the 
provision of those goods and services required by external metro- 
poli and their local representatives. The infusions of capital, 
technical expertise, and socio-political leadership necessary to 
thoroughly revolutionize productivity in the subsistence sector 
of the economy had never materialized. Its connection with 
Western modernity had, however, induced high-rates of population 
growth in the East. The high birth rates typical of a low-income, 
labour intensive/agrarian society had been - largely independent
of the initial burst of economic development which fostered
UQ similar phenomena in the Westn- translated into rapid population
growth as a result of dramatic reductions in infant mortality
and equally great extensions of longevity, both of which accompanied
the infiltration of Western medical technology and techniques,
and the introduction of Western welfare provisions, into the
region.
The net result was a massive expansion of population against 
a relatively static subsistence supply capacity. Out of this 
imbalance the phenomena of rural-to-urban and rural-to-rural 
migration, the substitution of cassava for yam, and the large- 
scale importation of animal proteins sprang up. However, the 
political aspects of underdevelopment in Nigeria effected the 
reversal of at least some of these ameliorative responses to 
overpopulation, resulting in the deterioration of nutritional 
standards into famine conditions. The transposition of non- 
modern values and beliefs into modern social organizations and
49. For a more detailed treatment of the differing propellants of 
population growth in the West and in the Third World, see Coale, 
A.J. and Hoover, E.M. Population Growth and Economic Development 
in Low-Income Countries: A Case Study of Indian Prospects Prince- 
ton~University Press (Princeton, N. J., 1958)', 'Introduction and 
Ch.l.
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institutions, which were themselves underdeveloped to the extent 
that they reflected metropolitan aspirations as much as indigenous 
requirements, generated increasingly severe political crises 
which wracked the state and ended in the repatriation of Eastern 
migrants,'the Federal blockade of the Eastern Region, and armed 
conflict between the Federal and Eastern regimes. The impact of 
these developments was such that they triggered off a famine in 
the war zone.
From about rnid-1968, however, the nutritional disaster was 
given a new, more obviously political, impetus. This was the 
restriction of the efforts made by the international agencies to 
alleviate the impact of the famine. The essentially humanitarian 
endeavours of these organizations were caught up in the conflict 
and relief came to be seen as Just another aspect of the political 
struggle between the Federal and Biafran regimes. Political 
considerations shaped the relief operation, determining, with 
only secondary regard paid to nutritional requirements, both the 
scale and duration of the assistance rendered to the victims of 
the famine.
An analysis of the Nigerian famine in the period following 
the commencement of large-scale relief efforts, must focus on 
these 'politics of hunger 1 . In the next chapters the 
development of relief operations in Nigeria will be outlined, and 
then the nature and impact of the political constraints imposed 
on the activities of the relief organizations will be discussed.
CHAPTER IV
Relief Operations
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The preceding chapter focussed on the origin of the Eastern 
famine. This chapter is devoted to a description of the efforts 
made to alleviate the impact of that famine on the civilian pop- 
ulation of the war zone.
Before proceeding with a description and assessment of the 
development of the relief operation and the politics of hunger 
which impeded it, it is necessary to enter a caveat about the 
structure of the analysis which will be presented. The descrip- 
tion of relief operations will be, for the most part, focussecl on 
the efforts to alleviate starvation inside the Biafran enclave. 
This emphasis stems from the differing nature of the crisis and 
relief efforts in the enclave and in the territory under i?eueral 
control. By late 1968 the nutritional emergency in the liber- 
ated areas of the East was largely over. Dr. R. G. Hendrickse 
made the following comment in his report on .a visit to the federal 
controlled areas of the East Central State in January 1969.* 
"There is at present no evidence of gross or widespread malnutrit- 
ion in the liberated areas of the East Central State. There 
was a serious nutritional problem in mid-1968 which was brought 
under control by the activities of the ICRC and other agencies 
concerned with food supply and distribution. The present nut- 
ritional state of the population is at least as good as that in 
other parts of Nigeria, and may in fact be better than in the 
poorest areas of other parts of Nigeria." From early 1969 on, 
the relief organizations were primarily attempting to alleviate 
the protein deficiencies which had characterized pre-v/ar diets. 
Within the Biafran enclave, however, the nutritional emergency
1. Hendrickse, E.G. Visit to the East Central State and South 
Eastern State, 31^1/69 to~7/|7^ (Report presented to the Paed- 
iatric Association of NigeriaTTSee also NgG/IGgC Information 
Bulletin, No.13 (Lagos, 15 June 1969).
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was never brought fully under control. Although the relis; 
agencies were able to check the massive protein starvation of 
mid-1968, constraints imposed on their operations kept the pop- 
ulation of the enclave at the threshold of starvation, which 
largely accounts for the sense of urgency exhibited by the relief 
organizations operating inside the enclave. The supplies of 
food brought into Biafra each night by relief aircraft were 
essential to stave off a rapid descent back into the Xalthusian 
nightmare of mid-1968.
Relief operations developed in parallel with the political 
crisis which wracked Nigeria. Both the Nigerian Red Cross and
religious organizations rendered aid to refugees and other victims
2of the communal outbursts which occurred during 1966. In
August 1966, the Eastern Region government established a Rehab- 
ilitation Commission which was empowered to explore a number of 
approaches to integrating repatriated migrants into Eastern society 
and economic life.
Secession, and the^outbreak of fighting two months later, saw 
an intensification of local efforts to provide assistance to the 
victims of the conflict. In Biafra the Rehabilitation Commission's 
responsibilities were widened to include the care and welfare of 
all Easterners in need as a result of the Federal blockade and 
secession , and in January 1968 the Biafran government set up an
2. For details, see Nigerian Red Cross Society ^
Action ^ Report of the Nigerian Red Cross Society Igb6-.1970~(ago s ,
and USAID, o2i.ci.tY7 p
3. For details, see Nigerian Crisis 1966 (Enugu/Aba, 1966-57), 
vol.3 ("Pogrom"), p
l\.. "Emergency Relief in Nigeria and the Biafran Enclave July 1967 
Through June 30, 1969" Aj!D._Fpj^ei^n^Disaste^
(Reprinted from: Ninth Report, Fiscal Year ~19697'^Foreign Disaster 
Emergency Relief, issued by Disaster Relief Coordinator Agency for 
International Development) (hereafter called 'USAID 1 ), P-35-
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Ad Hoc Refugee Comittee (absorbed by the Rehabilitation Commission 
in July 1963) which was responsible for the care of refugees from 
the combat zones.
On the Federal side, the Nigerian Red Cross bore most of 
the burden of relief up to mid-1968. Federal advances around 
Enugu and Calabar created a large refugee population - estimated 
by the NEC to number up to 100,000 - in the territory under. 
Federal control. In October 1967 the FMG asked the NRC to
expand its operations into all the occupied areas of the East,
£ 
making a grant of £N50,000 to the NRC to enable it to do so.
After one year of conflict between the Federal and Biafran 
armies, refugee populations on both sides of the frontlines had 
grown to proportions which overwhelmed the human and material 
capacities of either of the local organizations dealing with 
displaced persons. In an interview in March 1968, Moses Itoh, 
National Secretary of the Biafran Red Cross, painted a picture of 
the desperate problems confronting the local agencies:
5- Rehabilitation Commission Notes on the Management of Refugee 
Camps in the Republic of Biafra (Circular"H'o", l/l96'8)'~'(Enugu7 
10 July 1968).
6. Nigerian Red Cross, op.ci t., pp.6-7- Although the organization 
of emergency relief in Federavl territory was left primarily in the 
hands of the NRC, the Federal government assumed a direct role in 
relief operation. The Federal Army provided food and medical 
treatment for refugees in newly occupied areas until the NRC could 
move in and set up clinics and feeding centres. (See the Interim 
Reports of the United Nations 1 Secretary General ! s Representative, 
dated 9 and 30 October, and 21 November 1968, and 21 January and 
27 May 1969). At the same time the FMG established agencies to 
ensure that civilian relief operations conformed with government 
policy. In late 1967 an Ad Hoc National Relief Committee was 
established for the purpose of coordinating the activities of the 
Red Cross and other voluntary agencies active in the territory 
under Federal control. (USAID, op.c it., p.50); and in March 
1968 the FMG set up the National Rehabilitation Commission, which 
was given £N1,000,000 and a brief to determine priorities for 
emergency relief operations;and, through subordinate State Rehabil- 
itation Commissions, to obtain food, clothing,medicines, and shelter 
for v;ar victims living in liberated areas. (USAID, lo£^cijt.; anc. 
National Commission for Rehabilitation Emergen cy _g_elie f_0p era t ions, 
Resettles en tjt__and Rehabilitation: National Gor/iniission for Rehabil-
(Lagos," 1 July 197077 p.^iTI
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Yv'e estimate that of the million people v;ho have left their 
homes, perhaps 700,000 have migrated to other areas and 
found a place to live. Of the other 300,000, about 1^0,000 
have leftreverything, gone into the bush near their villages 
and homes, and are rarely cultivating now. Another 50,000 
are in more than 80 refugee camps (all in schools) and 
100,000 have been taken in by families... v;e are short of 
drugs, milk, and relief materials. Our budget is £N3»000 
a month. But this is chicken feed. There is danger of 
smallpox, diarrohea, dysentry, or polio epidemics which
would be disastrous because people would have to desert
7 the camps.
At about the same time, the Nigerian Red Cross renewed, and 
extended to an international audience, the national appeal for 
funds, volunteers, and relief materials which Sir Adetokunbo 
Ademola, President of the Nigerian Red Cross, had launched in
o
November 1967.
The time was ripe for the internationalization of the relief 
operation. A sudden burst of publicity from the world's press 
in May and June 1968 brought the impending disaster to the fore- 
front of world attention and stimulated the development of a 
massive international effort to rescue starving Nigerians and 
Biafrans. Discussing British reactions to the war, Kirk-Greene
noted:
...suddenly the world remembered the 'forgotten war 1 . 
'The agony of Biafra', it.was abrasively reminded, 'is an 
affront to the conscience of the civilised world.' Divided 
over Rhodesia, disgusted at the by-now-proverbial savagery 
of the earlier Congo, dazed by the succession of military 
coups in Africa, and no more interested in a mini-quarrel 
'between the blacks' than it had ever been in the continent
7. Observer, 3 Marten 1968.
8. Nigerian Red Cross, op_>cit., pp.6-7.
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even at the apogee of empire, the British public was at 
last presented with an issue of the Biafran struggle in 
a vocabulary that it could grasp and react to in a fam- 
iliar way: the horrors of starvation - and of children 
at that. In England, Oxfam mounted a heavily advertised 
appeal for £200,000; Caritas, a Catholic organization 
that was eventually to assume a hostile political presence 
in Federal eyes, arranged to fly relief supplies into 
land-locked Biafra from Sao Tome; and the ICRC prepared 
an airlift that promised to be on a scale second only to 
that which saved Berlin in 194-8."
Relief operations in Nigeria had exhibited an international 
dimension from the beginning of the political crisis. The 
League of Red Cross Societies, for example, provided financial, 
material, and technical assistance to the Nigerian Red Cross in 
the pre-war period. The NRC also received assistance from 
Oxfam in bolstering its logistical capabilities; and from the 
ICRC in setting up a tracing service to enable displaced persons 
to regain contact with their families. During the autumn 
riots in the Korth, the World Council of Churches (WCC) defrayed 
the cost of charter flights organized by Nigerian churches to 
evacuate Easterners. This was followed up in January 1967 by 
an appeal, made by the VJCC's Division of Inter-Church Aid, Refugee, 
and IVorld Service (DICARWS), to 1VCC members for US# 140,000 to aid 
Eastern refugees. The Christian Council of Nigeria (CCN) also 
requested the Church World Service (CWS), an American based 
Protestant agency, to investigate the possibility of obtaining
9. Kirk-Greene, A.H.M. Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A jjocument-
j.g66-19^9 Oxford University Press "(London, 1971)7"
-. 
Vol.2, p.56.
10. Nigerian Red Cross, ojD^cit., p.5.
US government surplus milk and grain for Eastern refugees. 11
The first agency to embroil itself in the affair following
the outbreak of armed hostilities was the International Committee
12 
of the Red Cross. Acting in accordance with its organizational
mandate to succor the victims on all sides of any armed conflict, 
the ICRC despatched loads of medical supplies for use in military 
hospitals to Lagos and Port Harcourt in July 1967- These v.'ere 
followed in August by two medical teams, sent to augment the 
medical staff of the Federal and Biafran armies. ^
The ICRC's involvement in the Nigerian conflict was, initially, 
confined largely to the performance of,its traditional tasks: 
maintenance and supervision of prisoner of war camps; tracing 
displaced persons; and, most importantly, providing medical 
facilities for wounded soldiers and civilians. This emphasis
~L
on medical assistance was replicated by the church agencies, which 
worked with refugees and other victims of the conflict following 
the commencement of hostilities. For example, the World Council 
of Churches Refugee Relief operation, based on the Queen Elizabeth 
Hospital in Umuhaia, "was primarily concerned with the hiring of 
medical staffs for the hospitals 'under the control of the foreign 
medical missions and the provision of medical supplies for the 
hospitals in the area... the distribution of food was of secondary 
importance to the medical work being done in the eight hospitals
11. For more details see Christian Concern in the Nigerian Civil 
War Day star Press ( Ibadan , ~196977~*P -
12. A comprehensive assessment of the role of the ICRC in the 
Nigerian Civil War is contained in Hentsch, T. Face au Bloc us "~, 
Institut Universiifcaire de Hautes Etudes Internatio'nales (Geneva, 1973)  
- ICRG Press_gelease No.S^3b> Geneva, 11 July 1967-
. Tojgical^Red Cross^News, No.97b, Geneva, 25 August 1967.
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under the control of the WCC operation in Biafra. "
International involvement in alleviating the nutritional 
crisis dated from the early spring of 1968, when relief organ- 
izations began to fly quantities of high protein foods into
1 f>Biafra. On March 27th, Caritas International (CI), in co- 
operation with two German religious organizations - Das Diakon- 
siche Werk (DDW) and Deutcher Caritasverband (DCV) - initiated
a series of flights from Lisbon to Port Harcourt, using a time-
17 
chartered aircraft. ( At about the same time, the ICRC wriggled
off the legalistic hook which, in January, had snagged its second 
attempted flight into the enclave (the ICRC's first flight took
place on November lllth, 1967). The FMG had refused to guarantee
1 R this flight safe passage and the ICRC felt compelled, unlike the
church agencies which operated without regard to official sanction,
15. Lloyd, H.G., Mollerup, M.L., and Bratved, C.A. The Nordchurch- 
aid Airlift to Biafra 1968-1970 : An Operations Report Folkekirkens
N0dh jaelp ( Copenhagen , 1972), p. 2.
16. The relief agencies began airlifting medical supplies - includ- 
ing small amounts of high protein foods - as early as I\Tovember 1967 
Both the ICRC and the church agencies had chartered aircraft for 
single flights into the enclave. The church agencies had 
gone even further, booking cargo space for relief supplies on. 
flights shuttling arms into Biafra. (See JCA 83, Geneva, 29 July 
1968; and St. Jorre, John de The Nigerian Civil War Hodder and 
Stoughton (London, 1973), p
17. JCA 52, Geneva, 9 April 1969.
18- See ICRC_Press_geleaGe No.871b, Geneva, 21 November 1967; 
and Topical Red Crossjeivs, Nos.l03b and 10^ b, Geneva, 2l\ January 
.and 20 February, "19&T. The FMG evidently grounded its refusal 
of the ICRC's request for a flight to the enclave in January on 
its belief that during the two day suspension of its air blockade 
which accompanied the ICRC's flight in November, the Biafrans had 
stepped up arms flights into Port Harcourt. On March 5th, 1968 
the1 ICRC requested the FMG to issue a ''laissez-passer ' for its 
flights into the enclave. This the FMG refused to do, but it 
did grant the ICRC standing permission to operate flights from 
Fernando Poo into the enclave - although they would have to be 
at the ICRC's own risk. (See "The Civil War in Nigeria - The 
Way Out" an advertisement placed by the FMG- in the New York Times 
of 8 July 1968). .
8H
in the interests of maintaining its image of neutrality to 
operate only with the permission of the FMG. Following dis- 
cussions in Lagos tbe Committee's representative was able to 
secure the tacit approval of the FMG for flights into the enclave 
on the condition that relief cargoes were inspected by the 1,'igerian 
consul on the island of Fernando Poo prior to delivery into the 
enclave. And on April 8th, 1968 the ICRC commenced a regular 
flight operation direct from Europe to'Biafra via Fernando Poo. 1^
It became increasingly apparent following the fall of Port 
Harcourt in May 1968, that the scale of the Red Cross and church 
air operations was wholly inadequate to meet the needs of the 
population in the enclave. As one priest described the situation:
 
"Help is being sent from overseas, but it is only a trickle in 
view of the number oif refugees, estimated at nearly ^., 000, 000... 
A recent consignment of salt from Caritas worked out at one cup 
for 10 refugees... Yesterday we got our share of a consignment of
rice and beans from overseas. There was one bag of rice and
U20 
half a bag of beans to be divided among 15 camps. Relief
workers inside the enclave began to report the urgent need for 
the establishment of large scale feeding programmes:
By the middle of June, surveys in some of the villages 
revealed widespread malnutrition, especially among the 
large number of refugees fleeing before the advancing 
Federal army. A limited number of feeding centres were 
set up in some of the refugee camps, providing three meals 
a week. The need for many more feeding centres soon 
became apparent and the system of locally run feeding 
centres supplied by the WCC grew rapidly, both in the 
refugee camps and the villages. By the end of June,
- ICRC Information Note No. 6, Geneva, 13 March 1969,
20. Daily J?_ele graph , 16 July 1968. See also paily_Tel_e. graph , 
July 1968.
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enough information about the food situation in Biafra was 
available to demonstrate that a large scale feeding program 
would be necessary if massive starvation was to be avoided. 21
Most estimates settled around the figure of 200 tons of 
high protein food (HPF) imports per day as the minimum amount 
required to stave off starvation mortality of up to 4,000 persons 
per day. (Compared to the total ICRC movement of food between 
April and July of 400 tons; with another 20 tons per month de- 
livered into the enclave by WCC planes and a total of 315 tons
22
under the auspices of Caritas). For example, Father Patrick
Devine, a Catholic priest who co-ordinated the network of priests 
and nuns that gathered information on the nutritional crisis, was
reported as saying:
« 
We calculate, working on a 'per person* basis, that Biafra
must get in 200 tons of protein food a day from now until 
6 months after the end of the war. This is minimal, 300 
to 400 tons a day is really needed. The Red Cross agrees.
Otherwise, up to 4,500,000 people are just going to die in
23the next few months.
The key to establishing a large scale feeding programme 
inside the enclave lay in expanding the flow of foodstuffs into 
Biafra. Organizing a distribution network inside the enclave 
presented few major obstacles. The refugee camps and village 
feeding centres established by the Biafran Rehabilitation Commission 
represented a more or less ready made structure for the distri- 
bution of the high protein foods imported by the international
21. Lloyd et al., op.cit., p.2.
22. Guardian. 6 July 1968; Daily Telegraph. 9 and 16 July 1968.
23. Observer, 26 June 1968.
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relief organizations. Nor was there any problem in securing 
supplies for use in the relief operation. Although the IGPvC 
had complained of inadequate response to appeals for support it 
made prior to the fall of Port Harcourt, in the months following 
both private and official sources pledged ample funds and materials
to enable the international relief agencies to sustain massive
25 feeding operations in the enclave. '
The major obstacle standing in the way of an increased flow 
of foodstuffs into Biafra was the Federal blockade. Consequently 
the relief agencies - through the offices of the ICRC - attempted 
to secure the belligerents' agreement to the establishment of 
corridors through which they could freely transport relief supplies 
into the enclave. Neither of the belligerents was, however, 
willing to concede the superiority of humanitarian over political 
considerations, which made it impossible to reach any agreement 
about the routes and methods to be used for moving relief 
supplies through the Federal blockade. In these circumstances 
the humanitarian agencies felt compelled, given the gravity of 
the nutritional situation inside the enclave in the summer of 
1968, to step up their ' clandestine f airlift of relief supplies. 
he large-scale expansion of the relief agencies 1 air oper-rrn-, J. Cl
, By June 15th 1968, the Biafran Rehabilitation Commission had 
established 688 camps containing ^82,923 refugees. In Hay the 
RehabilitatioLi Commission, concerned about the evidence of in- 
creasing kwashiokor both inside and outside the refugee camps, 
had begun to establish feeding centres in all Biafran villages. 
These nutritional clinics were aimed at providing protein rich 
meals to all children who required them. ("Notes on the manage- 
ment of Refugee Carnps in the Republic of Biafra", lo._c..cit; and 
US AID, ojo^cit. , p. 36).
25. ICRC Press Release No.889, Geneva, 3 June 1968. See US^ID, 
op.^cit. , pp.76-77 for a recapitulation of the value of donations 
by the USA and 30 other nations. And see the Times (London), 
15 July 1965, p.8 for a summary of British aid to the relief 
operations.
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ations dated from the first half of September 1968. During 
the preceding two months the relief organizations concentrated 
their efforts on laying the foundations for an augmented air 
bridge into the enclave. First, they established, and strength- 
ened their supply and maintenance facilities on the islands 
offshore Eastern Nigeria - the ICRC operating from Fernando Poo 
and the church agencies from Sao Tome. Previously,relief flights 
had mostly operated direct from Europe into the enclave, utilizing 
the offshore islands for no more than intermediate refuelling - 
or, in the case of the ICRC, inspection - stops. It was obvious, 
however, that the logistics of a large-scale sustained airlift 
required a staging base closer to the enclave. A growing pro- 
portion of the relief materials made available to the agencies 
were despatched by donors direct to Fernando Poo and Sao Tome, 
where stockpiles began to build up. The ICRC's accumulation of 
relief supplies on Fernando Poo increased, for example, from 180 
tons in June to 3,500 tons in August 1968. At the same time
the ICRC based 50 'specialists in air transport' on Fernando Poo
2(1 
to supervise the loading and maintenance of ICRC aircraft.
Secondly, they procured and positioned aircraft for use 
in the relief shuttle. On July 23rd the ICRC despatched a DC-6, 
which it had chartered for a period of three months, to Fernando 
Poo. ' Also in July, the German relief groups, DDW aad DCV, 
purchased, 5 DC-7 aircraft which, by mid-August, were in position
pO
on Sao Tome. This was followed by the coalescence of Danish,
26. See ICRCJP^ess Releases Nos.889 and 905, Geneva, 3 June and 
2 September 19&B; Topj^cal^ged Cr o ss K ew s llOb, Geneva, 27 Sept- 
ember 1968; and Lloyd et al., op.cit. ,
27. ICRC Press Release No.892b, Geneva, 23 July 1968.
28. Lloyd et al. , Q£± cit. , p. 6.
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Norwegian, and Swedish relief organizations into a body called 
I\ordchurchaid, vjhich announced, on August 19th, that it v/as 
adding six aircraft to the relief airlift based on Sao Torne-. 29 
At the beginning of September the ICRC announced yet another 
expansion of its air operations from Fernando Poo. It added 
four planes chartered by the Scandanivian Red Cross Societies, 
and one taken on charter by the Dutch Red Cross, to the DC-6, 
v.'hose 31 flights in August had delivered 231 tons of food and 
other relief supplies into the enclave.^0
The final preliminary to the commencement of a large-scale 
relief airlift involved the routinization of the operational 
procedures involved in sustaining a regular penetration of the 
Federal blockade. The combined weight of Federal interceptor 
aircraft and anti-aircraft gunfire had virtually halted the 
relief airlift in July and early August 1968. However, on 
August 12th Count Carl Gustav von Rosen, flying a cargo for 
Nordchurchaid, broke through the Federal blockade, establishing 
the pattern of low-level, night-time evasive flying tactics which 
were to characterize relief flights from that point onward.^1
From about the first week of September 1968 both the Red 
Cross and the church agencies' airlifts swung into full operation. 
'The ICRC, for example, utilizing the six aircraft which it had 
available on Fernando Poo, mounted Operation INALWA (International 
Airlift VJest Africa) on September 3rd.* Initially the ICRC.n.
29. Lloyd et.al., op.cit., pp.10-11.
30- 15RC_PressJJel^ase No.905, Geneva, 2 September 1968; 
Topical Red Cross News llOb, Geneva, 27 September 1968.
31. See Lloyd et al., op^ijt. , pp.9-10 for a description of the 
blockade-breaking flight made by Count von Rosen on August 12th 
1968. See also St. Jorre, op.cit., pp.329-331.
. Topical Red Cross News, No.llOb, Geneva, 27 September 1968.
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intended Operation IMIAVA 'flights to be carried out in daylight 
for a period of 10 days. However, when the FMG made its approval 
of the operation conditional on the neutralization of Uli airport 
- a condition rejected by the Biafrans - the ICRC decided to 
intensify itte night operations, for which it had the tacit per- 
mission of the PMG, while continuing negotiations with the belli- 
gerents over daylight flights and/or surface relief corridors. ^ 
A Red Cross press release dated 27 September 1968 described 
operation INALVVA, its impact, and its shortcomings, in the follow- 
ing manner:
Six, seven, and sometimes nine flights were carried out 
each night. Around September 12, however, as a result 
of the advance of Federal troops, the fighting came very 
close to the two airports of Uli and Obilagu. Mr. Karl 
Heinrich Jaggi, head of the ICRC delegation in Biafra, 
decided to cancel flights for the nights 14/15 and 15/16 
September. Flights were resumed on September 16. Since 
the beginning of Operation INAIAVA on September 3j in spite 
of adverse weather conditions, 75 flights have so far- 
transported 660 tons of relief and 97 passengers from 
Santa Isabel to Biafra. Consequently, there has been 
a substantial increase in the quantity of relief routed 
to the starving civilian population of Biafra. However, 
Mr. Jaggi considers that .at least 5 times this amount is 
required to relieve famine. Only the opening^of a land 
corridor would render such supplying possible.-^
The essential parameters of the relief airlift in the 
period from September- 1968 up to the collapse of ICRC air oper- 
ations in June 1969 were virtually all contained in that 'Red 
Cross press release. In the case of both the church agencies -
33.
Ibid.
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which from November 1968 became known as Joint Church Aid 
- and the ICRC each relief aircraft made one or two trips between 
the offshore bases and the enclave each night, carrying an aver- 
age of approximately 10 tons of cargo on each trip, with the 
number of trips on any given night being determined by weather
-7 r
conditions and the intensity of Federal harassment.->0
Even though imports of HPF never reached the level of 
minimum requirements forecast by relief workers in the enclave, 
the quantities of CSM, stockfish, and other high protein foods 
which the relief agencies did manage to bring through the Fed- 
eral blockade each night were sufficient to set up large-scale 
feeding programmes. In May 1969, at the 'peak of its activities, 
the ICRC reported that its supplies were reaching approximately
35. The name Joint Church Aid was adopted at a meeting of DDVJ, 
L-iOrdchurchaid, and Caritas International held in Rome on November 
8-9, 1968. Initially it was meant to be a titular entity through 
which the churches could funnel funds for the purchase of a 
C-130 Hercules aircraft. "However, when this project fell through, 
the title Joint Church Aid was retained as the designation of 
the churches ad hoc co-operation in procuring supplies for and 
operating the Sao Torne-Uli shuttle. At the Rome meeting, re- 
sponsibilities for the church agencies' airlift were divided 
as follows: Supplies - DDW: Airlift operation and technical 
questions - Nordchurchaid; Passenger list co-ordination - Caritas 
International; and PR - Catholic Relief Services, Geneva. 
V.'ithin the JCA structure the groups actually operating aircraft 
(and hence responsible for payment of charter and other operating 
costs) were Nordchurchaid with its k DC-6B ! s, and later Canairelief 
with one Super-Constellation, and JCA-USA with four C-97 Strato- 
freighters (aircraft numbers, types, and distribution as of 1? 
April 1969 - (JCA 54, Geneva, 1? April 1969)). For a detailed 
description of the evolution of the Joint Church Aid structure 
see Lloyd, et al., op.cit., Ch.lij.
36, For illustrations of the nightly air operations and constraints 
placed on the air bridge see the following press releases: j[CHC 
Pr£§§_ Releases Nos.9545 and 955b, Geneva, 19 and 22 February 19o9; 
ancTespecially JCA 65, Geneva, 2? May 1968.
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1.5 million people through 800 distribution points.' At the 
same time, Caritas International sponsored the feeding and care 
of about l.Jf million people through distributions made to 1,280 
refugee camps and 1,528 village feeding centres^ ; while the 
Protestant groups operating under the auspices of the WCC reported 
tuat they were assisting 1.9 million refugees and other needy 
persons, including ^00,000 non-refugees whose diets were supple- 
mented by HPF distributions to village feeding centres.^°
As a result of the establishment of these feeding programmes, 
the agencies were able to check the massive upsurge of starvation-
 37. Topical_Red_Gross_News, No.ll?b, Geneva, 30 May 1%9- The 
distribution of ICRC supplies was based on the following rationing 
system: "To about a million people, three million five hundred 
thousand meals are provided each week [report made in i-larch 1969]. 
The meals comprise mainly dried fish, rice, milk, and CSM and are 
distributed as follows: a) three meals per week as a preventive 
measure - mainly to children and expectant mothers; b) nine meals 
per week - as a preventive measure - to people displaying symptoms 
of kwashiokor or other deficiency ailments; c) twenty-eight rations 
per week - as a curative measure - mainly to children in hospital 
due to malnutrition (kwashiokor, etc.)... In the present structure, 
foods are distributed from a curative point of view to 10% of the 
population given relief, the remaining 90% towards preventive 
assistance." (ICgC Information Note to National Societies on 
ICgC_gelief_ Actign_o.g. Behalf of__the Victims oj'the_Conflict_in 
Nigeria,~No.67 31 March 1969) 
fT>
38. USAID, o^cit., p.62.
39. Lloyd et al. , orn cit. , Appendix 37c and pp. 84-85  Like the 
ICRC, Protestant and Catholic relief groups gave their highest 
priority to the provision of food and medical supplies for the 
hospitals, clinics, and mobile medical facilities which they 
operated. Both the Red Cross and church groups supported large 
medical programmes within the enclave. These comprised out and 
in-patient medical care, and large-scale vaccination programmes. 
In August 1969 the UCC reported that it was supporting five mobile 
medical teams which were conducting approximately 100 clinics 
each month at which over 50,000 patients were treated. This was 
in addition to their sponsorship of 28 hospitals and 100 sick 
bays throughout the enclave. (Lloyd et al., ov^cit., pp.88-90). 
The ICRC reported in May 1969 that it was treating an average of 
10,000 hospital cases each month. (Topical Red_Cross i\;ews, No.ll?b, 
Geneva, 30 May 1969)- For detailed descriptions of the joint 
measles and smallpox vaccinations campaigns conducted by the 
relief agencies see Lloyd et al., 0£JL>cjLt., pp.90-93; and Report 
on the Measles and Small-Pox Vaccination Campaign in Biafra 
(Mimeographed at ICRC Headquarters in Geneva, April 1969)".~
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related mortality which had been apparent in the summer and 
autumn of 1968. As the members of the Goodell study mission 
noted:
Since the end of October [1968], the nutritional situation 
has improved in the refugee camps due to the activities of 
the relief agencies. In particular, the prevalence of 
overt kwashiokor has decreased with the past 3 months 
[December 1968 - February 1969], though we must emphasize 
that in the camps v;e observed we did not see one single 
child \vhom we would describe as being a satisfactory state 
of nutrition... Regular operation [of the ICRC and JCA 
airlifts], accomplished despite formidable organizational, 
financial and weather difficulties during August, September, 
October and December of last year [1968], is credited with 
having reversed starvation of children in Biafra and pro- 
bably has saved more than a million lives...
Similarly, the Diggs study mission in February 1969 noted the 
beneficial impact of the relief agencies 5 operations:
Recent reports from Ihiala, the areas around Uli airstrip, 
and in relief centres, indicate that there has been an 
observable decrease in Kwashiokor among children. iMany 
children reportedly have recovered after receiving the 
needed protein. This is a real accomplishment, but it 
could be quickly reversed unless the children continue to 
receive protein in their diets.
The agencies had not been able to wholly lift the
pall of famine from the enclave. The failure of the belligerents 
to agree on the establishment of relief corridors limited the
"Report of the Biafra Study Mission" Congress 1 onal:__ jRe_cord 
eJ^ 91st Congress, 1st Session (Washington, 2p February 
Vol.115, No.33 (hereafter referred to as the Goodell Report), 
pp.S1980 and S1984-
i;l. Dig/TS, C.C. and Burke, J.H (Chairman) Report of Special Fact- 
fin din£^rij-^lon_jto_Ni^:eria February _?-2Q.y 196g~(Pursuant to H. 
Res. lA-3~authorizing the Committee on Foreign Affairs to conduct 
thorough Studies and Investigations of all Hatters coming within 
the Jurisdiction of the Committee). (March 12, 1969). US Government 
Printing Office ("Washington, D.C., 1969) (hereafter referred to as 
the Diggs Report), p.57-
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extent of the nutritional recovery in the civilian population. 
It constrained and reduced the volume of supplies the relief 
agencies were able to move into the enclave. Although the 
capacity of the airlift was augmented by the addition of Canadian 
and American sponsored relief aircraft to the JCA operation^2 - 
and enhanced even more by the introduction of larger capacity
Canairelief was the contribution of Canadian churches and 
secular agencies to the Sao Tome-Uli airbridge. In November 1968 
the Presbyterian Church in Canada and Oxfam of Canada pooled 
their funds to procure the charter of a Super Constellation for 
Biafran relief operations. This aircraft went into operation 
from Sao Tome on January 23rd, 1969- Later in the spring of 1969 
Canairelief took on charter three more s Super Connies' so that, 
by early June, three Canairelief planes were making an average of 
six flights with 60 tons of relief cargo each night. Its total 
contribution to the airlift up to the termination of its flights 
on January 10th, 1970, was 67k flights landing a total of 10,650 
tons of relief supplies in Biafra. (Brewin, A. and MacDonald, D. 
Canada and the Biafran Tragedy James Lewis and Samuel (Toronto,
1970), pp.92-95H
Joint Church Aid/USA was formed as a result of the ama^am- 
ation of the relief efforts of three American church agencies - 
Church World Service (Protestant), Catholic Relief Services, and 
the American Jewish Committee. Following negotiations with these 
groups, the US government made available to JCA/USA four C-97G 
Stratofreighter aircraft at a nominal purchase .price of US#3,670 
each. JCA/USA made its first flight into Biafra from Sao Tome on 
27 January 1969, and continued its operations up to the collapse 
of Biafra in January 1970. (See JCA 97, Geneva, 2.1+ September 1969; 
and USAID, Q£r.cit«, p.740-
aircraft into both the ICRC and JCA airfleets^ - the flow of
food into Biafra never averaged more than 150-160 tons per night/
in the period from September 1968 to May 1969. (On riay 1st, 
1969 the JCA reported that the combined operations of the ICRC 
and JCA since the beginning of the airlift totalled 3,889 flights 
carrying 38,208 tons of relief cargo). ^
The consequence of this politically inspired inhibition 
of the relief effort was multi-fold. In the first place, the 
agencies were prevented from importing sufficient quantities of 
food to eradicate the threat, or presence, of serious malnutrition 
in the enclave. Although through their endeavours they managed
Throughout the Biafran relief operation it was obvious that 
one of the ways in which the flow of supplies into the enclave 
could be stepped up, in lieu of any agreement on relief corridors, 
was by the introduction of aircraft capable of flying to Biafra 
with larger payloads. One step taken in this direction was the 
decision made in January 1969 by the US government to sell, at a 
nominal price, 8 C97& Stratofreighters to the airlift operators: 
4 were sold to the ICRC and 4 to JCA/USA. These aircraft had a 
load capacity of 16. tons, compared to the approximately 10 ton 
limit of the DC-6 f s, DC~7 : s, and Super Constellations which made 
up the bulk of the ICRC and JCA fleets.
The ideal aircraft for the Biafran airlift would have been 
the C-130 Hercules, with its load capacity of 20 tons and specially 
designed facility for operating into and out of improvised landing 
scrips. Xaj.Gen. A.E. Wrinch, National Commissioner of the Canadian 
Red Cross Society, .testified to the Standing Committee on External 
Affairs and National Defence of the Canadian Parliament that, if 
the ICRC fleet at Santa Isabel v.; ere replaced with Hercules; its 
capacity would be doubled from 73 to 160 tons a night. (Brewin and 
MacDonald, op.pit., p-85) Similarly, the JCA flight co-ordinator, 
Vigo Mollerup, observed in November 1969 that "if we had Hercules 
aircraft to replace the Constellations, C-97's, and DC-6 5 s v:e are 
now using, each aircraft could load up to 24 tons instead of 16 
tons. 11 (Cited in the Guardian, 19 November 1%9)   However, the 
Hercules is essentially a military aircraft and the airlift oper- 
ators' only access to them was through the armed forces of owning 
governments, none of which, with the sole exception of Sweden, was 
willing to make any available to the relief agencies on a sustained 
basis. See, for example, the description in Brewin and MacBonalci, 
op.cit. , pp.84-89, of the conflict over the Canadian government's 
reluctance to devote its Hercules 1 to the relief operation on any 
other than the terms laid down by the Federal government.
44' JCA 5.8, Geneva, 1 iMay 1969.
to check and then reduce the starvation-related rate of mortality, 
the rapid re-emergence of famine conditions following the con- 
traction of food imports which resulted from the termination of 
the ICRC airlift in June, 1969, showed that they had accomplished 
no more than the bare restoration of the enclave's population 
to the threshold of starvation. The fragility of the relief 
barrier which was erected between the civilian population of the 
enclave and starvation was indicated in a JCA press release:
According to Doctor Herman Middelkoop., the Dutch medical 
missionary, the death toll in Biafra territory is already 
rising alarmingly [this was approximately one month after 
the collapse of the ICRC airlift]. After the harvest, 
he told Joint Church Aid delegates,... some carbohydrates 
are still available, but protein foods are now quite ex- 
hausted.. . Dr. Middelkoop pointed out that people who have 
endured semi-starvation for over a year have no resistance 
or stamina left. About 3 million people, he said, were 
now at subsistance [sic] levels. The situation in Biafra 
was fast becoming worse than it was a year ago before the 
JCA and ICRC airlifts started... Children who have been 
treated in sick bays for kwashiokor...relapse in two or 
three days when they no longer receive proper nourishment. -*
The belligerents 1 obstruction of the relief agencies jeo- 
pordized whatever degree of nutritional recovery was achieved. 
Their refusal to subordinate political to humanitarian consider- 
ations - manifested primarily in their failure to conclude an 
agreement on relief corridors - meant that the inflow of food 
and medicine was not sufficient to allow the agencies to stock- 
pile supplies inside the enclave. Each relief group distributed
. JCA 80, Geneva, 18 July 1969- According to one nutritionist, 
by October 1969 the enclave's population was suffering from the 
highest rate of famine edemea ever recorded - even higher than 
in the Siege of Leningrad. (Beal, C.VJ. "How the State Dept. 
Watched Biafra Starve 11 gipon Forum 6 (3) 1970.
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its supplies for immediate consumption , moving them from Uli 
through central stores to provincial distribution centres either 
on the night of their arrival, or on the following morning.^'
In such a situation of hand-to-mouth existence, the day-to- 
day operation of the relief feeding programme depended on the 
uninterrupted flow of supplies over the air bridge. However,
 che Federal government never extended its official approval to
 > 
the relief agencies?night operations; and so long as the Biafran
overnment continued intermingling its arms flights with therr O
relief aircraft, the relief flights were subject to harrassment 
and occasional disruption by the Federal armed forces^" - with a 
consequential reduction in food distributions and a resurgence 
of mass starvation.
Oddly enough, the first major disruption of the pattern 
of air operations established in September 1968, occurred at the 
ICRC's base on Santa Isabel rather than the airstrip at Uli. On
46. From October 1968 onwards JCA aircraft were wholly devoted to 
the transportation of Caritas and \VCC supplies on alternate nights. 
(Lloyd et al., op.cit., p.19). *
47. For detailed descriptions of the supply distribution system 
inside the enclave see Lloyd et al., op.cit. , pp.20-22 and' Cho; 
nd USAID,-op.cit., p.62.C5.
i-3. For a detailed description of Federal harrassment of relief 
flights see St. Jorre, op ..cit., pp. 316-333- See also Col. Scott's 
Report in the gundav^^Tej^e^raph,. 11 January 1970. In fact, the only 
relief aircraft to be destroyed while in flight was the Swedish 
^ed Cross DC-7 intercepted by a Federal MIG on June 5th, 1969- 
All the other planes lost in the airlift either crashed due to 
bad weather or were destroyed on the. ground at Uli. (See Lloyd 
et al 'j O'P-cit., Appendix 34). The most serious effect of Fed- 
eral harassment was probably the abandonment of relief flights. 
In the period from May 1969 to January 1970 JCA reported 245 
aborted flights or flights unable to land in Biafra. This rep- 
resented 7.5% of all flights undertaken in that period. Of these 
aborted flights 40.4% were due to military actions of the FMG
(eitl
plac<
to
op.cit., pp.78-79).
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December 29th, 1968 the government of the Republic of Equatorial 
Guinea - as Fernando Poo had been renamed following the island's
LQ
achievement of independence r7 - forbade the ICRC to include fuel
50 in its relief cargoes. The reasoning behind this move by the
government of Equatorial Guinea was obscure. Some observers 
saw the hand of Lagos in the affair, but the Federal government
issued a vehement denial that it had anything to do with the ban
i
on Red Cross flights. According" to other reports the check to
Hed Cross operations was meant to be an indirect blow against the
51Ibo population of the island.
Whatever the Guinean government's motive was^the ICRC 
protested; justifying its inclusion of fuel in relief shipments 
on the grounds that the only supplies available in the enclave 
\vere under government control, and that in order to maintain its 
strict neutrality, the Red Cross needed to import fuel for its 
lorries and hospital generators. On January 14th, the Red Cross
chief in Santa Isabel, Dr. August Lindt, suspended the ICRC
52 airlift until the contretemps could be resolved. This suspei>-
sion remained in effect until February 12th when the Guinean 
authorities and ICRC officials concluded an agreement under 
which the island's government lifted its restrictions on the 
composition of relief cargoes, and authorized the ICRC to continue 
its operations for a further 30 day period, with as many flights 
during that period as would be required to transfer ICRC stocks
49. The former Spanish possession of Fernando Poo achieved indepen- 
dent status as the Republic of Equatorial Guinea in October 1960.
' I CR C Pr e s s S e 1 ease No. 942, Geneva, 8 January 1969 and Topical 
Red Cross News J\To.ll4b, 30 January 1969.
. See the Guardian, 9 January 1969. and Kirk-Greene, op.cit. , .Vol.2, 
pp. 97-98.
32. To-oical Red Cross News, loc.cit. and ICRC Press Release, loc.cit.
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53 from the island- ^
Aside from the fact that it presaged a much more serious 
interruption of the ICRC airlift later in 1969, the most impor- 
tant consequence of the January disruption was the establishment 
of a second ICRC airbase at Cotonou in Dahomey. From February
1st, 1969 the majority of ICRC flights travelled on the circuiucu;
Sit
route which linked Cotonou and Uli- ' Even following the re- 
sumption of operations from Santa Isabel, the base at Cotonou 
retained the pre-eminent role in the ICRC airlift. In the 
period following the resumption of flights from Santa Isabel 
up to May 19th, for example, the ICRC mounted 3^8 flights from
Santa Isabel to Uli. In the same period 728 flights \vere made
55 from Cotonou to Uli, carrying 1,294 tons of supplies. ^
The ICRC's wisdom in diversifying its bases was revealed 
on February 28th when political disturbances in Equatorial Guinea
forced it to suspend its operations from the island until March(-/* 
17th. ° However, not even the diversification of its bases
was able to insulate the ICRC's airlift from disruption at the 
point of delivery; and on June 5th, 1969 the Federal Air Force 
intercepted a DC-7 sponsored by the Swedish Red Cross and shot
53- I CR G P r e s s_ R e 1 ease No.951b, Geneva, 13 February 1969 and 
ICRC In formation Note to National SQ^c^eties on ICRC Relief Ac ~c ion 
on Behalf of the Victims of the Conflict_in_Nigeria No. 5, 2% 
February 1969-
54. Diggs Report, loc^ cit. ; ICRC Information Note No. 5, loc.cit. ; 
and Kirk-Greene, loc.cit.
55. Tapi£s.2-_R§d_Cr^ss_Jlews No.lli,6, Geneva, 30 January 1969; and
Note No. 5, loc.cit.
56. ICRC Information Note No. 6, 13 March 1969 and ICRC Information 
ffote'No.S, 31 "March, 1959.
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57 it down.-" The ICRC immediately suspended its air operations
into the enclave and, with the exception of one flight on June 
12th and two flights made from Cotonou in August, they were 
never to be resumed.
These events represented the culmination of a lengthy 
period of intensifying Federal hostility to the operations of 
all the relief agencies involved in the clandestine airlift. 
The FMG expressed with increasing frequency its belief that 
the relief airlift was, at best, providing camouflage for Biafra's 
arms suppliers; and, at worst, that the relief agencies' acti- 
vities were a major prop of the rebels 3 campaign for autonomy. 
This suspicion of the humanitarian agencies appears to have 
been brought to a climax of virtual certainty by the sudden 
emergence, in May 1969> °f Joint Church Aid's former chief of 
operations, Count Von Rosen, as the organizer, of Biafran Air 
Force attacks on Federal territory. " Provoked beyond toleration
57. See ICRC Press Release No.98lb, Geneva, 7 June 1969; Tc;oical 
Red Cross News No.ll9b, ^ July 1969; and St. Jorre, op.cit.. ~ro. 
331-332
58. Topical Red Cross News, loc.cit. and ICRC In Action Information 
Notes No.l22b, 22 August 1969-
59. For a detailed description of the evolution and operations of 
Count von Rosen's 'flying circus' of Swedish Minicon aircraft, see 
St. Jorre, op.cit., pp.333-339 and Cronje, S. The IVorld and Nigeria: 
The Diplomatic History of the Biafran War 1967-70 Sidgwick and 
Jackson (London, 1972;
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by the Von Rosen intervention , the Nigerian authorities vented
spleen on "che relief agencies: first, by detaining
-chen expelling the ICRC ! s chief representative in the conflict, 
Dr. Lindt ; secondly, by destroying the Swedish Red Cross 
DC-7; and finally, on June 30th, by withdrawing from the ICRC
the authority to co-ordinate relief operations in Federal terri-
62 tory.
The church agencies* and the ICRC's efforts to relieve 
suffering inside the Biafran enclave had been replicated by the 
estaolishment of a massive relief operation in the territory
60. St. Jorre described the psychological impact of Von Eosen-s 
intervention as follows: "As it was, the Minicon raids only 
partially succeeded. Several Nigerian aircraft were des'ji-oyed, 
but enough survived to continue the nightly bombing at tad-is on 
Uli and other targets, and although the flow of oil exports from 
the Mid-West, and with them Nigeria's most important source of 
foreign exchange, were significantly reduced by the raids the 
Nigerian war machine survived without undue difficulty. And, 
not surprisingly for those who knew the mood on the Federal side, 
Von Rosen f s intervention produced the opposite effect to the one 
ha had intended: the tempo of the struggle quickened. Aerial 
bobbing, which had eased off in April/May, intensified; the ill- 
fated Swedish Red Cross plane was shot down by an English mercen- 
ary under pressure from a furious Federal Government (there seems 
little doubt that this was a direct reprisal for the Swedish 
count's raids); the ICRC was compelled to halt its huge night 
relief operation into Biafra...and humanitarians in general were 
viewed in Lagos with a new mistrust since Von Rosen himself had 
en one less than a year earlier." (St. Jorre, op.cit., p.338).
61- ICRC Prs-ss Release No.978b, Geneva, 28 May 1969; and the 
Observer, Ip June 1969* Although Lindt's detention at Lagos 
airport on Hay 27th was generally attributed to the over-zealous 
performance of his duties by the airport commander, Capt. Charles 
Dixon, the action taken against Lindt was not without pro- 
vocation. There had been several incidents before .-iay 27th 
in which the Federal authorities had. been upset by the Red Cross 
co-ordinator's habit of pursuing his bi-lateral negotiations with- 
out seeking prior clearance for flights into and out of what the 
Federal authorities considered hostile territory.
62. See "Federal Government Briefs Relief Organizations on i-;s 
New Policy" (Document No.208) in Kirk-Greene, op.cit,, vol.2,
Pp.
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under Federal control. 0^ Although nominally under the direction 
of the National Rehabilitation Commission, and.in partnership 
with the Nigerian Red Cross, the ICRC, once the FHG had delegated 
to it the authority to coordinate all emergency relief operations 
in Federal territory *, gathered the overall direction of the 
Nigerian relief action in to its ovm hands. From mid-1968 on- 
v;ards religious groups - many of v;hich were also active in the 
Biafran relief operation - secular voluntary agencies, and official 
aid donors all funnelled their contributions of cash, material,
and personnel through Red Cross coordination centres .established
6"5 
in Geneva and Lagos. ^
Once intiial birth pangs had been overcome in the summer of
66 1968 , ICRC coordination of the Nigerian relief action was quite
effective. It enabled a multitude of organizations to bring 
uf.eir resources and skills to bear on the nutritional crisis in
63- Fo^ detailed descriptions of the relief action in Federally 
controlled areas, see USAID, op. cit., pp.^2-51, and 5*f onwards; 
Nigerian Red Cross, op. cit.., pp.6-8; and Hentsch, op. cit.
. IVhen it became apparent in the spring of 1968 that the nut- 
ritional emergency among refugees in areas under Federal control 
\vas outstripping the Nigerian Red Crosses ameliorative capacities, 
the NRC directed an appeal for material, financial, and human 
resources to the World's Red Cross societies. It was decided 
that the ICRC v:as best suited to coordinate the expected res- 
ponse, and in April the NRC sought and received from the FMG its 
explicit recognition of the ICRC as coordinator of emergency 
relief operations in Federal territory. (See Nigerian Red 
Cross Society, op.cit. t p.6-7)-
65. For details of the coordinating system set up by the ICRC, 
both in Geneva and Lagos, see Hentsch, op.cit.
oo. See the reports in the Times of 13 July 1968: Financial 
Times, 15 July 1968; Dail£ J£cie^raph. 17, 2/f, 28, 30 and 31 
July, and 7 August, 19^8; and the Guardian, 9 August 1968 - 
all of which deal with the problems confronted by the ICRC in 
establishing the Nigerian relief action.
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the liberated areas with a minimum of logistical and adminis-
67 trative duplication. ( In fact, the system worked so well that
by the end of 1968 it was becoming clear that the emergency phase 
of relief operations in Federally controlled territory was draw- 
ing to a close. Increasingly, medical personnel began to orient 
their activities toward the provision of preventitive and curative 
medical treatment not connected with the alleviation of Ic.ashiokor 
or marasmus (the two major forms of fatal, if untreated, mai- 
nourishment). Feeding operations, though still massive in 
terms of the quantities of food stuffs distributed and the number 
of people receiving some degree of nutritional assistance, were 
largely directed toward restoring - or in many cases, improving
r o
- pre-war nutritional standards.
3y the late spring of 1969, it had become obvious that 
the relief effort in Nigerian territory had evolved into a hold- 
ing operation: aimed at sustaining the nutritional recovery of 
people whose livelihood was disrupted by the continuation of 
armed hostilities; but, more importantly, standing ready to 
move large quantities of high protein food and a large number 
of vehicles and experienced relief personnel into the final 
Biafran redoubt immediately upon the termination of hostilit-
6?. A detailed assessment of the strengths and weal-messes of 
the Nigerian Relief action - especially regarding the ICROs 
coordinating role - can be found in Aall, C. Relief, Hutrit- 
ion, and Health Problems _in the Nigerian/Biafran V.'ar (Un- 
published manuscript, Ibadan, 1969) Chs. 5 and ?.
68. For an assessment of medical and feeding programmes see 
NKC/ICRC Information Bulletin ITo.15, dated 15 June 1969 (Lagos); 
Final Report of the Chief Medical Advisor, Hay-June JL9^9_ 
THimeographed at ICHC Headquarters in Lagos) ; and '.Report and 
Recommendations of the Chief Mec.icc.l Advisor (Himeographec. &'c 
TCRU'Eeadquarters in Lagos in September 1969).
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ies. 6?
It had also become obvious in the late spring of 1969 
that the Nigerian relief action was not immune to the political 
tensions which engulfed relief operations in Biafra. A vir- 
ulent anti-ICRC campaign in the Lagos press - including accus- 
ations that the Red Cross was responsible for the delivery of 
'fake 1 relief goods into the war zone, and that arms had been
found in the cargo of the Swedish Red Cross LC-7 shot down by
70the Federal air force' - presaged the June 30th announcement
that the Federal government was withdrawing from the ICRC and 
vesting in the National Rehabilitation Commission the respon- 
sibility for the collection and allocation of resources to be 
used in the Nigerian relief action.
This action, which was greeted v;ith apprehension in the
71 press and outrage in Red Cross circles' , marked, when taken
in conjunction with the essential termination of ICRC air oper- 
ations into the enclave, the beginning of a rapid reduction of
69. See Projected Nutritional Needs in Federal Nigeria 
graphed at ICRC Headquarters in Lagos in 19^91and the Report 
and Recommendations of the _Chief Medical Advisor, op.cit., 
Section 3«
70. See the major English language Lagos newspapers - The Daily 
Times and the government controlled Mornin^Posj: - throughout 
the period April-June 1969 ? especially during the month of June 
in which nearly every edition featured an anti-ICRC story.
The virulence of the press attacks on the ICRC was fright- 
ening - at least to some members of the Red Cross staff. The 
author can recall one session of the operations committee which 
met at ICRC Headquarters which was wholly devoted to discussion 
of the security of ICRC staff and the advisability of removing 
all decals and other insignia which identified ICRC vehicles.
71. See the articles and leaders in the Times (London) of July 
1st and 2nd,1969-
10k
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ICRC involvement in the-Nigeria/Biafra relief operation.
A sober appraisal of the scale and scope of ICRC activities in
Federal territory engendered a Federal request that the ICRC
7^ 
 phase' its withdrawal from the relief action. ^ However^ the
FHG's announcement on June 30th thau "The ICRC will no longer 
be competent to appeal for any aid from the international commu- 
nity and foreign donor Governments on behalf of the Government 
and people of Nigeria" checked the flow of contributions to the 
ICRC. '^ As a consequence the ICRC, driven by financial con- 
siderations, began divesting itself of operational responsibil-
72. 1'he author recalls that on June 30th, following Enahoro's 
announcement of the new policy on relief, there was great spec- 
ulation at ICRC headquarters in Lagos about the exact meaning of 
the phrase contained in the announcement: "...it will also take 
over from the ICRC its relief and related activities in Federally 
controlled areas in the shortes.t_t.4jne^,jp^ssible..." Based on the 
intensity of anti-ICRC feeling in Lagos during the weeks preceding 
the announcement, some staff members believed that the government 
would demand the departure of the ICRC within only a few days.
73. The joint communique issued by the ICRC and the FMG following 
their talks on the new relief policy provided for the transfer 
of coordinating authority to the Rehabilitation Commission, but 
vrith no date specified. This latter ommission reflected two 
perceptions: the first on the part of the ICRC that (as expressed 
in a news report) "if it were forced to abandon the job immed- 
iately, the whole operation of feeding and caring for- the hundreds 
of thousands of people displaced by the war and outside secession- 
ist held areas would grind to a halt," (Times, 1^ July 1969). 
Secondly, on the part of the Rehabilitation Commission, tnat it 
was assuming responsibility for an operation for which it had 
neither adequate administrative structures nor sufficient staff. 
(This latter view came across very clearly in the shocked ex- 
pressions of the Rehabilitation Commission's negotiators when 
they were informed by ICRC representatives of the scope of the 
operation in Federal territory).
. Kirk-Greene, loc.cit.
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ities at a rapid rate. ^ A goal v;as set - and met - of trans- 
om
ferring by the end of October' all but its traditional activities;
)
such as tracing or POW care to its successor as coordinator - 
after some dispute it was decided that the Nigerian Red Cross 
would take over coordination of emergency relief operations,
with the Rehabilitation Commission retaining overall authority
77and specific responsibility for post-emergency operations.
The ICRC's Biafran operations were similarly diminished. 
Although JCA diverted some of its supplies into the Red Cross
rnO
feeding network > the termination of the ICRC airlift fostered 
a re-orientation of the ICRC ! s operations in the enclave. In 
the period following June ^th the ICRC largely returned to its 
traditional emphasis on the provision of medical aid and facilities
for victims of the conflict - including in this case a large
7Q
number of malnourished children and adults. .
75. From mid- July onwards the ICRC was under pressure from both the 
Rehabilitation Commission and the Nigerian Red Cross to slow the 
pace at which it was divesting itself of operational responsibility. 
The speed of the ICRC withdrawal was s however, essentially dictated 
by financial considerations. ICRC operations in Federal territory 
had been running to about £N1,400,000 in cash expenses each month, 
and the duration of its future operations was largely determined 
by the extent LO which ongoing activities could be cut back and the 
funds in hand stretched over those reduced operations. However, even 
with drastic reductions in the level of feeding, staff reductions, 
and a re-organization of administrative procedures it was not poss- 
ible to stretch available resources over more than 3-6 months.
76. The Nigerian Red Cross assumed the role of -coordinator of 
emergency relief operations on October 31st, 1965« (Nigerian Red 
Cross, op. cit. , p. 8).
77. The division of responsibilities in the post-ICRC relief action 
was a source of friction between the National Rehabilitation Com- 
mission and the Nigerian Red Cross. See the text of the KRC Su^-ce- 
ment made at the meeting of voluntary agencies held in Lagos on 
11 September 1969-
73. JCA 86, Geneva, 7 August 1969-
79. ICRC ?'.n>o Action. ln_fp^ig-Mon^JToj:_s.s, No^.l2ob and 131b, dated 
7 Novernber^and ~~"
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The termination of ICP.C air operations shifted a heavier 
burden of supply onto the church sponsored airlift. Although 
its flights were subject to continuing Federal harrassment, and 
-chough its operations were briefly disrupted by the Federj.^ armed
forces, JCA managed to maintain a steady flow of supplies into the
80 
enclave. In July, for example, JCA/USA - the America:: contingent
operating under the church umbrella - flew into Uli 119 times, 
carrying a total of 1,904 tons o:'f ;relief cargo. 0
The inadequacy of the relief operation was, however, even 
more marked than before. As JCA put it in a press release 
issued in August 1969:
The reduced number of JCA flights, which only accounted 
in June and July for 5?430 metric tons, and which were 
sent into Biafra since the suspension of the IC3C air_ift, 
are estimated as having so far supplied less than 25 per 
cent of the minimum requirements of food and medicines to 
avert catastrophe as long as possible. If total star- 
vation is to be avoided, JCA officials estimate that the 
two airlifts must jointly provide 430-500 tons of relief 
supplies daily, This represents an increase of about 
50/o on the maximum provided before the airlifts were re- 
duced.., An immediate full resumption of both airlifts is
80, Throughout this period the air operations of JCA were supple- 
mented by ^ess massive airlifts operated by the French 3ed Cross 
and an Irish Catholic agency called Africa Concern. The French Red 
Cross initiated its airlift from a base in Gabon in the summer of 
1968, though its air operations were not freely acknowledged until 
July 1969. The French airlift accounted for about 4-5 tons of 
relief supplies each night. (See the Times, 23 July 1969). 
.-ifrica Concern also opened its. air bridge into the enclave in 
the summer of 1963. By June 30th, 1969 it had operated over 100 
flights carrying over 1,000 tons of relief cargo. Following the 
termination of the ICSC airlift its operations were stepped up -co 
one flight each night from Libreville into Uli. (See Africa Ccncerj 
Ltd. First Annual Report .of th^_ Joint ^ Biajfra Famine Appeal j:'c r^j^ 
J^2K 3Q/57o5 ; and the letter from H.l-i. Green in the ni'^s 
"~
- 
5 July 1969).
£!  JCA 97, Geneva, '24 September 1969.
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the last chance of saving the remaining Biafran children. 
i:or did the situation improve with the passage of time. In the 
month of December 1969 5 JCA reported, it had managed to p~-iatrate 
the Federal blockade 423 times, landing a total of 5,399 tcr.3 of 
food and medicine at Uli* Hovjever ; it was estimated that uhe 
population of the enclave should have been provided at leas^ 
15,000 tons of relief supplies during that month. ^
Reduced imports of HPF following the termination of ICRC 
flights resulted in an upward spiral in the starvation-related 
death rate in the enclave. JCA reported that death ratos among 
young in-patients at one of the hospitals which it supported rose 
from 16% in May 1969 to 24% in June, 31% in July, and stayed in 
the region of 30% thereafter. 0^" The impact of the reduction in 
imports was described by the ICRC as follows:
At the beginning of June, the ICRC had a network of about 
700 feeding centres which provided over a million children, 
pregnant women and nursing mothers with regular meals three 
times a week. Kwashiorkor had almost disappeared except 
in some territories recently occupied by the Biafrans. 
However, children and adults previously exposed to mal- 
nutrition had not fully recovered.
When flights were stopped, food stocks held at ICRC 
stores in Biafra would have allowed for continued operation 
on a normal scale for only ten days. Immediate steps were 
taken to reserve stocks for child malnutrition treatment 
centres and hospitals. Refugee camps being no longer
62. JCA 86, Geneva, 7 August 1969  S.ee also the article in -che 
Timesr 17 July 1969. Horst Meiner,, a member of the ICRC t^:;:. in 
Cotono'u, was reported as saying, in response to information ~hat 
4-5 JCA flights"were getting into Uli each night, "That is no- 
where near enough. It manages to feed and treat about 300,COO of 
the 1 million people in their care. VJe, too, look after around one 
million Ibos and they have had nothing since June 5th."
r-3- JCA 117, Geneva, 2 December 1969- 
84. JCA 97, Geneva, 24 September 1969.
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supplied, the number of children receiving ICKC relief was 
consequently reduced. At the beginning of July lees than 
10/o of those normally receiving the benefit of ICHC relief 
action were receiving a little food, mainly of local origin.
The effect of the food shortage was worse than e:-:pec'C3dj 
especially on children who had already suffered from star- 
vation, and in the Southern provinces where more than 60>:o 
of the children were affected. Child malnutrition treat- 
ment centres were again overwhelmed.
According to IC3C statistics, the mid-July death rate 
of children in ^0 ICRC centres was 50 a day, and the figure 
rose to 100 the following week.
The situation grows worse daily. If statistics from 
the other centres, the villages and refugee camps were in- 
cluded, these figures would be multiplied many times over.
Total relief supplies now reaching Biafra are only one 
third of what, in May 3 was considered the absolute minimum 
to avoid a catastrophe. This is in spite of the fact that 
food is still flown into Biafra by other organizations.^
As 1969 drew to a close, relief workers began to fear that 
even more dramatic rise in the death rate was imminent. Up 
to that point the major cause of mortality had been.protein 
starvation; however, the compression of the enclave*s population 
into a shrinking territory, and the excision from Biafran control 
of the best croplands in the East, portended the development of 
widespread carbohydrate starvation in the enclave. As one press
report put it:
... basic Biafran food is disappearing. The harvest of 
cassava and yams...have this year been disappointing, a_most 
disastrous. Many doctors in Biafra have in the last five 
weeks noticed an alarming increase in deaths from starvation 
These deaths occur in circumstances which indicate that the 
 orotein deficiency which cost hundreds of lives last autum:. 
has been replaced by plain starvation, which cannot be cured
o5. The ICRC in Action Information jjo^es No,122b, 22. August _So9. 
See also JCA 86 and 37, Geneva, 7 and 19 August 1969.
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by a protein supplement but only by a massive injection 
of basic foodstuffs. 0(86
Confronted with the prospect of a situation in which the 
need for imported foodstuffs would skyrocket from hundreds to
Oo
thousands of tons each day , even the churches began to waver 
in their commitment to the relief operation, questioning whether 
responsibility for the airlift should not be turned over to 
governments, whose resources were more appropriate for the task 
at hand. At a Y/orid Council of Churches Conference in December 
1969, delegates even went so far as to question whether the 
relief operation vjas not indirectly prolonging the suffering in
the enclave by making it possible for the Biafrans to continue
pp 
resisting the advance of the Federal army."1 'o
86. Guardian, o December 19o9«
8?. r_vf.e' logistical implications of a shift from protein into 
calorie starvation in the enclave were spelled out by the Goodell 
study group in their report in February 1969: "A calorie crisis 
presents far greater problems of transportation and relief than 
does a protein crisis. For example, our team estimates that if 
present airlift capacity is maintained throughout 1969, approxim- 
ately 50 ; 000 tons of fot>cl can be delivered into Biafra. "S:;,i^ 
will be 35,000 tons short of the animal protein needs required to 
prevent substantial starvation. [However,], the calorie deficit in 
1969 will be approximately 800,000 tons... Even the most optimistic 
projections...starkly reveal that Biafra will face a calorie deficit 
in the range of 500,000 to 600,000 tons this year... Thus, while 
the deficit in protein could be. overcome by expansion of the 
present airlift, the calorie deficit is clearly of a differer/c 
order of magnitude." Goodell Report, op.cit., pp.S1975 and S1980.
88. See the following chapter for details.
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In the event, tne rapid collapse of the Biafran Army in
f;o 
January 1970' ', and the cessation of ncstiiities on January 13th,
overtook these developments among the sponsors- of the church 
relief operations. Both JCA and the ICRC joined other official 
and private organizations in announcing their readiness to
immediately set in train a massive saturation of the final
QO Biafran redoubt with food and other relief ^r.v.--^Q .
Cust as political considerations had determined bot^ the 
and the scope of the relief operation throughout the war, they 
were to shape humanitarian activities once hostilities had 
ended. The FAG in a final, and finally triumphant, flourish of 
its sovereignty, barred from participation in post-war relief 
efforts all those organizations guilty, at least in federal eyes> 
of bearing "dubious and insulting gifts" and wearing a cloak of 
"false humanitarianism".
In the end the post-war relief operation rested largely in
89. If it was the prolongation of the war which was responsible 
for the intensification of the famine, it appears that it may have 
been the intensity of the nutritional catastrophe which triggered 
off the final Biafran collapse. According to most observers it 
was the sudden Federal breakthrough in the Ikot-Bkpene and Aba 
areas which v;as ~che crucial element in the Biafran collapse. (See 
£ ;. Jorre, o_p>.c_it« 3 p»393) And according to Akpan mass starvat- 
_on played a major role in creating the circumstances which made 
 chat breakthrough possible. (AApan, op. cit , pp.l9*f-193)  
90. See the reports in the Times for the period 12 to 20 January 
1970. Some ideas of the scale of the aid available to the Niger- 
ian relief agencies immediately after nostilities ended can be 
obtained from the list submitted by the United States Special Co- 
ordinator on Relief, C. Clyde Ferguson, to a US House Commit tee- 
on Foreign Affairs. (  ^hg_JQg^.. jj^g_. Nigerian Situation (Hearing 
Before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on African 
Affairs House of Representatives 91st Congress (2nd Session) 27 
January 1970) US Government Printing Office (Washington,DC, 1970) 
p.13).
91. These quotations are extracted from K -Fhe Dawn of Nationa- 
Reconciliation' - Gowon f s Victory Message -;o the Nation, 13 
January 1970" (Document No. 227) in Kirk-Gro-enc 5 op, cit., Vo_. A, 
'o-p. ^57-461. See also the reports in the Tim eg, IL and 13 January 
1970.
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the hands of indigenous relief bodies - the Nigerian Red Cross
op 
and the National Rehabilitation Commission. 7 Although there
was widespread publicity given to accusations that these organ- 
izations lacked the will and capacity to deal with the immediate 
post-surrender situation, it does appear - at least in the 
calmer waters of retrospect - that their performance was pro- 
bably about as efficient and efficacious as would have been the
case had international organizations been allowed free access
9^to the former war zone. -^ The best and most balanced assess- 
ment of the nutritional situation and relief operations in the 
immediate post-war period was probably the following statement 
made by St. Jorre:
...there was no 'genocide 8 , massacres or gratuitious 
killings; in the history of warfare there can rarely 
have been such a bloodless end and such a merciful after- 
math. Secondly, the expectations [and some of the reports] 
of mass starvation were not fulfilled. Phrases in the 
popular press like the 'missing millions', 'the brutality 
of peace' and f silent genocide' were utterly misleading. 
But there was mass hunger and there were concentrations 
of starving, sick and exhausted people, usually refugees 
caught a long way from home, some of whom died because aid 
was too slow in reaching them. There is no accurate figure 
for this category and probably never will be, though it 
ran into thousands, possibly even hundreds of thousands,
92. See "Emergency Relief Operations, Resettlement, and Rehab- 
ilitation" National Commission for Rehabilitation Progress 
Report, Lagos, 1 July 1970; and Nigerian Red Cross, pjDj^cjit., 
vrulC-1?. Also see the following press accounts: Times 22,2k 
and 28 January, 3, 5, 17 and 20 February 1970.
93. Evaluations of the performance of Nigerian relief agencies in 
the post-war period seem to have been as heavily influenced by the 
individual biases of the observers as by any consideration of the 
facts of the situation. Contradictory reports abounded. The 
Times for example carried successive wholly opposed reports on 
the~efficacy of post-war relief operations. (Times, 16 } 20, 21, 
22 and 23 January and 5 February 1970).
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but certainly not millions... The sudden end 
had two immediate consequences, one oj.d., the c'cher O cod. 
It caught the Nigerians with their administrative paircs 
down; there appeared to be no contingency planning for 
an emergency relief operation in the event of a Bia.ran 
collapse. If the Nigerian government had opened its 
doors to the humanitarians and foreign governments that 
were clamouring to cone in, it is possible that more lives 
ivould have been spared. But -_t does not necessarily 
follow. There vjas no shortage of food on the periphery 
of the affected area: the principal difficulties were 
lack of transport and personnel to take it where it was 
needed 3 an acute shortage of medical staff and equipment 
for the abandoned hospitals, an absence of any proper kind 
of administrative structure though the vastly improved 
Nigerian Red Cross did its best - and did not, in the 
event, perform at all badly - and finally the presence of 
the unruly Federal army. To let in the world's human- 
itarians and not remove the soldiers first would almost
certainly have led to disastrous misunderstandings and,
94 
very likely, serious trouble...
Given the material and financial assistance of outside
95 donors' , Nigerian agencies were able to bring the nutritional
emergency in the former enclave under control by the end of 
February 1970. And, four months later, in June 1970, the 
Nigerian Red Cross was able to announce that the emergency
phase of its operations had fully ended: the problems of relief
96 had, now become those of rehabilitation and reconstruction. --'
Perhaps the best way to conclude this assessment of the
. St. Jorre, ojo,cit., pp.404-405.
95. See Nigerian Red Cross,_p;D*_cit., Annex 5 and National Com- 
mission for Rehabilitation progress Report, pp. cit. , ^ppe::dl.-: 
1, for detailed breakdowns of donations of cash, material, and 
technical services from external sources.
96. Nigerian Red Cross, op.cit., p.18.
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Biafran relief operation is by comparing it with history's 
other famous airborne relief operation: the Berlin airlift. 
Statistically, the Berlin airlift absolutely dwarfed the Biafran 
air operations. ; During the period from June 1948 to May 1949, 
the 380 aircraft assigned to the Berlin airlift carried approx- 
imately 1,700,000 tons of cargo in 212,623 flights - an average
of roughly 660 flights and 5? ^ -.00 'cons of cargo delivered each
°7 
day. Compared to this, the ICRC and JCA together mounted,
in the period from April 1968 to January 1970, approximately
i 
7,250 flights carrying roughly 80,000 tons of relief supplies
- an average of 11 flights carrying a total of 125 tons each
There are a number of explanations for the great statistical 
disparity between the Berlin and.Biafran operations. Flight 
operations in Berlin were carried out on a 24-hour basis, while 
in Biafra JCA and the ICRC were able to mount flights only in 
the hours of darkness. Berlin had 3 fully fledged airports 
available to relief aircraft; Biafra offered only a v.'idened 
stretch of tarmac highway as a landing point for relief flights. 
The Berlin airlift was conducted by the world 7 s largest air- 
force. The Biafran airlift was comprised of an ad hoc collect- 
ion of amateur 'do-gooders', ageing aircraft, and mercenary 
pilots. Finally, except for the first few days?the Berlin 
airlift was unhindered by hostile armed forces, whereas the 
Biafran relief pilots were continuously confronted with an - 
however ineffective - enemy presence.
All of these logistical arguments miss the essential 
difference between the two operations. That wa_: that the Berlin
97- jC_A,?2, Geneva, 9 April 1969. -See also HMG Air Ministry 
The Berlin Airlift (London, 1949).
airlift was mounted not only in response to humanitarian imper- 
atives, but as an overt expression of the political philosophy 
and will of the United States government. In the face of 
sophisticated opposition, and '..! i\:h full knowledge of -cne dis- 
astrous consequences which could result from a direct clash with 
the blockading power, the American government assumed an oblig- 
ation to supply food3 fuel, and shelter for more than two milj_on 
Berliners. In the case of Biafra, however, neitaer uhe American 
authorities, nor their compatriots in other Western governments, 
were willing to assume a similar burden of responsibility for 
the survival of 8-12 million starving men, women, and children. 
V.hereas political considerations dictated the full involvement 
of Western resources in the relief of Berlin,, in the case of 
Biafra they deterred the direct involvement of authoritative 
and powerful Western organizations, leaving the ^urden of relief 
to be borne by unofficial groups s which, despite their strong 
commitment to the principles of humanmtarianism 5 lacked the 
political resources necessary to overcome constraints imposed 
on the relief operation by each of the belligerents.
The combined results of the belligerents 8 obstruction and 
the relief organizations 3 political weakness have already been 
assessed. Although the relief agencies were able to transport 
into Biafra sufficient quantities of food to move the population 
back across the threshold of starvation, they were unable to 
secure arrangements which would have, allowed them to import 
sufficient quantities of relief supplies to fully eradicate war- 
in due eel malnutrition in the enclave. They were not even a^e 
to ensure that there would continue to be a flow of food into 
the enclave sufficient to prevent a recurrence of the Xalthu.Li.an 
nightmare of mid-1968.
It appears then that the Liafran relief operation v;as 
simultaneously a success and a failure. It vjas a success 
in-so-far as thousands, even millions, of lives vjere save:, as 
a result of the intervention of relief agencies. It .:as a 
failure, however, to the extent that thousands } perhaps even
v ""' 1 "1 "i o vi c- pi v* "R~i c$ ~?~-^ o •"> Q c; •!- o •" T r ,c. H "!"• r\ r^oc-'hV) i?;l-^,^,Ti T 1^ ^v 'i" "i '".'•V; J,"" H C-T-—i.._L__Lj_-LUl-l'~'j wi UJ.Cla.j.c-.ilO O Uoxo. VCU. OU U.C-<XOQ I'J lit; II OI.wJ' lii-L^UO UO. < w
been saved had the activities of humanitarian organizations not 
oeen inhibited for political reasons.
,1
 The chapter which follows is devoted to an assessment of 
the objectives and perceptions which underlay these political 
constraints on the efficacy of the Biafran relief operation.
CHAPTER V
The Politics of Hunger
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In the preceding chapters i'c was asserted that the primary 
cause of famine in Eastern Nigeria in the period fro a mid-1968 
was.the hindrance of efforts made to alleviate the nutritional 
emergency. It was also asserted that the major constraints 
on the activities of the relief agencies vjere political; that 
political rather than logistical or nutritional considerations 
determined the shape, scope 3 and duration of tne relief operation. 
This chapter is devoted to an assessment of those political 
considerations; it is in effect an analysis of the politics 
of hunger in Nigeria.
The politics of hunger can be defined as that agglomeration 
of values, beliefs, policies and actions, which served to prolong 
and/or intensify the nutritional emergency in Eastern Nigeria. 
Defined this widely, an assessment of the politics of hunger 
could embrace every aspect of the war, for it was the prolongation 
of the conflict between the Federal and Biafran regimes which 
really underlay the famine in the period from mid-1968. It is 
possible, however, to narrow the analysis of the politics of 
hunger to an examination of those perceptions and objectives 
which underlay restrictions on the importation of relief supplies 
into the Biafran enclave.
Kost of the limits imposed on the actions of the relief 
agencies stemmed from the failure of the belligerents to con- 
clude any agreement on methods and routes by which food and 
medicine could be imported, "unhampered by the Federal blockade, 
into the enclave. From the earliest days of their involvement 
in the Biafran relief operation the agencies had recognized that 
only the establishment of approved relief corridors offered a 
real prospect of moving into the enclave the volume of food 
required to meet the nutritional needs of the civilian popul-
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ation. For example: in May 1968, the IC3C addressed an appeal 
to the belligerents, requesting that n a certain number of urgent 
humanitarian measures be adopted,-' U Among these \ias a pisa for 
the establishment of relief corridors: "...the International 
Committee of the Sed Cross is taking all the necessary measures 
for medicines and food of v;hich there is urgent need to reach 
without any delay the areas afflicted by the ivar. 1:: so far as 
Eiafra is concerned, however, faviiities must be accorded it by 
the tv.'o parties opposing each other to enable transports v/hich 
\vill be organized by the 1CSC to arrive rapidly and v;ith security 
en the site. It therefore requests in a pressing manner tnat, 
in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Geneva Convent- 
ions, every facility be granted it to have an extensive lifting 
of tae blockade enabling the passage through of relief supplies. ;: " 
For al~most eighteen months the relief organizations (represented 
for the most part by the ICRC), the Federal and Biafran govern- 
ments, and, on some occasions, other interested parties enga0 ed 
in vjhat proved, in the end, to be a futile search for some 
agreement concerning for the movement of relief supplies. As 
St. Jorre put it: "All attempts to reach a mutually acceptable 
relief agreement failed though every conceivable possibility -
1, The question of just what type of relief corridors best met 
the needs of the situation v.'as a matter of some dispute among the 
various groups involved in the -relief operation. Some focussed 
on the scale of food imports needed, arguing that on I;/ surface 
relief corridors offered a realistic prospect of moving the 
volume of supplies required. Others emphasized the urgency of 
the situation, and asserted that only a large-scale airlift could 
get the needed supplies of food to the enclave 5 s population in 
time to prevent starvation. See, for example, the reports in 
the Guardian^ of 6 and 30 July 196c; also lord Kunt f s contribution 
to the debate in the House of Lords on August 2?th 1968.
2. Tcroical 5ed Cross Keivs No.lO?b, Geneva, 31 May 1968.
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daylight flights, land, sea and river corridors, parachute 
drops, aircraft carriers, helicopters - v.'as exhaustively ex- 
amined. "^
Of all the reasons why this protracted haggling over 
relief corridors came to naught, one appears to have been most 
fundamental: that was the belligerents 1 refusal to acknowledge 
the imperatives of humanitarianism. The term humanitarianism 
implies the existence of a pattern of behaviour rooted in the . 
explicit and unvarying affirmation of certain fundamental and 
inalienable rights - most basically the right to life - as the 
ideal basis for all inter-personai or social interaction. It 
v;as this vision of human existence that motivated most of the 
relief agencies which involved themselves in the Nigerian conflict 
Throughout the war 'they demanded that the belligerents shape 
their policies and actions in conformity with the dictates of
3. St. J-orre, John de The .Nigerian .Civil \Var Eodder & Stoughton 
(London 1972) p.2-;0. The range of initiatives on relief corridors 
was quite remarkaole. When more straight-forward proposals for the 
establishment of land, sea or air corridors proved .unacceptable, 
exotic plans began to come forward. One of the most intriguing of 
these was the idea put forward in Oct.1969 by a group calling it- 
self the Internationa,! Committee of Conscience. This group, whose 
major sponsors were Senator Hubert Humphrey, Mrs, Martin Lutnar 
King, and Lt.-Gen. \Villiam Tunner (director of the Berlin airlift), 
proposed that relief be delivered into the enclave by helicopters 
operating from aircraft carriers stationed off the coast of Eastern 
Nigeria. The Committee argued that the configuration of the helicop- 
ters would make it easy for the Nigerians to distinguish relief from 
arms flights. Inspection would be simplified because of the con- 
finement of stores to a sms.ll discrete area. Helicopters would be 
able to deliver straight to distribution points, thereby avoiding 
the use of Uli. The Biafrans would not have to fear an attack on 
Uli by FMG aircraft Hailgating 8 on relief aircraft, and there 
'.. Guld be no contact with Federal controlled territory. (Times, Z}th 
Octooer 1969). However, aside from the fundamental problems of 
availaoiiity of the type of equipment whose use was visualized in 
this 'olan, the Committee's proposal came too late in the course of 
negotiations over relief corridors to offer much hope for its a^op- 
tion. Even though the plan met al_ the requirements on relief 
corridors enunciated by each side, both belligerents were so set 
in their resistance to any proposition acceptable to the other- 
side that any proposal on relief corridors was doomed to rejection.
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humanitarianism. In October 1967> for example, the IC^C b: 
cast an appeal to the belligerents^ emphasizing their respon- 
sibilities under the Geneva Conventions:
It draws their attention to the humanitarian principles 
recognized by ail peoples and contained in the Geneva 
 Convention of 19A9 for tne protection of victims of v;ar. 
These principles demand in particular that the lives of 
combatants who have surrendered be spared, that the woun- 
ded be respected and given the necessary care., that merey 
be shown to the civilian populations... The International 
Committee of the Red Cross counts on the authorities of 
the parties concerned to take the necessary measures to
ensure that these principles be applied strictly and in
., . . L. 
a_ circumstances. '
Similarly, in March 1963 the world Council of Churches an^ ta^ 
2oman Catholic Church made an 'unprecedented' joint appeal for 
the cessation of hostilities:
While it is not our part to declare on the issue of con- 
tention, we are bound to call the most immediate attention 
to the sacred issue of the human right to life itself... 
V.'e therefore urge governments and international agencies
in a position to act effectively in this.matter to secure
5 
...a negotiated peace.
It soon became apparent, however, that both the ?edera^_ 
and Biafran governments grounded their policies and actions in 
a different, more expedient, perception of human existence: ene 
in which human rights rated as only one among many factors which 
determined patterns of personal or social behaviour. The diver- 
gence between the value patterns of -the belligerents and the
g s - ev'.g > i-.ro.99bj Geneva, 30 October 1967.
5. Cited in Xirk-Greene, A.r-.l-i. !: The Unacceptable I?ace of Human- 
itarianism" (Paper delivered at the Centre for African Studies, 
SOAS, University of London on lp November 1973 during a Confer- 
once on the problems of Christianity in post-Colonial Africa).
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relief organizations was aptly summed up by St. Jorre:
Throughout the war tnere was a fundamental dichotomy in 
the approach of the humanitarian agencies and the belli- 
gerents to the relief problem which throws an illuminating
^ ' -U \^J
and infallible shaft of light down every down every twist 
and turn of the dark labyrinth of their relationship. 
The Nigerian and Biafran leaderships had one central over- 
riding aim: to vjin the war by fair means or foul; all 
other considerations including the starving thousands 
were secondary. ..[ the humanitarian a0 dnciesj order of 
priorities was thus the reverse of the belligerents 8 , 
their overriding aim being to save lives, ignoring, \vhere 
possible, political considerations of boundaries, front-
x*
f~~~.
.Lines, nationalities, tribes, flags and anthems. w 
The belligerents* disregard for the imperatives of human- 
itarianism made it virtually certain that the movement of relief 
supplies would become an issue in the conflict. For the military 
situation in which the belligerents found themselves towards 
the end of the first year of the war transformed the penetration 
of the Federal blockade, even for humanitarian purposes, into 
an act of political significance.
Federal offensives during the first year of fighting had 
resulted in the encirclement of the territory under Biafran 
control. As a result, penetration of the Federal blockade 
assumed a central significance in the rebel leaders 3 strategy. 
First, because the Biafran army required supplies of arms and
6. St. Jorre, op_.cit., p.236.
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ammunition which vjere only availaole from external sources. 
Secondly, because the prospects of success for Eiafrm : s inde- 
pendence struggle depended partially on her ability to gee
spokesmen out into the international community (and re'jreeent-
o 
atives of that community into the enclave for inspection tours).
Finally, at least in the latter stages of the v^ar v;hen the llbos 2
'/. According ~co j-ixpan, 'cae .uiairan xrmy vjouid have eo.__apse:. 
following the fall of Ovjerri and Aba in September 1963 vjithcut 
an influx of foreign arms. Ke asserted that Ojukvru and oeaer 
leaders v;ere preparing to give up 'formal resistance 1 and either 
take to the bush to conduct a guerrilla \var 3 or flee the country,
_ _"  > ^ r
Akpan ; N . U . ccoun o
the Nierian Civil War A'rank C ndon 1971
an   s account 01 tne j_in 01
:.rmy prior to the arrival of arms from external sources - 
primarily France - may have been exaggerated, his conclusion
have had difficulty prolonging any formal resiseance eo the 
Federal troops is echoed by other analyses. .See ? for e::mmp_e,
S 4- ~/^r*-r*,-. n~\ ^ ~" •'- -->-•-. PI ~_P^! • ^ ~i r*V—"-- --.--,-- o ' v-r "./ P-.-.' -- o . o O X JL <o , CJ ,J •>-..'_ ^ », ^JjJ . £1JL ^- —£_J? J. j *<-ll j^_—^ _ o ^ ii <d j _- e j._ . i i • w^. ^: .._ ,:^
and _Con flj-_cj__in__jji_geria: A '^0£^\£^
Oxford University PressCLondon, 1971), Vol.2, pp.75-^0; ; and 
C r o n j e , S. The_WorM^and Nigeria::_Th^ _Di; ^ lomat ic_History_ of 
the__£ig.fran War 19o7-7Q Sidgwick and Jackson fLondon, 1972"),
. 9  
6. According eo Kirk-Greene one of Ojukv:u*s primary objections 
to tee inspection of relief cargoes and flights in Legos or on 
any oeher territory under Federal control v;as that ;; j.it mould 
have] closed the sole route for his jet-set emissaries to com- 
municate v;ith the outside vjorld." (Kirk-Greene, op. cit. (1971) 
Vol.2, p.121).
Kirk-Greene also noted, the importance to the iiiafrans 
of outside journalists and_other observers ? reports on con- 
ditions in the enclave: "In Britain, a series of stirring anc. 
en'r a-^ articles in the 8 I vjas there' vein from VJinston Chureh- 
iTjTiin' the Times so underlined the magnitude of the suffering 
inflicted by the reportedly indiscriminate strafing of Liafran 
civilians 'chat the Government v:as forced to seek an explanation 
of this apparent denial or defiance of General Govjon 5 s orcers 
to his Air^Force." (Kirk-Greene, pmo^cit. (1971), p.103).
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fear of genocide had been eroded by the survival of millions 
of their comrades in territory under Federa^. control, because 
the civilian population f s vjiil and capacity to obey its leaders 1 
exhortations to continue the struggle became more and more 
directly linked to the quantity of food carried into the enclave 
on relief aircraft. As a British correspondent, touring the 
enclave one \veek before the collapse of Biafra : s resistance, 
pointed out, the fear of genocide had waned and as the flovj of 
relief supplies dwindled Biafrans were giving up their struggle: 
"People are nov; choosing, in large numbers, to risk massacre
at Federal hands rather than die slowly from starvation in a
o 
shrinking enclave... 1"
The importance of the blockade was also increased in the 
eyes of Federal leaders. In the first place, tae relative 
ease \vith which the non-Ibo periphery of the Eastern Segion 
had been v;rested from rebel hands had been, succeeded by the 
prospect of a long and difficult struggle for control of the 
Ibo Heartland. The Federal Army was probably incapable of 
conquering the Ibo Heartland by direct assault. (In fact, 
Britain J s military observer. Col. Robert Scott, was emphasizing 
tae offensive weakness of the Federal armed forces even so late 
as December 1969). A total economic blockade of the terri- 
tory still under Biafran sv/ay offered, in the context of a 
protracted conflict, one of the most effective and least costly
9. Sunday Time.s, 11 January 1970.
10. See Cronje, o^^cit., p.160.
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means of eroding the secessionists : resistance
T-,, O1 . f^ U ^ -' -,-, ,-. - -. ,- -'- ,-^ -,- ^ __ --,,-,-., ^~ ,-..-,-, .'."• ,~ -^ /- ' ^ _, .'- ^ 1- ", -• ^-,1 „ ,„ -- ™
relief corridors were inevitably evaiu,
" i _ ^ j^ 4-1 , -i ~| -" ~ - 1   ' 
_*. t- -i v/ ^*  . LJ i t> w JL. v *. ^  w I A i ^. ^ . A. O Ov  . V CA. \«-C V O\. 1. A W C-s. -- Vw* W X
thereto. The most extreme articulations of these military 
assessments of the relief operation came from the * nardiiners 3
12 r-in tne Federal camp. This group of soldiers, politicians, 
and civil servants savj that relief distributions within the 
o'nc_i_cs.\/e ui__c_u^-jauec; uiie _i_Li'Dacc o.^ one D_LOcmacxe; aiiCi cnaT/ o^ie 
operation of relief corridors enhanced the prospects of Biafra's 
arms suppliers., enabling them to hide behind a relief mask and 
evade interception by the Federal forces. ^Rationalizing the 
nutritional consequences of a policy of total blockade by arguing, 
first, that the nutritional crisis was itself a. product ex the 
war and therefore that any policy which promised to speed the 
conclusion of the war also hastened the end of the famine; and
Algerian context } a legitimate weapon of war 3 the Federal hawks 
s'cood out against the operation of any relief corridors. AS 
Chief AwolowOj ohe most prominent civilian'hardliner'put it in a 
speech in 1969: U I don't',see why we should feed our enemies fat.
CJ.
11. A second factor which enhanced the importance of the blockade 
was the Federal leaders 2 reluctance to mount an invasion of ~cne 
Ibo Heartland, In June 1968 Gowon promised that "there \vouid 
be no attempt by the Federal troops to drive into the heart of 
the East-Central s"i:ate and no pursuit of the Biafrans in'co their 
homeland except as a last resort after all appeals to Biafr 
had failed." " (Kirk-Greene, .o^^cit. (1971),"Vol.2, p,53) 
(Although, this decision was apparently nullified by Gowon v 
announcement of a 'final' military offensive on August 2A-h 
1968. (See Kirk-Greene, o^cit. (I97D, Voi,2 5 pp.?l-?2).
12. ine term 'hardliners' was used by St. Jorre, £^i£i£'? IP
12/f
This statement, followed one day later by a remark from 
Brigadier kassan Katsina^ the Chief of Staff of the Feceral 
Army^ that "1 would not feed somebody I am fighting1 ' led the 
Times to condemn the FkG for adopting a policy.of famine:
All the evidence now snows that starvation as an act of
T-I'~--~» "1 O "f~ o Ci fT^ ''~* "^ d r* ~r ~^ XT' ^ —\ ^ 1 ""' ^% ^ T r^ "^ —^ '^ h ' ~" "" ^i v**^ •": v^ i^l' -^ "t r ^ --.-", -,- - -~-,~,'~\ T
',1 c^-. io l/wc c-j.j-UOU2.vo jJ^i JL^-^j Uj. L.^O i._!- 0 c-IicLJ.i LvU v c; j. 4.1.;.^. il U . . •
whatever intentions it may have had at the oeginning of 
the war, is now prepared to use blockade and starvation, 
even at the cost of a further million deaths., rather than 
agree to secession. Leaving aside the massacres of the 
IboSj tnis has the effect of a policy of genocide.^"'
The Times nay have been overly harsh in its castigation of the
FkG. In the first place blockade and its nutritional consequences
15 have jeen time-honoured weapons cf war. ^ Secondly, actua^
Federal policy regarding relief corridors appeared to amalga- 
mate the hawk 7 s perception of the military disadvantages in-
in the oeration of relief corridors v;ith a more subtle
evaluation of "he ong-range oecves o ne : an ev -
uation \vhich recognized that the ultimate goai of tne Federal 
government vjas not conquest of the Ibo Heartland^ but the re- 
conciliation of the Ibo masses vjith the rest of the peoples cf 
the Federation; and that "nourishing their bodies was one way
-3- guardian, 2? June 1969
-:,• See, for example, the letter from Judith Lady Listowel in 
the Timers, 2 July 1969 in v<hich it is argued that :: In parsing 
judgement on the Federal Nigerian Government, it v/cuid be fair 
to bear in mind that blockade, that is denial of food and med- 
icines to an enemy, has been practiced since time immemoriaJ.. . . I: 
See, also, the consideration of starvation as a weapon of mar- 
in relation to the Nigerian conflict contained in ITsmsvjs^k, ~j,Z 
September 1968-
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starvation v/as employed against the Bialran enclave. 
The filial balance of influence between the Fe
nd moderates appears to have favoured the .
Certainly the net result of negotiations over relief corriiors 
v.as consistent with their "oosition. Although, it could ;:e
«L -^fJ J
argued that, to the extent the Federal 'hardliners- imposed
acie oO cne .QiairanSj cney saootageci. tnemse-i-ves. _'Cr "one
fb.i^ure to achieve any agreement on relief corridors virtually
nsured the continuation of the nighttime relief airlift v/nich
ci -^ ~i c; r* r*, "* " "-^ "I" 't"'^"! <~* ^'Vi o 1"> oi'i 1 -" ^ ",~d^r 1ojaTr^ oo^'o •••••' r"! ^ ^ , -1 --. -" ----- U. u. J.o 1-' ^J ^IA U OiiJ_o» j. 11 1: Cicx.J/i.o ii-d.^ ildvo o^Cxlj sT-.o Lu_v.t _ /j. _ ^o.. _ .
military observer, that even if the relief shield \vere remove 
i~ ivas improbable that the Federal Air Force v/ould. be ac__e to 
cnec': ohe flovj of arms into iiiafra. They may have therefore 
ep~ced to at least minimize the mitigating effect of "cne relie
Responsibility for the failure of the belligerents to 
agree on relief corridors cannot, hov.'ever^ be YJholly attributed 
to tne FAG. For the Biafran regime vjas dominated by a group of 
'hardliners 3 v;hicn, like its Federal counterpart,, consistently 
subordinated humanitarian considerations to its pursuit of 
political goals. As St. Jorre put it: !: In Biafra there mere 
similar divisions. The hardliner-, led by Ooul-ivro., urged a ; 
of no compromise (as in peace negotiations): Food and relief 
supplies were unacceptable unless they came from sources a:.i 
through channels that had no connection with tae Federaj. Gcvernment7 yi o
. St. Jorre, ou.cit.
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serious denial that the liafran leaders prefer the nresenu 
night to day flights partly because the food planes provide
p V
a convenient cover to arms planes.^
Considerations of the military significance of relief
v.-c inere e concluson of any agreemen on e de_very
i 
of relief supplies vjas the attitude of each of the belligerents
toward international intervention in the conflict.
ihe Biafran position on international involvement v/as 
sui:;zed up by Ojuknu in a speec.i made to the Consultative Assembly 
in September 1968: !; 0ur aim all along has oeen ~co delay t^o-
enemy until the vjorld conscience can effectively be areusec.
2L 
against genocide. ?; '' The nutritional crisis uhic^ became
^.pparent in uhe spring of 1966 preferred the rebels a reprieve 
from t^e failure v;hich had largely characterized their previous
j^iiJrJVL-' 8 -'!-.Q-Ig^l i 22 November 19c9 
Cited in St. Jorre, op^cg.t. , p
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attempts to engage international support for the Biafran cause. ^ 
It led to .recognition of the validity of secessionist objectives 
among a few of Africa 1 s leaders who were most concerned about 
the impact of the war on civilians. On April .13th, 1968 Tanzan- 
ia's President Nyerere broke ranks with the rest of the OAU's 
leaders and announced formal diplomatic recognition of Biafra. 
Arguing that unity could not be forged by the force of arms,
25. Biafra had mounted both diplomatic and public relations 
initiatives following secession. The diplomatic offensive got 
off to a shaky start. A few hours after secession Biafran 
Radio announced that Ghana, Togo, Gambia, Ethiopia, and Israel 
had all recognized the legitimacy of the secessionist regime: 
a claim which was hastily denied by all the countries involved. 
(Cronje, op.cit., p.28?) Formal recognition of the justness 
of the Biafran cause was to prove an elusive quarry throughout 
the early months of the war. The most severe blow to Biafra's 
diplomatic hopes was delivered by her fellow African states in 
the OAU. Although the OAU was deeply involved in arranging 
peace negotiations between the Biafran and Federal leaders, it 
was clear throughout the war that the weight of opinion in the 
organization favoured the FMG. (For details see Cronje, op. 
cit., Ch.13). Eastern secession infringed two of the funda- 
mental precepts underlying the OAU: first, the inviolability 
of the national boundaries of post-colonial African states; 
and secondly, non-interference-in the 'internal 1 affairs of member 
states. At the same time memories of the chaos and international 
derision which accompanied Katangan secession remained fresh 
in the minds of African leaders. Although a detailed cohipar- 
ison of the motivations of the secessionist regimes revealed 
only superficial similarities, they were closely allied in their 
revelation of the instability and inadequacy of political authority 
in post-colonial Africa. Perhaps the most important factor in 
determining OAU support for the FMG, however, was the existence 
of fissiparous strains similar to those of pre-war Nigeria in 
many of the OAU member states. Confronted with incipient or 
potential secessionist movements in their own domains, few 
African leaders were willing to support any challenge to central 
authority.
Biafra also enjoyed only limited success on the public 
relations front during the early stages of the war. As St. 
Jorre put it: "In the early days, the 'religious' war was 
played up. The Muslim Northerners, backed by the Arabs and the 
Russian anti-Christs, it was argued, were bent on a fanatical 
jihad against the Christian Easterners. But this made little 
mileage, its palpable fallacies - Gowon himself and two-thirds 
of his cabinet were Christians, while the bulk of the Federal 
Army was non-Muslim - soon being exposed. Deliberate mass 
starvation and genocide then came to the fore, the latter having 
the longest and most effective run." .(St. Jorre, op.cit., p.352).
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Nyerere said that "it seemed to us that by refusing to recognize 
the existence of Biafra we were tacitly supporting a war against
the people of Eastern Nigeria - and a war conducted in the name
?( of unity. We could not continue doing this any longer."
Both Nyerere 's reasoning and action were replicated less than
one month later when, on May 8th, Gabon recognized Biafra; an
P7 action followed within twelve days by the Ivory Coast and Zamoia.
This same period also saw concern about the plight of 
Eastern Region civilians mounting in Western Europe and North 
America. As Kirk-Greene put it:
Biafra had been gathering more and more support among 
certain classes of Britons and Americans. They were 
influenced by a number of factors. These included letters 
in the press from prominent churchmen, reports of the 
bombing of Mary Slessor hospital, apparently unsubstantiated 
accounts of the wanton killing of civilians, but above all 
the signal superiority of Biafra f s public relations agencies
p 0
in Europe and the USA.
As the spring wore on, and increasingly grim reports of the 
nutritional situation filtered out of the war zone, this rather 
diffuse anxiety began, Increasingly, to focus on the prospect of 
mass starvation in the East:
'Milk - not murder 1 , shouted a Daily Sketch banner head- 
line. ! How can we sit and wait for a million innocent 
people to die? 1 asked a skeletal Biafran child from an 
OXFAM advertisement. 'Biafra: starving children don't 
care which General wins' proclaimed another poster. Con- 
fronted with reports of a weekly death rate in the thousands, 
British public opinion now suffered the prickings of its
26. "'Why We Recognized Biafra' - President Nyerere" (Document AO. 
1/49) in Kirk-Greene, op.cit. (1971) Vol.2, pp. 211-213).
2?. See "Zambia Recognizes Biafra" (Document No. 155) in Kirk-Greene, 
op.cit. (197D Vol.2, pp. 220-221, also pp. 41-
28. Kirk-Greene, op.cit. (1971) Vol.2, p. 29.
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uncomfortable humanitarian conscience, suitably stirred
by the vigorous application of the swizzle-sticks of 
pq
mass-media. 7
The dilemma confronting the Biafran leaders was how to 
translate this international concern, into a sufficient weight of 
world-wide affirmation of the justice and validity of Eastern 
autonomy to overcome Federal resistance to the disintegration 
of the Federation-^ ; and secondly, how to sustain international 
concern for the civilians in the war zone until the former 
objective could be achieved. It was the Biafrans' solution 
to this latter problem which blocked the establishment of mutually 
agreeable corridors for the transportation of relief supplies. 
The hawks who dominated Biafran policy-making saw that an un- 
hampered relief operation would, by eradicating starvation in 
the enclave, almost surely reduce international interest in 
Biafra's struggle. So far as -they were concerned "the relief 
operation as it stood" - to use St. Jorre f s words - "though far 
from satisfactory in terms of saving lives at home, was doing 
Biafra a power of good abroad, publicizing its case and filling 
its coffers. A relief pact would have taken the steam out of
29. Kirk-Greene, op.cit. (1971), Vol.2, p.57.
30. It has been argued by some observers that Biafra's focus 
upon the international concern for starving Biafrans as a mech- 
anism for the generation of political support was counter-prod- 
uctive. Cronje, for example, asserted that "On the whole, the 
emphasis on suffering and the relief of it damaged Biafra's 
chances of gaining international recognition. The problem came 
to be regarded as a humanitarian rather than a -political dilemma; 
it was easier to donate money for milk than to answer Biafra's 
international challenge." (Cronje, op.cit., p.211) 'In a similar 
vein, the authors of The Other Side of Nigeria's Civil War noted 
that "Relief also functions as a political ideology. By pro- 
viding the images through which the Civil War is seen - tribal- 
ism, genocide, etc. - it shapes the way people understand the 
conflict. These images function to distort the problem and obscure 
the origins of the war. While they waken humanitarian impulses, 
they deaden political understanding." (Africa Research Group 
The Other Side of Nigeria's Civil War (Cambridge, Mass., 1970),
~
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the first and dried up the second. 11 ^
Not surprisingly, the Biafrans did not articulate their 
objections to various proposed relief corridors in terras of
their desire to sustain a high-level of international concern
"52
for famine victims in the war zone. Therefore, a statement
that such an intention lay at the root of their policy can be 
no more than an hypothesis. The strength of such an hypothesis 
appears to be considerable, however, when the articulated ration- 
alizations upon which the Biafrans based their rejections of 
relief proposals are compared with the impact of those rejections 
on the civilian population. Probably the best illustration of 
this disparity was to be found in the Biafrans 1 rejection of 
the relief agreement signed by the FMG and the ICRC in September 
1969- Biafra objected to the principle that the 'FMG could call 
relief flights down to Lagos for inspection if it wished. The 
Biafrans claimed that this threatened their security by making- 
it possible for FMG aircraft to 'tailgate* relief flights into 
Uli (even though the ICRC planned to eliminate this possibility 
by arranging for any flight called down at Lagos to fly back to 
Cotonou prior to heading for Uli.) To eliminate any chance 
of Federal treachery the Biafrans demanded a third party guaran- 
tee. The ICRC responded the following day, asserting that the 
Biafrans had not spelled out the details of what they wanted in
31. St. Jorre, Q2.jci.t» , p.
32. Although, as the war drew near its end, there was apparently 
a greater readiness to admit the political rationale which lay 
behind their obstruction of relief operations. According to St. 
Jorre, Ojukwu told Lord Carrington in late 1969 that he had 
rejected the daylight flight schemes proposed in the summer and 
autumn of 1969 because of '"mainly political reasons. 1 " (St. Jorre, 
op. cit. , p
33- Times. 13 September 1969-
134
such a guarantee, and that, in any event, such a matter was 
political and exceeded the ICRC's brief. ICRC spokesmen said 
all they could no was ask the Biafrans "'Do you persist in 
refusing the supplies of food and medicaments which are ready 
to go? 1 "-^ Biafra refused to budge, even to accept the written 
declaration of intent offered by the FMG.-^ Nor would the 
Biafrans accept Federal assurances that they would not use 
relief flights to cover a military operation when these were 
given to the American government.
All this time the death rate from starvation in Biafra 
was steadily mounting. As Norman Kirkham put it in a report 
from the enclave in November 1969 i
...the death toll among the children begins to mount 
again as Biafra reaches the end of an early harvest and 
prepares to reap the next early in the new year... It is 
impossible to convey in precise statistics the awful 
suffering in the worst areas... I am convinced that relief 
agency estimates of between two and three thousand deaths 
a day are modest. Many thousands more have little strength 
left and a few days without food would undoubtedly kill 
them, ,, , Church' agencies have been flying in recently up 
to 200 tons each night from Sao Torne but they estimate
that this must be increased by at least 300 tons to tackle
tn 
acute problems. '
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that Biafra ! s 
leaders were playing politics with their followers lives, counting 
on moral pressure from the outside to force Federal acquiescence 
in Biafran sovereignty. Among the various policies and percept-
34. Times, 16 September 1969-
35. Times, 23 October 1969.
36- Guardian, 18 November 1969.
37. Daily Telegraph. 22 November 1969.
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ions which comprised the politics of hunger Biafra f s manipul- 
ation of international concern for its civilians was, however, 
matched in importance by another aspect of the inter-face between 
the belligerents and the international community: Federal 
hostility toward the international relief organizations which 
involved themselves in the conflict.
Federal antipathy towards the international relief agencies 
dated from the earliest days of their intervention on behalf 
of war victims. When the church-sponsored relief groups 
shipped cargoes on flights which were also carrying arms to 
Biafra, the FMG was outraged. As St. Jorre put it:
Arms kept Biafra going and it was well-known that, in 
the early days, the Churches had condoned the despatch 
of mixed cargoes to Uli. This poisoned relations between 
the Churches and the Federal Government throughout the
•zO
rest of the war,
Even the first flight made by the ICRC into the enclave caused 
resentment in the FMG, which believed that the rebels had taken 
advantage of its declaration of a two-day hiatus in Federal
air operations and had stepped up their arms flights into the
39 enclave.
As reports reached Lagos of a large-scale mobilization of 
resources for use in Biafran relief, Federal antipathy to the 
agents of this international concern waxed. When, in May 1968,
38. St. Jorre, op. cit. t p.2/fl.
39. Statement issued by the FMG in Lagos on 2? May 1968.
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the ICRC presented the FMG with the demand that "in accordance 
with the letter and the spirit of the Geneva Conventions, every 
facility be granted it [the ICRC] to have an extensive lifting 
of the blockade enabling the passage through of relief supplies" 
the FMG not only rejected the request but appended to its re- 
jection an accusation that the ICRC was acting as a "tool of 
rebel propaganda".^° As the summer of 1968 wore on, Federal 
hostility intensified. On July 5th the FMG felt constrained to 
announce, in response to reports that the British government had 
succumbed to pressure from British relief groups, which wanted 
to use RAF aircraft to air-drop accumulated stores of food and 
medicine into the enclave, that "Instructions have been issued 
to the Nigerian Air Force to seek and destroy all aircraft which 
enter into Nigeria on missions not expressly authorized and 
cleared by the Federal Military Government."^ 1 . This announcement 
was followed on the 8th of July with a general castigation of the 
relief agencies for their pro-Biafran attitudes and disregard for 
Federal sovereignty:
Since Ojukwu and his gang began to play politics with the 
sufferings of the masses in the rebel held areas, several 
foreign relief organisations, particularly in Britain, 
have been trying to fish in troubled waters. They have 
foolishly exploited the problems created by the sick and 
hungry in the distressed areas to defy in a most annoying 
manner the authority of the Federal Military Government. 
They have not disguised their admiration for the rebels' 
continuing resistance to the Federal authorities even 
though they know it is this resistance that has brought
^°- Topical Red^Cross News, No.lO?b, Geneva. 31 May 1968- and 
Financial Times,29 May 1968. ' '
J»l. Lagos radio report, 5 July 1968 (BBC ME/2815/BA); and Times 
9 July 1968.    
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about the refugee situation which they now claim to oe 
interested in solving. The motives of these so-called 
humanitarian organisations have been clear right from the 
time they began to feature in our crisis. Their actions 
and public statements have demonstrated that they are not 
interested in seeing peace returned to this country. It 
is clear to us and to all impartial observers that the 
sole aim of these groups is to assist the secessionist 
forces in their criminal act of breaking up our country. 
They hope that after this disgraceful objective has been 
achieved, the way will be open for them to carry out a 
carefully hatched imperialist conspiracy to other African 
countries.
The origins of the Federal hostility to the relief agencies 
were multi-fold. Federal perceptions of the military signif- 
icance of the relief operation, and particularly of the nightly 
penetration of the Federal blockade by a mixed fleet of ICRC, JCA, 
and arms flights, have already been examined. Of equal if not 
greater importance in determining Federal attitudes toward the 
relief operation, however, were the FMG's views on the general 
issue of international involvement in the Civil War.
If Biafra gaw international intervention as its last, best 
hope of securing independence, the Federal Government was equally 
strongly opposed to international involvement in what it saw as 
a domestic affair. From the earliest days of the war the FMG 
stressed the domesticity of the conflict. Immediately after 
the outbreak of hostilities the Federal government warned fellow 
members of the OAU that it would consider the diplomatic recog- 
nition of Biafra a breach of relations. At the same time Gowon 
attempted to minimize the conflict between the Federal and 
secessionist regimes, referring to the outbreak of fighting as
. Lagos radio talk, 8 July 1968 (BBC ME/2817/B/2).
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Ifl a surgical police action and not civil war 1 ."^* For the
first ten months of the war international involvement was mini-
\s 
mized, with what intervention that did occur largely favouring
the FMG - for example, Britain and Russia's decisions to supply 
arms to the Federal armed forces. Things began to fall 
apart, however, in the spring of 1968. Recognition of Biafra's 
sovereignty by four African states, pressure in Britain to cut 
off the flow of arms to Nigeria^ , and widespread appeals for a 
ceasefire arrangement, all of these were indicators of the 
growing inclination on the part of the international community 
to intervene in the conflict.
Spokesmen for the FMG were quick to vent their antipathy 
toward any person or organization which articulated the inter- 
national community's growing sense of unease about the impact 
of the war. For example: when Cardinal Heenan, the Archbishop 
of London, condemned the belligerents for the suffering they were 
causing among Eastern civilians, Federal spokesmen quickly re- 
taliated with an attack on the Churches for their partisan- 
ship in the conflict: "...neither the Church of England or the 
Roman Catholic Church is a pacificist organization. Their 
opposition to the war in Nigeria can only derive from their 
support for the break-up of the country... 11 ^ Its most vehement
. Kirk-Greene, gp_.cjlt. (1971) Vol.2, p. 3-
i|i|. Biafra was largely limited to the commercial market for arms 
(at least until the French intervened in Sept. 1968). For a detailed 
analysis of the arms trade during the war see Cronje, op. cit. , Chs. 
3, ^, and 12.
^5. For an illustration of strength of feeling in the UK about 
Britain's position as the chief armourer of the Federal armed forces, 
see the press reports of the special debate in Parliament in August 
1968. (These are collected together in the Press release GEN-285, 
issued by the Biafran Overseas Press Division, Geneva, 31 Aug. 1968).
k&. Cited in Kirk-Greene, op. cit. (1971) Vol.2, p.V7.
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condemnations, however, the .federal government reserved for the 
international relief organizations. This was largely determined 
by the evolving mode of international intervention in the conflict.
Rationalizing their timidity by referring to legalistic 
interpretations of the meaning of national sovereignty^ , most 
national or international bodies of an official nature avoided 
direct involvement with relief operations. Mindful of domestic 
outrage at the reported levels of civilian suffering in the war 
zone, they instead channelled funds and material to the unofficial 
organizations which dominated the transportation and distribution 
of relief aid for the enclave's population. Analyzing American 
policy towards the conflict and relief operations, Lee Auspitz 
noted:
Though the United States was in the forefront of nations 
when it came to taking credit for the success of the 
Nigerian ! showcase 1 it has seized on the present turmoil 
as an occasion to withdraw to a pious wringing of the 
hands. The new American posture was struck in an eloquent 
address by Under-Secretary of State Katzenbach in December 
1968. Katzenbach enumerated the reasons for America's 
helplessness in remedying the situation: its wisdom in not 
supplying arms to either side; its determination to pursue 
a humanitarian course; its firm belief that it could not 
be the policeman of the world; its reluctance to intervene 
in a situation that was essentially African. All of these 
self-imposed restraints made the United States powerless 
to act, though it would continue to provide relief, monies 
and to use routine diplomatic channels to hasten a settlement 
... The lesson of Vietnam was to let the Biafrans starve.
For an illustration of the debate over the meaning of sover- 
eignty in the context of the Nigerian famine, see the discussion 
of Canadian relief policy in Brewin, A. and MacDonald, D. C:;.:.aaa 
and the Biafran Tragedy James Lewis and Samuel (Toronto, 1970)  , 
pp.130-133.
140
The US was willing to deal with the situation through 
intermediaries but not to take a visible role on its own.
The consequences of this timorous official approach to the 
war and problems of relief were two-fold. The self-defined 
limits on official involvement in the relief operation circum- 
scribed the effectiveness of efforts made by the relief agencies. 
Western governments provided all the material resources but none 
of the political power needed to effectively counter-act the 
impact of the nutritional crisis. The WCC summed up the problem 
in a statement issued in August 1968:
Governments generally have avoided their own responsibility 
by designating the Churches and other voluntary organizations 
as channels of this desparately needed relief, knowing very 
well that without strong Government and political action 
the Red Cross, the WCC, Caritas, and even UNICEF cannot 
deliver the food and medicine to the starving people. "
This point of view was echoed by Lee Auspitz:
Unfortunately, the available intermediaries are simply not 
equipped to exert any decisive pressure to stop the star- 
' vation. The favoured intermediaries of Mr. Katzenbach 
were the Organization of African Unity...for political 
aspects of negotiation and the International Committee of 
the Red Cross...for relief efforts. Both of these agencies 
have had severe difficulties in meeting the urgent demands 
of the situation... The ICRC, for its part, has sent Dr. 
August Lindt...as a go-between to negotiate for increased 
relief. But since any given proposal has military impli- 
cations that seem to favor one,side or the other, Lindt's 
experience has not been very happy. Lacking.-the power base
48. Auspitz, L. "Biafra and the Bureaucrats: Anatomy of a Bloody 
Mess" gipon Forum 5 (2) 1969.
- Guardian .10 August 1968, p.7. .
that would enable him to threaten or cajole the two sides 
to accept his proposals, his diplomatic credit has become 
quickly exhausted in the recriminations on relief that are 
part of the propaganda war between Nigeria and Biafra. 
...If Mr. Nixon wants to get massive relief into Biafra 
he must recognize that this means anticipating political 
trouble with the Nigerians, possible objections from the 
Biafrans, and complications for Great Power diplomacy. 
It is the stubborness of these political forces that makes 
the present policy of dealing through conventional channels 
and intermediary agencies ineffective... the longer the
United States delays using its leverage the greater will
SO be the cost in innocent lives...
The second consequence of official Western policy toward 
the conflict and relief action was that the relief agencies wore 
made highly visible targets for Federal rancour. It was left 
largely to the unofficial relief organizations to exert pressure 
for Federal acquiesence in penetration of the blockade; and 
when efforts to conclude an agreement on relief corridors failed, 
the relief agencies were left to assume the full burden of 
Federal resentment of Biafran relief.
The relief agencies themselves were not, however, wholly 
without responsibility for the hostility with which the FMG 
greeted their activities. In some cases their endeavours appeared 
to be motivated by political partisanship. As St. Jorre noted:
[some of the agencies] went far beyond their humanitarian 
brief and made a bad situation worse by becoming active 
Biafran propagandists. This was most true of the Catholics, 
particularly Caritas, Africa Concern and the Irish Order 
of the Holy Ghost, which had more than a hundred priests
and nuns in Biafra. They did a tremendous job and saved 
countless thousands of lives but many of them were 'political
50. Auspitz, loc.cit
priests' who tended to become more Biafran than the 
Biafrans...
These pro-Biafran attitudes had complex origins. Their 
fundamental source lay in the relief agencies' committment to 
the principles and imperatives of humanitarianism. Their 
humanitarian fervour was translated into political support for 
Biafra largely as a result of the plausibility of Biafran accus- 
ations of Federal genocide. When confronted with accounts 
(often exaggerated) of the atrocities visited on Ibos during the 
May and September riots, with reports of the slaughter of 
innocent Eastern civilians by advancing Federal troops, and with 
Federal intransigence on the question of relief corridors at a 
time when millions were reportedly starving to death in the 
enclave, many of the individuals and groups engaged in the pro- 
vision of relief for the population of the war zone accepted the 
veracity of Biafran assertions that the future safety of the 
Ibos could be guaranteed only by Federal acquiescence in Eastern 
autonomy. As the African Research Group put it:, "Saving Biaf- 
rans was difficult to distinguish from saving Biafra. The image
of genocide became...the catalytic impulse for the Biafran
'"52 
relief movement. ^
Not all of the apparent partisanship of the relief agencies 
was voluntary, however. The Biafran government's attempt to 
transform international concern into political intervention in 
its favour went beyond the construction of a propaganda campaign, 
which linked starvation in the enclave to a Federal policy of
51. St. Jorre, op.cit., p.251-
52. Africa Research Group, op.cit.
genocide, and the survival of Ibos to Eastern autonomy, ^ It 
carried on into a more sinister manipulation of the humanitarian 
fervour of the relief agencies. The Biafran leaders imposed 
conditions on the delivery of relief into the enclave which if 
accepted amounted to a de facto recognition of the sovereignty 
of the secessionist regime. The relief agencies, if they 
wished to carry out their humanitarian mission were forced to 
accept these conditions, even though in Federal eyes this gave 
their activities a definite flavour of partisanship.^^ For 
example: although the Geneva Conventions allow signatories to 
supervise the transport of relief supplies to their destination, 
Biafra refused to accept food or medicine which had come under 
Federal control. A number of relief agencies accepted the 
Biafran's objections and rationalized on this basis their dis- 
regard of Federal strictures on the delivery of relief supplies. ^
Some agencies were much more vulnerable to this form of 
moral blackmail than others. The ICRC, for example, resisted this 
Biafran ploy. Although it based its activities on a humanitarian
53. For a striking illustration of all the integral components of 
this propaganda campaign, see the press release GEN-2^6 issued by 
the Biafran Overseas Press Division in Geneva on 29 July 1968.
. The involuntary nature of the apparent partisanship of the 
relief agencies was also recognizable concerning the question of 
a ceasefire. As Cervenka explained: "...the relief organizations 
vehemently supported the call for a ceasefire, which they SL,V; as 
the necessary pre-condition for carrying out a really effective, 
unimpeded, relief operation in the war-affected areas. This 
coincided with Biafra ! s call for a ceasefire, which was made for 
entirely different reasons. Biafran leaders assumed (probably 
quite rightly) that, once the Federal Military Government had 
agreed to a ceasefire, it would be almost impossible, in the face 
of public opinion, to resume fighting and^the existence of Biafra 
would therefore have to be accepted." (Cervenka, Z. The Ili^erian 
War 1967-197Q: History of the War, Selected Bibliography an.d^:)o cu- 
rrents Bernard and Grae'f e "Verlag FUr Wehrwesen (Frankfurt am >Iai t:', "
1971, p
55- St. Jorre, op.cit. , p. 237
mandate - specifically, the role assigned it under the 
Geneva Conventions - the ICRC was impelled by considerations 
for its future acceptability as a neutral administrator of aid 
to victims on both sides of any conflict to confine its activities 
to those which were acceptable to the FMG. In the summer of 
1963, when pressure to get the large-scale airlift going was 
building up, the ICRC persistently attempted to restrain the 
impatience of other agencies at the slow - and in the end non- 
existent - progress being made in negotiations over an agreed 
relief corridor. ' On August 13th Hella Pick reported from Geneva 
that Dr. Lindt was being forced to 'appease 1 agencies and govern- 
ments which had donated money and supplies for the relief action. 
"He is also evidently trying to restrain the voluntary agencies
from going ahead with efforts of their own to break the blockade
56 and fly in relief planes."^ The Daily Telegraph of August
23rd, 1963 carried a similar report of dissension within the 
ranks of the humanitarians:
At the Geneva conference last week, I understand, Mr. 
August Lindt...was under severe pressure from donors 
and charity workers to rush supplies into Biafra by any 
means... Oxfam, Caritas, and the WCC favoured disregard- 
ing the FMG... Mr. Lindt stressed the necessity for the 
ICRC to preserve its traditions of working with the per-
56. Guardian, 13 August 1968.
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mission of governments.
Again, in 1969, following the collapse of the ICRC air- 
lift in the wake of the FMG's destruction of the Swedish Red 
Cross DC-7, the ICRC resisted pressure to recommence its fligh 
operations without the sanction of the FMG. Its attitude.-was 
succintly summed up in the following report from the Times of 
September ifth:
The committee cannot, it says, do what their Cotonou
57. These differing interpretations of the relative values of 
neutrality and urgency underlay the failure of the churches and 
the ICRC to merge their air operations. There was, at least within 
the VVCC, a strong initial impulse toward cooperation with the ICRC. 
At its Assembly in Uppsala in July 1968 the WCC issued the follow- 
ing statement: "We would once more like to explain that our policy 
in not operating from Sao Tome and in supporting the actions of 
the ICRC from Fernando Poo are mainly due to two facts: (a) For 
most African countries Portugal and its possessions in Africa are 
an expression of European colonialism and anybody who associates 
with them shows a lack of feeling for the spirit of freedom and 
independence of the new African nations, (b) We are in no position 
to prejudge the outcome of the hostilities in Nigeria but we aust 
recognize that we have also a large church constituency in the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria and it would be tragic if, at a time 
when hostilities have ceased, we would be unable to extend our aid 
for reconstruction and development to all communities affected by 
the war. In supporting the relief actions of the ICRC we believe 
that we are keeping the doors open." (Lloyd et al, op.cit. , pp. 6-7). 
Their contacts with the ICRC, however, soon dimmed the ardour with 
which the WCC pursued a connection with the Red Cross airlift. 
Lloyd asserted that: "Dr. Lindt made it clear that he and the Red 
Cross did not approve of the churches 1 effort to start an airlift, 
and that they were not interested in a joint venture. When the Red 
Cross finally did on July 31st, 1968 get clearance to fly to Biafra 
at night, they were not prepared to give the code signals and radio 
frequency to Captain Duch [the DANCHURCHAID flight operations chief] 
(Lloyd et al, loc. cit.) At the same time the ICRC's commitment 
to operating out of Fernando Poo, where its cargoes could be in- 
spected by the FMG's consul, drove the church agencies and the 
ICRC apart. The government of Fernando Poo had placed a ban on 
ni^ht flying YJhich, with the Nigerian Air Force effectively restr- 
icting access to Uli to the hours of darkness, limited the daily 
utilization of each aircraft to one round trip into the enclave. 
The church agencies, especially Caritas, were unwilling to accept 
such a restriction on their activities, and opted to establ 
their base of operations on Sao Tome, where no limits on 
hours existed. (Lloyd et al. loc. cit.)
pilots have been suggesting recently, that is hand over 
their aircraft and relief to another organization willing 
to fly in defiance of the Federal government. This, they 
think, would be as much an offence against their own con- 
ventions as flying over Federal air space themselves with- 
out permission... The ICRC are particularly sensitive about 
being involved in the political discussions that have been 
going on since the airlift stopped on June 5th. They are 
aware that their position of impartiality is in constant 
danger and one often gets the impression, when speaking to 
senior ICRC officials, that they fear Biafra could be the 
ruination of the Committee, which was founded in 1863, if 
they are not all very careful... A senior ICRC official 
told me: f \Ve dare not force this issue. People often do 
not understand that for the sake of people in dozens of 
other countries and possibly many wars to come, we must 
work with the agreement of both sides in their involvement. 
At the moment we are constantly in danger of losing our 
position in the eyes of many countries. We have limits 
and they are nothing to do with courage but with our own 
role.'
No such considerations restrained the church-sponsored 
groups active in the relief operation. Perhaps the strongest 
illustration of the attitudes which infused the participating 
members of the church-sponsored relief airlift came in the follow- 
ing statement issued at a plenary session of JCA held in December 
1969. The statement was a direct response to doubts about the 
wisdom of continuing the 'clandestine' airlift which had been 
expressed at a WCC Assembly held one week earlier:
The organizations participating in Joint Church Aid all 
recognize that relief work has political side effects. 
This is true of relief work in Nigeria as in 'Biafra, but 
they do not see that they are left with any choice. Joint 
Church Aid has supported directly and indirectly all ini- 
tiatives to establish more regular and effective alterna- 
tives to night flights.
To stop the airlift now would not only have political 
consequences, but also result in the death of millions of 
innocent civilians. It would establish starvation not 
only as a legitimate weapon of war but also as a partisan 
tool in the hands of groups pursuing their own motives.
Concerned to follow the divine law which commands that 
above all we serve our neighbour in need we have no alter- 
natives but to continue the relief work for as long as it 
is an effective means of alleviating the present suffering
It is difficult to assign blame or praise to either of 
these groups for their choice of policy regarding clandestine 
deliveries of relief supplies. As St. Jorre noted, the relief 
agencies were, in a situation in which no agreement could be 
reached on methods and routes for a mutually acceptable penetrat- 
ion of the Federal blockade, confronted with the question:
Should relief agencies defy a sovereign government in order 
to save life and fulfil their humanitarian mission? The 
ICRC had opted for the path of legality, the Churches, less 
encumbered by sets of rules, precedents and international 
obligations, chose defiance... Given the Protestant and 
Catholic Churches' deep missionary commitment in Biafra - 
the most intensely missionized part of Africa - it is 
difficult to see how they could have acted otherwise. 
Their local interest dictated that they should defy the 
Federal government, whereas the ICRC's international respon 
sibility had, with a similar cogency, demanded that it
59 
should be obeyed. '
Not all of the animosity between the FMG and the relief 
agencies was attributable to the voluntary or involuntary appear- 
ance of partisanship on the part of the humanitarians. The 
agencies often unnecessarily antagonized the Federal authorities 
by casually disregarding Federal sensitivities. Some of the
58. Lloyd, et al., Appendix k
59. St. Jorre, op.cit., p.249-
relief groups which appeared on the scene in Nigeria/Biafra in 
the summer of 1968 were as notable for their propensity to drav; 
attention to themselves as for their contribution to the relief 
of starving civilians. As Kirk-Greene put it:
...it was not hard for some of the less experienced of the 
relief personnel to prejudice their position by mis-handled 
protocol, an inadequate grasp of ligistics, and sheer over- 
enthusiastic under-organization...the noisy attitudes of 
the international relief agencies, for all their honourable 
intentions, had much of the makings of provoking a conflict 
in their own. right.
What Kirk-Greene called the 'noisy attitudes' of the relief 
agencies reflected several disparate impulses. For example, 
many of the relief agencies were impelled toward publicization 
of their efforts by their need for contributions of financial 
and other forms of support. Voluntary aid agencies are constantly 
caught up in the problem of stimulating humanitarian reactions; 
and one of their most frequent approaches to solving this dilemma 
is a gross exaggeration of the severity and urgency of any given 
disaster situation. In the case of Biafra, pronouncements on the 
actual and prospective death rate in the enclave appear to have 
been inflated, and for just such a reason. At the same time 
the emphasis placed by many agencies on securing air as opposed 
to surface relief corridors reflected a desire to obtain a 
heightened public awareness of their endeavours - planes being 
loaded with blankets, medicines or other (often unessential) 
relief goods transmit a much greater (and more newsworthy) sense 
of urgency than does a ship plodding over the seas.
60. See, for example, press reports of a proposed evacuation of 
children from the enclave in the Guardian, 2i\ July 1968.
61. Kirk-Greene, Q-p.cit. (1971) Vol.2, pp.57-58.,
A second facet of the agencies' behaviour which irritated 
Federal sensibilities was the arrogance of some relief personnel. 
The most striking example of this was to be found in the character 
of Dr. August Lindt, the ICRC's chief of operations. Everyone 
who met, or had dealings with, Dr. Lindt was immediately struck 
by two characteristics: first the undoubted intellectual capacity
V
of the man; and secondly his equally forceful display of arrogance, 
St. Jorre's summary of Lindt was superb:
VJith tremendous energy he got the relief operation going, 
especially on the Nigerian side, secured the 'at your own 
risk 1 concession from the Federal government to fly into 
Biafra, and injected into the task a much needed inspirat- 
ional spirit. But he was temperamentally unsuited to 
cope with the complex political subtelties of the crisis 
and the sensitivities of the belligerents... He flitted 
from side to side tirelessly arousing everyone's suspicions 
... He also tended to take the law into his own hands and 
some of his negotiating techniques were closer to those of 
a nineteenth-century mill-owner handling the labour than 
those normally associated with an ambassador who had served 
his country in Washington and Moscow. 'If he spoke to the 
Americans and Russians as he does to us, ' a Nigerian 
diplomat once complained to me... 'it's a wonder that Switz-
£\2
erland is still around- '
Although Lindt 's insensitivity was perhaps the more serious, 
considering the position he occupied, his disdain for the feelings 
of the Nigerians was matched throughout the Swiss and most other 
international contingents of the relief operation represented in 
Lagos. It is unclear to what extent this reflected sheer racial 
prejudice. Conversations soon revealed that there was a great 
deal of this- Most important- in determining attitudes toward the 
Nigerians, however, was the fact that they had been unable to
62. St. Jorre, op.cit. , p
150
organize for themselves the assistance their own people required. 
This was taken as a general mark of incompetence and when re- 
inforced by encounters with the unquestionable lethargy and 
evasion of responsibility typical of the lower levels .of the 
Federal bureaucracy, fostered a contempt for all Nigerians. 
Like the Chinese torture of a thousand slices, myriad small 
affronts to Nigerian pride and dignity finally resulted in bitter 
resentment of the presence of the offending relief agencies and 
the eventual demise of the international relief operation.
The cumulative consequence of all these irritations of 
Federal sensibilities - the growing involvement of the inter- 
national community in the conflict, Biafran manipulation of 
international concern, and the tactlessness of some relief agencies 
- was an intensifying Federal hostility to the activities of the 
relief organizations. This reached a peak in mid-July 1968, 
when the FMG, "having taken just about all it could endure from 
some of the more 'where-angels- fear-to-tread 1 humanitarianists", 
summoned representatives of the relief groups to a meeting with 
Gowon, At this gathering all the relief agencies, but especially 
the representatives of Caritas and OXFAM, were cautioned against 
their "deepening political involvement." **
As relief operations actually got under way on a significant 
scale in August/September, 1968, and each side was able to sort 
out from the welter of rhetoric surrounding the question of 
relief the actual intentions of the other, tensions between the 
FMG and the relief agencies subsided to an extent. The most 
violent impact of Federal hostility to the relief agencies was
63. Kirk-Greene, op^cit. (1971), Vol.2, p. 58. See also the reports 
of talks on Lagos radio, BBC ME/2827/B/2 and ME/2831/B/2.
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not to be felt until the late spring of 1969 when the FI-IG, 
frustrated by events in the military arena, lashed out at the 
relief agencies. It appears that the event which triggered 
off this Federal attack was the sudden emergence of Joino Church 
Aid's former chief of air operations, Count von Rosen, as the 
leader of a series of assaults made by the Biafran Air Force on 
Federal targets during May 1969- Von Rosen's 'Minicon' aircraft 
only marginally altered the military balance - although, in 
conjunction with raids made by Biafran ground forces on oil 
prospecting camps in the Mid-West, Biafran air strikes on Federal 
oil installations did crimp the surging flow of oil revenues
r >
into the Federal war chest. ^ However, as another instance of 
undesirable international intervention in the conflict, they 
roomed large in Nigerian'minds.
Their smouldering anger and distrust of the international 
community re-ignited by von Rosen's intervention, the Federal 
authorities struck at that community's humanitarian agents, with 
which von Rosen had been so closely associated. On Play 27th 
the ICRC's chief delegate to Nigeria and Biafra, Dr. August 
Lindt, was detained by the Lagos airport commander, and although 
Dr. Lindt was released on the following day without any charges 
being laid against him, the FMG declared him personna non grata 
on June 1/fth, accusing him of political involvement in the cause 
of the Biafrans. The meaning of Lindt's.detention and expulsion 
was explained by Kirk-Greene:
...this [Lindt's expulsion] was the climax rather than
the cause of months of mounting irritation by the Nigerians
at the undeniable relationship (if not a causal link)
6^}. For a more detailed analysis of the impact of these combined 
air and ground attacks, see Cronje, op.cit.. pp.lij.8-157.
between relief supplies and the undreamed of protraction 
in the Biafran defense... Impatience with Western European 
susceptibilities was exacerbated by the connection in 
the Nigerian minds between Count von Rosen's threatening 
revival of the Biafran mini-air force and intolerable 
interference by humanitarianists in general. The under- 
standable resentment of Nigerian opinion now found ex- 
pression in further lambasting of these relief organizations 
by the Nigerian press, especially the ICRC, as being run 
by 'thoroughly discredited European humanitarians 1 and 
'hirelings of imperialism 1 and in the angry demands by 
student and trade union movements for the Government to 
remove its kid gloves and end the war forthwith. Dr. 
Lindt's subsequent condemnation of the rashness of the 
von Rosen exploits came too late to save the ICRC relief
co-ordinator or indeed the ICRC itself: it never regained
65 its position in Nigeria. ^
This attack on the leading representative of the ICRC was, 
however, pushed into the background by the Federal Air Force's 
destruction of a Swedish Red Cross DC-7 operating in the ICRC air- 
lift on the night of June 5th. This action ushered in a new Fed- 
eral policy toward relief flights which reflected a changed balance 
between Lagos' hardliners and moderates. The preceding tolerance of 
the relief agencies 'clandestine' night air operations ended. Though 
the moderates' commitment to seeking a mutually acceptable relief 
corridor was retained, it was apparent that a hawkish perception 
of the nature of relief operations was the dominant factor in
65. Kirk-Greene, op.cit. (1971), pp.117-118. Also see the 
Daily Telegraph, 10 June 1969 for a more extensive sampling 
cTjHthe expressions of hostility to the ICRC in the Nigerian 
press of this period.
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the new Federal policy. As a leader in the Times of 1 uu^y 
1969 summarized the Federal attitude:
The real change here is that in the past the Nigerian 
authorities have in some slight measure connived at relief 
operations to Biafra, arguing that their quarrel was v.'ith 
General Ojukwu and his supporters, not with the Ibos as a 
people. The Nigerians now put the relief agencies in the 
dock and ask them to prove that relief aid will not help the 
Biafran war effort.
Under these conditions the ICRC, ensnared in its long-terra 
commitment to an image of neutrality, had little choice but to 
halt its operations pending the successful outcome of negotiations 
over relief corridors. In an article in the Times of June 21st, 
1969, the ICRC was reported to have made it clear that it would 
1:0 longer allow either of the belligerents to exploit its activities 
for political purposes. Any resumption of relief flights to 
Biafra on the part of the ICRC would be, according to the ICRC 
spokesman, M. JacoAues Freymond, strictly subject to the full 
acceptance of guarantees and conditions by both sides. At the 
same time the ICRC's spokesman rejected charges made by Diallo 
Telli, Secretary-General of the OAU, that Red Cross officials 
were insensitive to the prerequisites of African sovereignty. ' 
M. Freymond said: "On the contrary, we have been extremely 
moderate in our relations with both sides." The fact that the 
ICRC had not replied to propagandistic attacks, M. Freyuiond 
continued, should not be interpreted as a weakness but rather 
as evidence of a desire not to provoke an open breach. The
66. For an illustration of the new balance in Federal policy see 
the text of Chief Enaharo's announcement on June 30. (''Federal 
Government Briefs Relief Organizations on its New Policy" (Document 
,\o.208) in Kirk-Greene op.cit. (1971), pp.^05-/f08).
67. See the report in the Guardian,19 June 1969.
ICRC was prepared to continue its activities for the sake of the 
civilian population, but would no longer tolerate the exploitation 
of humanitarian sentiment for political advantage.
Following a brief but virtually total collapse in relations 
between the FMG and the ICRC after the Federal government withdrew
from it the authority to coordinate relief operations in the
so
territory under Federal control , the quest for mutually accept- 
able relief corridors was resumed with a new intensity, which 
reflected the gravity of the nutritional situation in the enclave
following the withdrawal of the ICRC's contribution to the
6Q 
relief airlift. ' A five-day hiatus in contacts between the
68. The Federal Government's action 
unprecedented outburst of indi£nati<
.president 01 T.ne lujrcu, n. ixiarcej. i\avi±jLe. me lUKU's representative 
at the briefing on relief agencies in Lagos had refused to subscribe 
to the joint communique issued following the meeting: President 
Naville reinforced this attitude toward the Federal initiative., 
described it as 'a conscious affront to all the principles o
.vay 'one v;ou±d snow tne door to an unwortny servant 1 , ne asse 
that the ICRC was not in Nigeria to assuage the conscience of 
'cannon merchants 1 and "reminded 'some people' that not all t 
nptrnl in Ni/zerla could r.roduce sufficient deter/rent to wash
W U \^ !•*/ W V^V _J» *•* %^ dto » *• N^ •*« *b IV %^«rfk W •*• ^ .^b* rvr *vr* v •*» ^ ^ ,** Mte »» V »* ^r v * «^^d» • ^ *h^ >v ^ V b* ^^ v^^c » M^ >*• ^. ^ ^
in the Times, 2 July 1969 for these and other cited remarks from 
Naville's press conference of 1 July. Also see Document No.210 
in Kirk-Greene, op.cit. (1971), Vol.2, p.Jfll for ICRC criticisms
M * * I 1 - ^      ^ ^ ^B^ _ _ _ _  -1 -1 _   _ T _ .___ _L\
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of the way the press reported Naville's debut).
69. According to a report in the Times the cessation of ICRC 
flights had fostered a recrudescence of mass starvation. Famine 
conditions were expected to reappear because the interruption of 
the airlift coincided with the annual occurrence of the hungry 
season. Also the population was more susceptible to starvation 
than a year before simply because of the hardships undergone in 
the intervening period. (Times, 25 June 1969. See also the report 
in the Times on the next day, June 26th.) These assessments of the 
gravity of the situation inside the enclave in June and July 1969 
Sere later questioned. M. Naville was reported to believe the 
food situation in the enclave was "much less disturbing" than most 
of the recent remarks made on this subject by relief officials in 
Geneva had indicated. Children were perishing of hunger but mass 
starvation had not yet begun, because of the trickle of food other 
agencies were continuing to move into the enclave. However, though 
the food situation f is not yet alarming 1 , Naville added that: "In a 
few weeks - and time is passing very quickly - the point will be 
reached where stocks are completely exhausted." (Cited in -che Times, 
18 July 1969. See also the report in the Times of 28 July 19697^
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ICRC and the FMG, ended when their representatives met together 
with spokesmen for the British government in London.?0 They 're- 
established 1 relationships, with the result that on July 9th Pre- 
sident Naville and a team of ICRC negotiators flew to Lagos for 
talks with Federal representatives. These negotiations resulted 
in an agreement between the ICRC and the FMG which provided, first, 
for the transfer of co-ordinating authority to the National Re- 
habilitation Commission; secondly, for the continuation of the 
ICRC's traditional 1 activities; and finally for one liaison flight 
to be made into the enclave by the ICRC, but no other flights to
be undertaken by the Red Cross until a mutual agreement on relief
71corridors had been concluded. Relief negotiations in the summer
and autumn of 1969 proffered, however, no greater prospect of 
success than those of the previous year. Neither of the
70. See the reports in the Times of 7, 8, and 9 July 1969-
71. See Topic_al Red Cross News No.lSlb, Geneva, 25 July 1969 
for more details.
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belligerents had reversed its previous order of priorities 
regarding humanitarian and political considerations. Federal 
negotiators continued to insist on conditions which made their 
proposals on relief corridors unacceptable to the Biafrans. 
At the same time the Biafran leaders refused to abandon their
perception of the military and political advantages accruing to
72the obstruction of any agreement on relief corridors.
Nor had the intensity of Federal hostility to the inter- 
national relief organizations changed. Although the ICRC 
restored a degree of cordiality to its relationship with the 
Federal government - largely as a result of its decision not to 
contest the prerogatives of sovereignty exercised by the FMG in 
its announcement of June 30th - relations between the FMG and
the Christian groups which sponsored the ongoing JCA relief
73flights remained strained. ^ In the end the sponsors of JCA -
^ least those affiliated to the World Council of Churches -
began to raise questions about the roots of this Federal animosity, 
At an assembly of the WCC held in Uppsala in December 1969, it 
was suggested within the Division on Inter-Church Aid, Refugee 
and World Service that Federal perceptions of the military and 
political benefits the Biafrans were deriving from the 'clandes- 
tine 1 operations of the JCA might be accurate:
...should the Churches' major effort to meet this human 
need be the indirect means by which some governments are
72. For details of relief corridor proposals in this period, and 
both Federal and Biafran rationales for their rejection, see the 
Guardian 21 August 1969, the Times k and 15 September 1969, and 
the Guardian 1A November 1969-
73. AS was indicated by Joint Church Aid's vigorous rejection 
of attacks against it. (See "Joint Church Aid Rejects Anti- 
Huuianitarian Agencies Propaganda" (Document No. 216) in Kirk- 
Greene, pp.cit. (1971), Vol.2, pp.i|-26-^27.
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enabled to pursue their own ends and thereby achieve their
7kown goals... H
These doubts reflected three developments of significance 
for the future of the relief operation. The first of these was 
the growing concern among relief workers in the enclave that the 
protein crisis, which had been the chief cause of famine up to
the end of 1969, might be replaced in the immediate future by a
75carbohydrate emergency. ^ Secondly, there was a widening per-
.ception that the onus of responsibility for the failure to 
establish relief corridors had to be shared by the Biafran leaders; 
who had pursued their political objectives without regard to the 
suffering this caused the civilian population. This perception 
stemmed partly from the erosion of belief in the validity of the 
rebels' claims that the FMG was pursuing a policy of genocide. 
As St. Jorre noted, the themes of deliberate mass starvation and 
genocide had been in the forefront of the Biafran propaganda 
campaign since mid-1968- However, they began to lose credibility 
as a result of the physical evidence of large numbers of Ibos 
living in the Federal controlled areas, and the impact of reports 
by foreign correspondents and other observers on the status of
7£
Ibos living in Federal territory. The perceptible strength 
of the Biafran case waned also because of their persistent 
refusal to accept Federal concessions on the operation of air 
corridors which virtually removed any threat of a Federal assault
Ik. Lloyd et al., og± cit. , Appendix
75. See above Chapter Three.
76. St. Jorre, op.cit., p.352.
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along the relief corridor." As St. Jorre put it:
Throughout the protracted negotiations with the ICRC that 
followed [June 1969], it became evident that the Biafrans 
were as obstinate as the Federals on the two central issues 
of exercising their sovereignty over the despatch of relief 
supplies and protecting their military operations... The 
rigidity of Ojukwu's policy was shown by the fact that he 
never once tried to call the Nigerians' bluff - he could 
have, for example, accepted day flights for a short period 
without undue military risk - by agreeing to one of their 
proposed relief corridors. Politically it would have been 
an astute move since if Gowon had refused to play fair the 
whole world would have seen clearly who was at fault.
Finally, it had become increasingly obvious that the prospects 
of the Biafran Army winning a final victory were almost non- 
existent. Nor had the Biafrans been able to convert either of 
the two great upsurges of international concern for the war's 
victims into a sufficient weight of international intervention 
to break down Federal resistance to the achievement of Eastern 
autonomy. In such circumstances the relief agencies, especially 
the Churches, had to consider the impact of continued defiance 
of the FMG on the future of their organizations in Nigeria.
77. These involved the Federal government's concurrence in 
ICRC plans to originate flights outside Federal territory, with 
inspection normally taking place at the point of origin under the 
auspices of an international team. The FMG would have had only the 
right to call down random flights to Lagos for inspection. And in 
cases where this occurred, the ICRC planned to order the plane 
back to Cotonou prior to carrying the cargo on into the enclave. 
The Biafrans rejected this plan on the grounds that it did not 
meet their requirement of a third force guarantee that the FMG 
would not 'tail-gate 1 relief flights into Uli. This objection 
became increasingly difficult to understand following repeated 
Federal pledges to the ICRC and the US government that it woulu 
not misuse the relief corridor. (See the Times ,15 September 1969 
for the basic elements of the disputed corridor plan).
78. St. Jorre, op.cit., p
159
As a DICARWS statement put it:
...the Division expresses its deep distress at the ambiguous 
position in which,the tremendous effort has put Christian 
people, Churches and agencies because of its political side- 
effects.^^
These expressions of doubt came too late, however, to 
enable the relief agencies to reconstruct their relations with 
the FMG. (And in any event, Joint Church Aid rejected the 
WCC's idea that the relief operation might be counter-productive 
to the achievement of a cease-fire and the end of the Federal 
blockade.) Within only a few weeks of the WCC conference, 
Biafra's resistance was brought to an end and the Federal govern- 
ment, "freed from any constraints on the expression of its feelings 
about the war-time activities of the humanitarian organizations, 
immediately barred those groups it deemed most offensive from any
O-i
further participation in relief operations.
This-was in effect the last act in the politics of hunger. 
To some observers the FMG's vituperative exclusion of the relief 
agencies which had participated in 'clandestine 1 relief was a 
sudden and unwelcome reminder of earlier suspicions that Federal
79. Lloyd et al., lo c.ci t.
80. In a statement issued at the 5th Plenary session of JCA 
it was asserted that: "The organizations participating in Joint 
Church Aid all recognize that relief work has political side 
effects. This is true of relief work in Nigeria as in Biafra, 
but they do not see that they are left with any choice... To 
stop the airlift now would not only have political consequences 
but result in the death of millions of innocent civilians. It 
would establish starvation not only as a legitimate weapon of 
war but also as a partisan tool in the hands of groups pursuing 
their own motives." (Lloyd et al'., log, cit.)
81. The agencies which were banned were Joint Church Aid, Caritas, 
Canairrelief£ Nordic Red Cross Societies, and all other agencies 
which had participated in unauthorized flights direct into the 
enclave. Aid from France, Portugal, South Africa, and Rhodesia 
was also rejected. (Times, 15 January 1970, p.l).
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trhetoric concealed a policy, if not of genocide, then at leas 
of callous disregard for the lives of the Ibo masses. These 
observers saw in the structural elements of the JCA operation, 
and especially in the presence of a fleet of vehicles and relief 
cadres based on Uli, the ideal means of saturating the Biafran 
redoubt with food and medicines. The FMG's insistence that 
relief supplies be moved into the area of the final enclave from 
its perimeter, rather than through its centre smacked, these 
observers believed, of a willingness to see thousands of refugees 
die rather than see any prolongation of the use of the strip
of widened highway which to much of the world symbolized Biafran
£? 
resistance. v
A definitive evaluation of the motivations underlying 
Federal policy on post-war relief is not possible. A strong- 
logistical argument can be made favouring the FMG's refusal to 
base the relief operation on Uli. Reports from relief workers 
who remained in the enclave up to the last days of- the war 
indicated that the logistical advantages to be gained from re- 
surrecting the Uli based operation may not have been that great.
Vehicles, disappeared, or were in any event in very poor condition
O-z
prior to the collapse. ^ At the same time many of the relief 
personnel who had operated the distributive network had been 
evacuated out of the enclave just prior to its collapse. J^ Of 
greater importance, however, was the fact that the key objective 
of both the FMG and the relief agencies was to transcend, as
82. See the lengthy analysis which appeared in Time Magazine. 
26 January 1970-
83. See the report in the Guardian, 8 December 1969.
See the description of this evacuation in St. Jorre, op. 
pp.395-398.
161
rapidly as possible, the emergency stage of operations and 
begin rehabilitation. In order to accomplish this it was 
vital that refugees return immediately to their homes. A 
relief operation based on distribution from the centre of the 
disturbed area would probably not have been as effective in 
encouraging these movements as one in which, as the refugees 
moved out of the final redoubt toward their homes, they were 
in fact travelling toward supplies of food and other relief 
materials located on the enclave's perimeter. ^
In the end, however, it is impossible to escape the con- 
clusion that, regardless of the extent to which they coincided 
with logistical and/or nutritional criteria, political consider- 
ations were the essential determinants of Federal policy with 
regard to post-war relief operations. Just as had been the 
case throughout the war, it was impossible to separate the 
question of relief from its political context. The war had 
been fought over the issue of Federal sovereignty in Eastern 
Nigeria. The government had sacrificed large amounts of blood 
and treasure in ensuring that the East remained attached to the 
Federation by more than the ties of geographical contiguity and 
a common heritage of colonial and post-colonial subordination.
V
It was hardly surprising then that the government's reaction to
85. The following passage from the Nigerian Red Cross's report on 
its activities during the Civil War indicates that such a percept- 
ion may have contributed to the decision not to make Uli the centre 
of the relief operation: "During the last half of January 1970, 
great masses of people trekked from the crowded former enclave to 
their homes, many in regions more productive agriculturally. 
Probably more than a million people made this exodus, and the 
majority of them appeared to be in reasonably good nutritional 
state. Few workers in the field at that time saw any roadside 
deaths due to starvation. 'Open kitchens' were organized along 
major roads radiating from the former enclave to serve the home-bound 
travellers at each stop. Many of them were so anxious to get home 
that they preferred dry rations to cooked meals unless they had 
children with them." (Nigerian Red Cross, opA cit., p.11).
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the international hysteria which followed the final Biafran 
collapse was a rigid defense of its rights to call forward and 
accept only such aid as it deemed necessary and desirable. As 
St. Jorre's description of the mood of the FMG in the days 
following the collapse of the enclave showed, the politics of 
hunger proved as compelling in the post-war period as during 
the preceding eighteen months:
If the Nigerian government had opened its doors to tne 
humanitarians and foreign governments that were clamouring" 
to come in, it is possible that more lives would have been 
saved. But it does not necessarily follow... In any case, 
the Nigeriani'-s mood was far too bitter and xenophobic to 
think along these lines. To the Western world it seemed 
brutal and incomprehensible that the Federal government 
should slam the door. It was as if a poor country had 
suffered some natural disaster like an earthquake and then 
refused to allow anyone, including the International Red 
Cross to come to succour the victims - and all for some 
prickly and ridiculous notion of 'sovereignty'. The 
central fact, however, was that the relief situation at the 
end of the war could not be suddenly taken out of the 
context of the war itself; almost from the beginning relief 
had been inextricably mixed with the politics of the crisis 
and it was impossible to separate them overnight, especially, 
as it seemed, at the whim of the deeply mistrusted foreign 
humanitarians. Rightly or wrongly, Gowon and most Nigerians 
felt that the action of many of the relief organizations, 
particularly the Churches and the countries which supported 
them, had unjustifiably prolonged the war - hence the angry 
cry from Gowon, normally the mildest of men, about 'blood 
money 1 . Unprecedented foreign pressures, doubts and seem- 
ingly endless criticism during the war had taken their toll 
on the Nigerians. The sudden and virtually bloodless end
came as a great relief to an emotionally and physically 
exhausted people. The internal reaction was not vindictive- 
ness, as many people had expected, but mercy and magna..a;:i':y. 
Nobody had ever believed them during the war, the Nigerians
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complained, even when what they were saying was demon- 
strably true as, for example, the fact that more Ibos 
were eventually living safely on the i\igerian side of the 
line than hazardously in Biafra. Even with the war over, 
still the feeling of suspicion, the hectoring tone, the 
incredulity of foreigners, especially the whites of the 
West with their own ugly record of wars, brutality and true 
genocide persisted. There was also a political reason for 
keeping the foreigners out. Throughout the war it had 
been Gowon's firm policy to show the Ibos as a people that 
he had nothing against them personally. Turning over the 
whole relief operation to the Nigerian Red Cross, which 
incidentally had many foreigners working for it, was 
designed to prove to the defeated that the Federal govern- 
ment did, after all, care for their welfare. Having won
Of
the war, Gowon was determined to win the peace.
Having assessed the origins and impact of the politics of 
hunger it now remains only to ask the question whether or not 
they were unique. So far as the elevation of political above 
humanitarian considerations is concerned, the Nigerians and 
Biafrans were hardly the first, and undoubtedly will not be the 
last, governments to pursue political objectives regardless of 
their cost in human suffering; although few, if any, previous 
relief operations had resulted in such acrimonious relations 
between the donors and recipients of relief aid. However, at 
least one observer later argued that there were likely to be 
extreme tensions between donors and recipients in any 'large 1 '
civil war:
...when viable civil wars occur, international relief 
agencies cannot remain pristinely non-political. If 
they try to ignore these tragedies, in effect they favour 
the stronger (usually the authorized) regimes. If they 
respond decisively to the suffering, they are for good
36. St. Jorre, op.cit., pp.
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reason almost certain to be identified with one of tne 
contesting sides and to be restricted or excluded by the 
other. The humanitarian aims of the relief organizations 
thus cannot insulate them from political involvement... 
As the events in Nigeria/Biafra showed, international 
relief processes in viable civil wars involve unavoidably 
political tasks being undertaken in an undeniably political
Oo
context. '
87. Davis, M. "The Politics of International Relief Processes 
in*Lar^e Civil VJars: An Editorial Comment" Journal of Developing 
Areas 6 (July 1972), p
CHAPTER VI
The Political Economy of Famine in 
Nigeria and the Third World
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The objective in this final chapter of the thesis is to 
situate the Nigerian experience of famine and relief in relation 
to similar episodes of mass starvation elsewhere in the Third 
World; and to situate the study of acute hunger in the analysis 
of social change in that World.
On first consideration, the Nigerian famine appears to 
fall outside the general pattern of nutritional disasters in 
the Third World. Famine in Nigeria was an overtly political 
phenomenon. The disintegration of the civil order, armed 
conflict between the Federal and Biafran regimes, and the refusal 
of either government to subordinate the pursuit of its political 
objectives to the imperatives of humanitarianism, all of these 
contributed to the starvation of millions of Eastern civilians. 
Most nutritional catastrophes in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, 
however, have been triggered off by natural calamities, such as 
floods and droughts. Although these episodes of mass starvation 
have often been accompanied by the disintegration of pre-existing 
political structures, the relationship has generally been one in 
which mass starvation engendered civil upheaval rather thai: vice 
versa.
In fact, the origins of the Nigerian famine appear to 
have most closely resembled the propellants of mass starvation 
in Western society during the past 100 years. There famine 
has been closely linked to war and revolution, and to the use 
of starvation as a political weapon. From the siege of the 
Paris commune in 1&?0, right up to the blockade of Berlin in 
19^)8, Western men have displayed few qualms about the deliberate 
creation of famine conditions where political advantages could be
1. Consider, for example, the ouster of Haile Selassie in Ethiopia 
and the overthrow of Hamadi Diori in Niger.
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reaped from doing so.
The incongruity of the Nigerian vjith other Third World 
famines was, however, more apparent than real. Certainly the 
triggering events were wholly dissimilar; however, whether the 
catalyst was a natural or a civil disaster, both Nigeria and other 
famine afflicted societies in the Third World suffered the trans- 
formation of disaster into episodes of mass starvation because 
of a common heritage of underdevelopment. At the same time, 
flaws in the organization and administration of relief have been 
a major determinant of the scale and duration of nutritional 
catastrophes throughout the Third World.
2. in the twentieth century, the Russian people have suffered 
the ravages of famine more severely than any other Western group. 
In each case, these famines have stemmed from civil disasters. 
See Fisher, L.S. The_..Famine in Soviet Russia^ Igl9-192;> Harper 
ex Row (New York, 1927); Dalrymple, D.G. "The Soviet Famine of 
1932-3V 1 ^ Soviet Studies kO (3) 196/t, pp.259-262; and Salisbury, 
H.E. The 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad Pan Books Ltd. (London, 
197D.
3. The term underdevelopment as used here is meant to indicate a 
process as well as a state. The sense in which the term is used 
is succintly summed up in the following definition of 'dependence 1 
"...dependence is a conditioning situation in which the economies
_
of one group of countries are conditioned by the development and 
expansion of others. A relationship of interdependence between 
two or more economies or between such economies and the world 
trading system becomes a dependent relationship when some countries 
can expand through self-impulsion while others, being in a depend- 
ent position, can only expand as a reflection of the expansion of 
the dominant countries, which may have positive or negative- 
effects on their immediate development. In either case, the 
basic situation of dependence cause these countries to be backward 
and exp-oited. Dominant countries are endowed with technological, 
commercial, capital, and socio-political predominance over depen- 
dent countries - the form of the predominance varying according 
to the particular historical moment - and can therefore exploit 
them and extract part of the locally produced surplus. Dependence, 
when, is based upon an international division of labour which 
allows industrial development to take place in some countries 
while restricting it in others, whose growth is conditioned by and 
subjected to the power centres of the world." (Dos Santos, T. 
"The Crisis of Development Theory and the Problem of Dependence 
in Latin America" in Bernstein, H. (ed.) Underdevelopment and 
Development: The Third World Today Penguin Books (London,"1973), 
p.76).
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In Chapter Three it was argued that the uneven modernization 
of Nigerian society made the population of the Eastern Region 
highly vulnerable to devastation by mass starvation. Production 
systems had been transformed only to the extent required by the 
capitalist nexus. As a consequence increases in productivity 
and incomes were small. Whatever improvements in productivity 
did occur were absorbed by the rapid growth of population, which 
had itself been triggered off by the infiltration of modern 
medical and social welfare concepts into Nigerian society. 
The net result of these developments was a general inability to 
generate either the food surplusses or the purchasing power which 
would have enabled the populace to endure an interruption of 
current production without severe privation. In fact, without
the development of palliative responses such as migration and
a
the cultivation of cassave, to the problems of overpopulation and
economic impoverishment it is likely that many inhabitants of the 
Eastern Region would have sunk into starvation even without the 
occurrence of a disaster which disrupted production. (Though to 
the extent that they were reversible, these palliative responses 
heightened the region ! s long term vulnerability to famine: they 
shifted part of the burden of support off the regional food 
economy and enabled population growth to continue unchecked.) 
The vulnerability to mass starvation engendered by the 
uneven progress of modernization in the Eastern Region of Nigeria 
has been widely reproduced elsewhere in the Third World. There, 
societies have been characterized by the retention of traditional 
production systems, low productivity, low incomes, high rates of 
population growth, and, inevitably in view of the other character- 
istics noted, grinding poverty. The peoples of these largely 
agrarian societies have enjoyed only a limited capacity to produce
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food in excess of the immediate requirements of subsistence; 
nor have they been able to generate cash incomes of sufficient 
size to acquire large amounts of foodstuffs from the market. 
Although the actual degree of vulnerability to mass starvation- 
has varied widely throughout the Third World - being most pro- 
nounced in those areas or societies such as the Eastern Region 
which have been under the greatest pressure from population 
growth - there is no question that it is directly related to 
the nature of the Third World f s connection to Western capitalism*
Malthus believed that famine resulted from the natural, 
absolute scarcity of subsistence resources: a scarcity caused 
by the inherent and ineradicable superiority of man f s reproductive 
over his productive capacities. This certainly appears to 
have been true during most of mankind's history. Prior to the 
industrial and commercial revolutions which, beginning in the 
18th century, transformed life in the West, virtually no society 
v;as immune to the ravages of mass starvation. In nearly all, 
the balance between the requirements for and production of sub- 
sitence goods was so tenuous, and societies 1 ability to redis- 
tribute food stocks from surplus to deficit areas so limited, 
that any adverse phenomenon could propel a population, regardless 
of its wealth in non-subsistence resources, across the threshold 
of starvation. As Bhatia put it:
There was no direct relation between the economic con- 
ditions of a people and their vulnerability to famine. 
Thus some of the most terrible famines known in world 
history occurred in ancient India, Egypt, China, Greece, 
and Rome at a time when these were economically the most
k. See McCleary, G.F. The Malthusian Population Theory Faber and 
Faber,Ltd. (London, 1953)V Chapter 3-
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advanced countries in the world.
The advent and fruition of capitalism and industrial 
production systems broke the 'cycle of deprivation 1 in the 
\Vest. Agricultural productivity was transfigured by the addition 
of capital goods to the factor inputs of land and labour v;ith
n
which Malthus was familiar.' At the same time., improvements 
in techniques of communication and transportation enhanced 
societies' capacity to transport both food and people from surplus 
to deficit areas. As a result Western societies were able, 
contrary to Malthus 1 beliefs, to sustain a rapid and massive 
expansion of population and still consistently produce significant 
quantities of subsistence goods in excess of current consumption 
requirements (even though those consumption requirements were 
greatly elevated as a result of widespread improvements in the 
nutritional status of Western populations). As Bhatia, yet 
again, put it:
...the whole tendency of the modern civilization was to
5. Bhatia, B.M. Famines_in India: A Study of some Aspects of the 
Economic History of India'~(lori50.-l943T Asia Publishing House 
(London, 196*3) > PP  1-2.
6. It can be inferred from Malthus 1 Essay on the Principle of 
Population that he believed there was a cycle of Tiuman deprivation 
"in wYich per capita consumption of subsistence goods was, because 
of the inherent disparity between birth rates and the rate of 
growth of output in labour-intensive agrarian societies, inex- 
orably reduced to a level barely capable of sustaining human 
life. At this point men were highly vulnerable to the transform- 
ation of any natural or civil disaster which disrupted normal 
supply and demand relations in the food economy into the "powerful 
and obvious check11 of famine - a famine which by reducing populat- 
ion enabled per capita consumption of foodstuffs to rise until 
the perennial disparity between birth rates and the growth of 
output resulted, once again, in over population and the reduction 
of consumption rates to the point at which men were, yet again, 
highly vulnerable to famine. (See McCleary, op.cit.) .
7. See McCleary, op.cit., Ch.9 and 10.
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rear up intervening influences which rendered the relation 
of actual pressure to natural scarcity less certain, and 
less direct until the two terms, which were once convertible,
o
came to have very little connection with each other.
The material benefits of modernity were, however, largely 
confined to the populations of Western Europe and North America. 
The development in the West of the techniques and technology 
which made possible the consistent production of food surplusses, 
and the elevation of incomes to a level where consumers could 
command food supplies from surplus areas in order to make up 
deficiencies in local production, made little difference in 
the lives of most of the inhabitants of Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America. However, it is clear that,although the objective 
conditions of their lives may not have altered significantly as 
a result of the modernization of Western societj.es,the develop- 
ment of V/estern capitalism did fundamentally alter the determin- 
ants of those objective conditions.
The natural and absolute scarcity of subsistence resources 
in which Malthus believed was replaced by an induced and relative 
scarcity. This was largely determined by the nature of the 
Third World ! s nexus with Western capitalistic societies. This 
connection was largely exploitative. Third World societies 
experienced only a selective and partial modernization. Pro- 
ductive systems were transformed only to the extent required to 
ensure the provision of the raw materials or other resources 
Western rnetropoli sought from the Third World. As these resources 
rarely included the staple foodstuffs of the producing country 
- the Western world having relatively rapidly reached a point 
at which its major agricultural problems involved the disposition
8. Bhatia, pp.cit., p.10.
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of surplus domestic production of staples - there was little 
incentive to foster the adaptation and transfer of high pro- 
ductivity Western techniques of food production to the subsistence 
sector. Whatever modernization of the agrarian sector - and it 
must be remembered that these are societies in which a large 
majority of the population lives in rural areas and is engaged 
almost wholly in agricultural activities - occurred, v?as largely 
limited to the cash cropping export sector. And even in this 
sector, the major innovations introduced were more directly 
aimed at securing a wider participation in cash cropping than at 
improving the per capita level of productivity.
Food producing systems in most Third World societies 
remained mired in tradition. Neither external nor local markers 
for foodstuffs offered the degree of incentive required to 
foster the extensive adoption of new techniques. Indeed, the 
major force behind whatever improvements did occur in most Third 
World food economies was the pressure of rapid population growth. 
For if the imperatives of capitalism had constrained the diffusion 
of modern food production techniques in Third World societies, 
their connection with the West had resulted in the widespread 
introduction of Western medical techniques and social welfare 
concepts; with the consequence that infant mortality rates fell 
sharply at the same time that longevity rose dramatically. The 
net result - in the absence of concomitant economic developments 
which would have reduced the birth rate - was a rapid and massive 
expansion of population in most Third World states.
The vulnerability fostered by this uneven process of 
modernization has, over and over again, resulted in the trans- 
formation of disasters which disrupt current production into 
famines. The experience of famine in Nigeria was unusual c«ly
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in the overtly political nature of the events which triggered 
off this transformation process. Other areas of the Third 
World displaying the same characteristics of uneven modernization 
or underdevelopment have suffered more frequently and with at 
least equal, if not greater,,severity from the ravages of mass 
starvation.
Consider, for example,the case of India. Based on his 
study of famines in India in the period from I860-19/f3, Bhatia 
concluded that the imposition of capitalistic imperialism on 
Indian society heightened its vulnerability to famine. The 
creation of the social, political, and economic structures of 
underdevelopment sapped the Indians 1 capacity to resist the 
transformation of calamity into famine. As Bhatia put it:
Under the new conditions famine ceased to be a natural 
calamity and was transformed into a social problem of 
poverty and dearth...the human and institutional factors 
were becoming more important than the natural calamity
Qin causing distress and starvation.
Similarly, Mitchell saw India's vulnerability to famine as a 
product of her nexus with the West, and the resulting under- 
development of Indian society:
In Western countries the growth of industries encouraged 
a rapid increase in population and provided for its support. 
In India, industrial development has been artificially 
restricted, and an increasing proportion of the people has 
been forced to depend on a primitive system of agricultural 
production, which, in turn, is less and less able to meet 
the demands placed upon it...
9* -~'^* Although - and for this observation the author is indebted 
-co Arnold Hughes - the colonization of India also engendered the 
growth of modern bureaucratic and transportation systems which 
facilitated the relief of famines when they did occur.
10. Cited in Brown, M. India Need Not Starve Longmans (London, 
, P-vii.
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Strangely enough, probably the most clear cut demonstration 
of the fact that in the modern epoch it has been the nexus with 
capitalism which has heightened non-Western societies vulner- 
ability to famine involved an underdeveloped Western society - 
Ireland. The great potato famine which ravaged Ireland between 
1345 and I8*f9 appears to contradict the assertion that, in the 
period following the capitalist and industrial revolutions in 
the West, the triggers of famine have been confined to war and 
revolution. However, even in the case of the Irish potato 
famine, the nexus with capitalistic society - in this case, 
particularly with the United Kingdom - underlay the transformation 
of a natural disaster into a nutritional catastrophe.
The ostensible cause of the famine was the destruction 
of successive potato crops by a hitherto unknown form of blight. 
Closer analysis shows, however, that it was the poverty of the 
Irish people which converted the failure of the potato crops 
into a famine. rt lt would be impossible to adequately describe", 
stated the Devon Commission in its report made in 18^3> "the 
privation which they habitually and silently endure...in many 
districts their only food is the potato, their only beverage 
-.vater.. .their cabins are seldom a protection against the weather
...a bed or a blanket is a rare luxury...and nearly in all their
12 homes a pig and a manure heap constitute their only property."
In fact the pre-emptive position of the potato in Irish diets 
was a direct reflection of the impoverished state of the Irish 
masses:
11. For a fascinating and detailed account of the great Irish. 
-QO tat o famine see Woodham-Smith, C. The Great Hunger: Ireland 
-^ Hamish Hamilton (London, 1962).
12. Cited in Woodham-Smith, op.cit. , p. 2k.
...the existence of the Irish people 
wrote Woodham-Smith in his study of the Irish famine,
depended on the potato entirely and exclusively. The 
potato, provided it did not fail, enabled great quantities 
of food to be produced at a trifling cost from a small 
plot of ground... The potato was moreover the most univer- 
sally useful of foods...it \vas simple to cook; it produced 
fine children; as a diet, it did not pall...neither meal 
nor anything else could replace it. There could be no 
question of resorting to an equally cheap food, no such
food existed. ^
^
The potato had not always so dominated life in Ireland. Its 
supremacy dated from the late 18th century. The extraction of 
agricultural surplusses by (mostly British) absentee landowners 
created such impoverishment among the agrarian labouring classes 
that they were forced to take up the potato as the staple of 
their diet. Their production of other agricultural commodities
- Ireland was a major producer of cereal crops - was almost 
v.'holly devoted to the payment of land rents, failing which there 
was no opportunity even to undertake the production of potatoes. ^ 
At the same time the potato proved itself such an excellent staple 
upon which to base life - being easily grown and highly nutritious
- that the population of Ireland underwent a rapid expansion
15 throughout this period. ^ Thus, when the first major failure of
< 
13. Woodham-Smith, op. cit. , pp. 35-36.
. Woodham-Smith, op. cit. , Ch.3- The impoverishing impact of 
extortionate ground-rents was, of course, not a factor of any 
importance in creating the Eastern Region's dependence on yams 
and cassave. There, it was a combination of soils and climate 
which pushed the starchy tubers rather than any other foods into 
the leading dietary role.
15. Ibid.
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the potato crop occurred in 1845, it fell upon a population which 
had expanded beyond the supportive capacity of any other crop 
grovm in Ireland, and which was, in any event, too impoverished 
to afford any food other than the potatoes, which most families 
produced for their own consumption.
The Irish potato famine was not, however - and in this 
respect its similarity to the nutritional catastrophe in Nigeria 
and elsewhere is striking - engendered solely by the interaction 
of the crop failures of 1845, 1846, and 1848 with the vulner- 
abilities created by the underdevelopment of Irish society. 
The pincers of starvation which gripped Ireland's people in this 
period had another tong: the political considerations which 
inhibited efforts made to alleviate the suffering of the Irish 
masses. The political ideology of laissez-faire dominated the 
reaction of Ireland's masters. As Woodham-Smith noted:
...the behaviour of the British authorities only becomes 
explicable when their fanatical belief in private enter- 
prise and their suspicion of any action which might be
T /*
considered Government intervention are borne in mind. 
Although the British government was unable to wholly avoid 
involvement in relieving the famine, its unshakeable commitment
to what Charles Trevelyan, permanent head of the Treasury during
17 the period, called the 'operation of natural causes 1 ' greatly
intensified the impact of the crop failures on the Irish people. 
As Woodham-Smith remarked:
...It has been frequently declared that the parsimony of 
the British government during the famine was the main cause 
of the sufferings of the people...Adherence to laissez- 
faire was carried to such lengths that in the midst of one
16. Woodham-Smith, op.cit. t p.54-
17. V.'oodham-Smith, op.cit., p.274.
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of the major famines of history, the government was per- 
petually nervous of being too good to Ireland and of
corrupting the Irish people by kindness, and so stifling
i $ the virtues of self-reliance and industry.
Although such a rigid interpretation of the doctrine of 
laissez-faire has long since passed into a well-deserved oblivion, 
disaster-stricken Third World societies still suffer from the 
inhibition of ameliorative efforts. In Nigeria, for example, 
this phenomenon resulted in both the intensification and pro- 
longation of the nutritional disaster. The belligerents 1 per- 
ception of the military disadvantages accruing to unhindered 
relief operations; the Federal authorities' resentment of inter- 
national intervention in what they saw as a domestic affray; the 
rebel leaders 1 manipulation of international concern for starving 
Biafrans; all of- these constrained the ability of the relief 
organizations to carry out their humanitarian mission.
Nigeria presented an extreme instance of the restriction 
of relief efforts for political purposes; however, other examples 
of the politically inspired limitation of the alleviation of 
mass starvation in the Third World are readily found. Consider,
for example, the case of the drought-stricken societies of West
1Q Africa ! s Sahelian region and the central provinces of Ethiopia.
The famine which ravaged these areas in the early 1970s clearly 
demonstrated not only that poverty is the chief mechanism involved
18. Woodham-Sniith, op.cit. , p.410.
19. The most detailed study of the Sahelian drought is contained 
in Sheets, H. and Morris, R. Disaster in the Desert: Failures of 
International_Relj.ef in West Africa's Drought Carnegie Endowment 
ToFTnternational Peace (Washington, DC, 1974). On Ethiopia's 
famine see "The Political Economy of Famine: A Case Study of 
Ethiopia" (Paper delivered by Abraham Kidane at the 1974 Annual 
Meeting of the African Studies Association, Chicago, 31 October 
1974). Also see "An International Perspective on the African 
Famines" (Paper delivered by Laurie S. Wiseberg at the 1974 ASA-USA
meeting).
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in the transformation of disaster into mass starvation, but that 
the intensity and duration of episodes of extreme nutritional 
privation are largely dependent on the political impulses which 
condition relief efforts. In the Sudano-Sahelian famines 
(especially in Ethiopia) a major determinant of the suffering 
of the masses was the unwillingness of the local elites to call 
for and assist relief efforts. They were evidently afraid that 
to do so would both-'tarnish their image and undermine their local 
power base. In fact, they even displayed a readiness to utilize 
continued disaster conditions to secure personal financial or 
political gains.
V
Just as in the case of Nigeria, however, responsibility 
for the political restriction of relief connot be wholly laid 
upon the local elites. Of equal importance in determining the 
intensity and duration of the famines in both Nigeria and the 
Sudano-Sahelian regions was the inadequate response to these 
disasters on the part of the international community. In 
Nigeria the mode of international involvement, with the major 
donor states unwilling to intervene in the dispute except through 
intermediaries, impeded relief efforts. Although the inter- 
national community did not stint in its provision of material 
resources for relief operations, the refusal of its leading 
members to act to break the political impasse over relief corri- 
dors condemned thousands in the war zone to starvation. In the 
case of the Sudano-Sahelian famines,, the inadequacy of inter- 
national response was perhaps more typical in its manifestation 
in that it combined both material and political shortcomings. 
In late 1973, for example, the Secretary-General of the United
20. See Wiseberg, op.cit.
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Nations urgently appealed 'for US# 30 million in cash for Sahelian
21 
relief. Four months later only US# 4.6 million had been raised.
In Ethiopia the United States Government apparently connived at 
the f cover-up 1 of the famine in the central provinces. As 
Senator Kennedy put it in a US Senate hearing: "We [the US Gov- 
ernment] did not want to expose it. We were not prepared to 
blow the whistle on it because of our relations with them [the 
Ethiopian government]. As a result a lot of people starved to 
death."22
The extent to which it will ever be possible to wholly 
eliminate political influences on relief operations is uncertain. 
In the first place disaster relief itself has an inherent political 
dimension. Davis stressed this in his evaluation of relief 
operations in a context of civil upheaval: "As the events in 
Nigeria/Biafra showed, international relief processes in viable 
civil wars involve unavoidably political tasks being undertaken 
in an undeniably political context." ** Even in those less 
politically frought situations where disaster originates in 
flood or drought, there is an inescapable political dimension to 
relief. It involves the introduction of relatively large 
quantities of material resources into impoverished societies: 
resources which can be utilized either in support of or to under- 
mine the prevailing social structure. Secondly, relief aid 
differs from other types of aid only in its composition and the 
general urgency surrounding its delivery. So far as its other
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Davis, M. "The Politics of International Relief Processes 
in Large Civil Wars: An Editorial Comment" Journal of Developing 
Areas 6 (July 1972), p.'"
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attributes are concerned the same proscriptions apply to emergency 
aid as to all other forms of bilateral or even multi-lateral 
assistance. So long as the provenance and destination of 
resources for use in relief is tied to national governments - 
and no major disaster can be dealt with solely from the unofficial 
resources available to voluntary agencies - both disaster aid 
and its administration will be conditioned by the political con- 
siderations of both donors and recipients. Even the multi- 
lateralization of relief operations - in the sense that resources 
v;ould both flow from and be administered by a body such as the 
UN - would be unlikely to wholly remove the political constraints 
on disaster aid - witness the difficulties experienced by the 
UN in its relief operation in East Pakistan just prior to the 
1971 Indo-Pakistani war. In any event the benefits of enhanced 
political acceptability which might be achieved by widening the 
sponsorship of relief actions would probably be tempered by a 
diminished administrative flexibility and responsiveness.
Flaws in the administration of disaster aid already make 
a large contribution to the limited beneficience of relief 
operations. Relief agencies generally waste large amounts of 
 cime and resources. This stems partly from their rather startling 
ability to ignore the lessons of previous disasters; partly from 
their acutely inadequate knowledge of local conditions and 
customs in 'normal 1 times; and, closely related to the preceding 
point, partly from their failure to establish sensible criteria 
for the recruitment of staff. The most important flav.: s - at
!
least in the long term - in the organization of relief operations 
sterns from the fact that they are both organized and evalu^ed 
within a framework of \Vestern. precepts of efficiency and effect- 
iveness. This inevitably involves the location of effective
180
control in expatriate relief workers 1 hands. As a result 
current operations are often ineffective, and there is little 
improvement of local capabilities for dealing with future dis- 
asters - the relief organizations, in effect, perpetuate them- 
selves.
The only point remaining to "be made in this thesis concerns 
the relevance of the study of acute hunger to the general analysis 
of the processes of social change in the Third World. Any 
study of hunger could be said to approach the central meaning 
of human existence. In the final analysis, most of the history 
of the majority of mankind has revolved around the struggle to 
secure at least the minimum quantity of material resources 
required for subsistence. Even today, when most Europeans and 
North Americans enjoy an abundance of material possessions which 
enables them to live far above subsistence levels, the daily 
quest for sufficient food to sustain life remains at the centre 
of existence for the majority of the world ! s population. In 
fact, the possibility, or probability, that over the next few 
years millions of the peoples of Latin America, Asia, and Africa 
may fail in that daily quest is a spectre which haunts all of 
mankind today.
In the late 1960 f s it appeared that the development of 
high-yield strains of staple food plants would revolutionize 
productivity in the most famine-prone areas of the underdeveloped 
world. However, it is now recognized that the ' green revolution 1 
has not been wholly successful. ^ Countries such as India, 
which only a few years ago were bravely forecasting the rapid
2L\. See Griffin, D. The Political Economy of. Agrarian Change
Harvard University PressTCambridge," Mass., I97L\T for
a detailed assessment of the successes and failures of the Green
Hevolution.
181
achievement of self-sufficiency in the production of foodstuffs, 
now find themselves at the head of the queue of nations attempting 
to stave off a nutritional catastrophe by procuring a share of 
the West's dwindling reserves of foodgrains. Belatedly, it 
has become apparent that there is no miracle cure for the in- 
capacities of the food economies of Third World societies.
It was in recognition of the centrality of the problem 
of hunger in the Third World that the world's nations felt 
compelled to meet and discuss both long and short-term measures 
for the eradication of starvation in those societies in November 
1970. At this World Food Conference it was recognized that 
both famines and what Laffin has called 'normal 1 hunger are 
manifestations of the underdevelopment of Third World societies. 
It v:as asserted that the tenuousness of the balance between the 
production of subsistence goods and the subsistence requirements 
of Third World populations can be remedied only by attacking 
the fundamental conditions of underdevelopment which generate 
the imbalance between productive and reproductive capacities in 
the first place. It was argued that unless the nexus between 
Western capitalism and the Third World, which creates under- 
development, is radically altered there will be no end to the
"2 *r
threat of famine for most of the world's population. '^ Thus 
the improvement of food supplies and eradication of acute hunger 
were established as key criteria for the judgement of the progress 
of social change in under-developed countries. The world 
community, finally and publicly, acknowledged its belief "chat in
a world of over-populated and underdeveloped societies hunger was,
26 once again, becoming the 'mainspring' of politics.
25. See the report on the World Food Conference in World : r ----::.<^.:.e
U 6,:.n.!5» 1975, pp. 15-24. Also the special Report in Time 
11 November 1974.
26. Cited in Brown, loc.cit.
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